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Abstract 
 
Rumour and information are one of the most fundamental ways in which people engage 
with one another. Rumours can change the way that individuals and groups see each other 
and the actions that they take. Sociologists and anthropologists have long used rumour as a 
way to explore the experiences of their subjects. Historians of early America have, in recent 
years, begun to make use of rumour as a way of examining the, often hidden, world of 
interactions between American Indians and white Europeans. This thesis will expand upon 
this work by exploring the changing role of rumour within an intercultural relationship over 
several decades. This thesis will focus on rumour in the relationship between the Cherokee 
Nation and the colonists of the British Empire. It will explore the ways that rumour 
influenced these interactions and the impact of the rapidly changing backcountry 
environment of the latter eighteenth century, both on rumour and on the wider Cherokee-
British relationship. This thesis will argue that rumour shifted in the course of the 
eighteenth century from being a diplomatic tool which could be used- either to create 
further panic and confusion or to calm and smooth over problems- to an uncontrollable 
force which would deepen and exacerbate the divisions between Cherokees and the 
British. Rumour played an important role in politics and society in the eighteenth century 
backcountry and its changing function offers a way to better understand the shifting 
currents of life in early America. 
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 ‘A giant with his head in the Foothills and his feet far down in the lowlands’ 
Rumour, an Introduction 
 
In the winter of 1757 the Overhill Cherokee town of Hiwassee was generally peaceful if not 
quiet. The town was sat upon a wide floodplain on the northern bank of the Hiwassee River 
and in the shadow of the Chilhowee Mountains. Hiwassee was certainly not isolated; it lay 
on the Warriors Path, a major artery between the Overhill towns and the wider world of 
American Indian peoples in eastern North America. The town had been recently reoccupied 
after being abandoned during the devastating small pox epidemic of 1738-39.1 The weather 
in the winter was cool with the temperature around freezing for much of December and 
January. This was also the hunting season when many of the townsmen were away bringing 
in the deerskins which were important to the economic life of both the Cherokees and the 
neighbouring British colonies.2 
 
One winter morning a party of white colonists from the British settlement of Ninety Six (so 
called because when it was founded it was situated ninety six miles from the Cherokee 
towns) arrived at the house of Cornelius Doherty, a deerskin trader resident at Hiwassee. 
The posse was led by Robert Goudy, magistrate of Ninety Six and a long time participant in 
the deerskin trade himself. Goudy and his men pushed their way into Doherty’s house, 
                                                          
1
 Vicki Rozema, Footsteps of the Cherokees: A Guide to the Eastern Homelands of the Cherokee 
Nation, (Winston-Salem, NC, 2007), p.110. On the communication links between the Cherokees and 
the wider North American world see Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ‘The Land and Water Communication 
Systems of the Southeastern Indians’, in Peter H. Wood and Gregory A. Waselkov and M. Thomas 
Hatley (eds.), Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, (Lincoln, NE, 1989), pp.27-42. 
2
On the deerskin trade see, Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: Creek Indian Trade 
with Anglo America, 1685-1815, (Lincoln, NE, 1993), pp.40-58, W. Neil Franklin, ‘Virginia and the 
Cherokee Indian Trade, 1673-1752’, East Tennessee Historical Publications, No. 4, (January 1933), 
pp.3-21. On the development of the trade through the early eighteenth century see John Philip Reid, 
A Better Kind of Hatchet, Law, Trade and Diplomacy in the Cherokee Nation in Early Years of 
European Contact, (Philadelphia, PA, 1976), James H. Merrel, ‘”Our Bond of Peace”, Patterns of 
Intercultural Exchange in the Carolina Piedmont’ in Wood, Peter H., Gregory A. Waselkov and M. 
Thomas Hatley, (eds.), Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, (Lincoln, NE, 1989), 
pp.196-223. 
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seizing goods and slaves ostensibly in payment of the debt that Doherty owed to Goudy.3 A 
number of Cherokees were present at Doherty’s when this occurred. On seeing Goudy’s 
party removing slaves and goods from the trader’s house, several of these Indians were 
‘frighted’, ran into Hiwassee and into the nearby town of Natalee. They began excitedly 
warning anyone they met ‘that the white People were coming to carry them away’. Shortly 
after this numbers of men, women and children were seen streaming across the Hiwassee 
River and into the forest beyond to hide.4 
 
But this was not the end of the havoc sparked by Goudy’s invasion. Shortly after the 
incident at Doherty’s, a trader named in the records as Mr Benn was transporting his goods 
through the woods close to Hiwassee. On the road Benn was confronted by a group of 
young Cherokee men who demanded his goods, declaring ‘The white People have begun to 
be Rogues, it is high Time for us to be so now’. Benn refused to give up his goods and in the 
ensuing struggle shot one of the Cherokees fatally. Fearing retaliation from the dead man’s 
clan, Benn fled the Cherokee country. It was common for such outbreaks of violence to 
fester and spiral into ongoing vendettas in the backcountry but on this occasion several 
senior Cherokee headmen spoke out in support of Benn.5 The headmen declared that Benn 
should not be harmed for the killing of the Cherokee as he had acted in self defence.  
                                                          
3
Goudy had kept a store at the Cherokee town of Tellico, Superintendent of Indian Affair John Stuart 
claimed in July 1757 that the town lacked a reliable source of goods since Goudy had closed his 
store. Stuart also noted that Goudy had been one of two primary suppliers of goods on credit to the 
deerskin traders and that many of those traders had been unable to repay those debts due to a bad 
years hunting for Cherokee hunters, John Stuart to William Henry Lyttelton, July 1757, William Henry 
Lyttelton Papers (Letterbooks), William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor Michigan, Vol.3. 
4
Paul Demere to Governor Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, 30
th
 December 1757, in William McDowell Jr. 
(ed.), Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1754-1765, (Columbia SC, 1970),(hereafter referred to as 
DRIA 1754-65) pp.426-30. 
5
Within Cherokee society the killing of one’s clan members, whatever the circumstances, placed a 
duty of vengeance against the perpetrator or their people. For descriptions of Indian laws of blood 
vengeance see John Philip Reid, A Law of Blood The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation, (New 
York, NY, 1970). For discussion of the development of changing Cherokee responses to murder in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century see Michelle Daniel, ‘From Blood Feud to Jury System; The 
Metamorphosis of Cherokee Law from 1750 to 1840’, American Indian Quarterly, Vol.11, No.2, 
9 
 
 
Regional Map of the Southeastern British Colonies and their 
Neighbours  
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Spring, 1987), pp.97-125, Rennard Strickland, Fire and the Spirits: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court 
(Norman, OK, 1975). 
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Furthermore, these same Cherokee leaders blamed the rumour-mongering of whites for 
the trouble. Kanagtucko, the headman of Chota, one of the most senior of the Overhill 
Cherokee towns, known to the British as Old Hop, insisted, ‘some white Man was the 
Occasion of this Usage, and has told the Indians some Story, for otherwise they would 
never have done it’. Lame Arm, a headman of the town of Tellico concurred, claiming that ‘I 
am most certain that some white Man is the Occasion of this’. While some British observers 
suspected Doherty of having stirred up the trouble in retaliation for the seizure of his 
goods, Old Hop claimed to have investigated the matter and found him blameless.6 Slowly 
the tension faded to become simply another incident in the fractious relationship between 
the British and the Cherokees. 
 
The fracas at Hiwassee touches upon a number of issues connected to the political and 
social life of the late colonial period. It suggests the issues of law, authority and economics 
that were continually in flux in this contested and fractious environment.7 But most 
importantly for this study, the events at Hiwassee make clear the importance of rumour 
and the flow of information in the backcountry in shaping the course of events. Rumours 
and the issues that underlay them were an important aspect of how the Cherokees 
interacted with one another and with their neighbours, European and Indian. While the 
experience of the Cherokees was by no means unique in the eighteenth century, the 
Cherokee’s position at an intersection where a large number of Indian and European 
peoples met makes them a particularly good example of the role of rumour in the later 
colonial era. In discussing the relationship between the British and the Cherokee, this study 
will focus in particular on the relationship between the Cherokees and the colony of South 
                                                          
6
Demere to Lyttelton,, 30
th
 December 1757, DRIA, 1754-65, pp.426-30. 
7
The clash between the Cherokee and British laws on murder in particular were a constant source of 
friction, see Daniel ‘Blood Feud’. This became a particular issue in the lead up to the Cherokee War, 
see John Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63, (Basingstoke, 2001), 
pp.5-6, 42-43. 
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Carolina. While other colonies, most obviously Virginia, engaged with the Cherokees over 
the course of the colonial era, South Carolina sustained the longest, closest relationship 
with the Cherokees. South Carolina was also central to the single greatest disruption of the 
Cherokee-British relationship, the Cherokee War of 1759-61. This thesis will investigate 
how rumour worked over an extended period of time. The role of rumour did not remain 
static through the changes that rocked the North American backcountry in the late 
eighteenth century. This thesis will explore the relationship between the Cherokees and 
the British through the lens of these rumours. It will chart the way that rumour shifted 
from being an aspect of the Cherokee-British relationship which could be used either to 
divide or maintain peace between the two powers and became a decisive mechanism in 
increasing hostility and mistrust.  
 
The ways that people pass information to one another and process the information they 
receive stands as one of the most fundamental factors in how we interact and how 
societies operate. Control of information has been critical to any exercise in power 
practically as far back as human history has gone. In Virgil’s Aenead we see an allegory of 
‘Fama’ the god of rumour and fame. Fama is a monstrous being, ‘a winged angel of ruin’ 
covered in eyes and ears to see and hear every tale and event and countless mouths to 
whisper them about.8 Once society grows beyond a size where all members can be 
intimately acquainted with one another’s decisions and motives the things that we tell one 
another as rumour or gossip have profound effects. The ability to shape how a situation is 
perceived is in many senses to control that situation. Rumour holds an important place 
within any discussion of how people communicate with one another. 
 
                                                          
8
Hans Joachim Neubauer, The Rumour: A Cultural History, (Berlin, 1999), p.39. 
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In this introduction I will explore the context in which this thesis has emerged. Firstly I will 
consider what we mean by rumour and different ways that rumour and information might 
be evaluated both by actors at the time and by those of us seeking to understand the 
history of these events. I will then examine the different ways that rumour has been 
examined by sociologists and historians. Lastly I will discuss the society of the Cherokees 
and the British and the ways that rumour worked and acted upon those societies. 
 
Perhaps the most critical consideration to be made at this point in this discussion is what is 
meant by rumour in this historical context. A dictionary definition of rumour provides some 
illumination. Rumour can be ‘general talk or hearsay, not based on definite knowledge’ or 
‘an unverified or unconfirmed report circulating in a community’.9 A key element in 
defining rumour is the question of verifiability; if something is known with certainty then it 
is not a rumour. But the question is then, how could individuals in the eighteenth century 
backcountry verify the information that they received? The fact was that travel and 
communication throughout the backcountry was a slow process. Letters from the most 
regular correspondents to colonial officials, the deerskin traders, often took a month or 
more to reach the coast.10 Letters from the commanders of backcountry forts, were quicker 
often reaching the colonies in around a week.11 Rarely would a colonial governor receive 
word of what was going on in Cherokee country in less than a week 
 
More importantly information was almost always passed through several interlocutors 
before it reached its final recipient. For example, a colonial governor, no matter how 
effective an intercultural diplomat, needed agents to provide him with information and to 
                                                          
9
 Oxford English Dictionary online, entry for rumour/rumor, n., 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/168836?rskey=ro3ixf&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (viewed 
20/2/2013).  
10
 See for example, South Carolina Council Journal,1754 pp.122, p.187, 1756, p.166. 
11
 See for example, South Carolina Council Journal, 1754, p.185, p198, 1756, p.292. 
13 
 
implement his policies. Governor Glen of South Carolina relied upon men like Daniel 
Pepper, the agent to the Creek Confederacy, and Ludovic Grant, a trader, for information 
and support on the ground in the backcountry.12 These agents were often themselves 
deeply involved in the politics and economy of the backcountry and Indian country. Thus it 
was difficult for a colonial governor to ascertain whether the information he was receiving 
was true or not.13 The balance of power between the British and the Cherokees, not to 
mention Britain’s imperial rivals, meant that neither British nor Cherokee leaders could rely 
upon having overwhelming force at their disposal. Hence knowledge of the course of 
events at a distance was an important asset. There was a constant battle by colonial 
leaders to establish reliable sources of information and gain an accurate picture of the 
events beyond their borders and this dilemma was shared by Indians and whites of all 
backgrounds. What was true for the colonial governor was true for the backcountry settler 
trying to decide whether to move his family closer to the colonial capital. Given the 
difficulty of communications and the myriad of competing agendas that information passed 
through to reach its final destination, the question remains what actors in the backcountry 
and the colonies could know with certainty.  
 
For many observers a key factor in deciding what was true and certain was the question of 
trust. The question of whether an informant could be trusted decided whether those 
listening would accept what he had to say as fact or would view it as suspicious and 
uncertain. To give one example: a British officer forwarding the deposition of an Indian 
warrior about the movements of the French among the Indians of the south-east felt 
moved to inform his superiors that ‘This Warrior is a true friend to us, and anything he says 
                                                          
12
For Daniel Pepper’s role see Pepper to Lyttelton, 30
th
 March 1757, DRIA, 1754-65, pp.351-356, for 
information passing by Ludovic Grant see Grant to Glen February 8
th
 in South Carolina Council 
Journal, pp.122-25. 
13
James Glen of South Carolina for example complained bitterly about the unreliability of the 
information sent into his capital by deerskin traders, Glen to Board of Trade, February 7
th
 1747, 
CO5/385, f.141-46. 
14 
 
is matter of fact , I sent him on purpose to Tellico for this Intelligence’.14 The officer had 
clearly built up a trust relationship with the Indian and was prepared to risk his own 
reputation with his superiors in order to add force to his informant’s information. But the 
precarious nature of these trust relationships could make those who passed rumour 
vulnerable to accusations of untrustworthiness. In a 1747 letter decrying the prevalence of 
alarming rumours in the backcountry, Glen directed his ire in particular at ‘low Indian 
Traders and Packhorsemen who frequently impose upon the Government by Lying Letters, 
and false reports’.15 Glen’s frustration at the traders was due to a combination of their 
prevalence in backcountry information networks and his personal mistrust of traders and 
their networks. He disliked relying on traders and their customers for information but 
lacked a viable alternative. 
 
It is also important for us to consider whether there is a clear and meaningful difference 
that can be drawn between the concept of rumour and that of information. Although it 
might be tempting to view information as a separate category from rumour, the difference 
is, I believe, rather more blurred. Indeed the dictionary definitions for information do not 
make mention of reliability or certainty. One definition defines information as ‘Knowledge 
communicated concerning some particular fact, subject, or event; that of which one is 
apprised or told; intelligence, news’ explicitly linking information to news and rumour.16 In 
fact the difference between rumour and information is an artificial one. As the sociologist 
                                                          
14
 Deposition of the Old Warrior of Tomatly, November 25
th
 1756, CO5/386, f.87.  
15
 Glen to Lords of Trade, February 7
th
 1747, CO5/385, f141-46, Traders were also mistrusted for 
attempting to evade their obligations. This was particularly acute after the foundation of Augusta, 
Georgia, situated as it was on the Savannah River, within easy reach of the South Carolina side. It 
allowed debtors from one colony to easily evade their creditors by trading across the river. The large 
partnerships of merchants and traders, headquartered at Augusta, Brown, Rea and Company and 
the McCartan Campbell Company, in particular were accused of setting up their storehouses in such 
a way that traders who owed debts to other trading houses could bring their deerskins in and 
resupply without entering the settlement, frustrating their creditors, see Braund, Deerskins & 
Duffels, p.47. 
16
 Oxford English Dictionary online, entry for information, n., 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/95568?redirectedFrom=information#eid (viewed 11/3/13). 
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Noel Kapferer has argued ‘the watershed between information and rumours is not 
objective’.17 This is not to say that no-one can know anything with a reasonable degree of 
certainty. In eighteenth century America it is clear that different actors had a certain 
amount of understanding about their respective situations. Colonial governors were 
generally well informed about goings on in their immediate areas of influence. For 
example, during the rumour panic of 1751, amidst some of the most intense and baffling 
rumours of the entire colonial period, Governor James Glen felt able to accept with 
certainty that a group of South Carolinians had stolen some 330 deerskins from the 
Cherokee town of Tugaloo.18 It is not that all situations were completely unknowable in the 
eighteenth century backcountry but that the line between rumour and more reliable forms 
of information was not clear. 
 
‘What was told them by the French’ Lies and Rumour 
 
Another important issue in studying rumour, and an issue which concerned contemporaries 
deeply, is the question of whether those forwarding untrue rumours were lying or were 
uninformed. The question of the difference between rumours and lies is a difficult one to 
quantify. Lies can be defined as untruths deliberately told with the knowledge that they are 
untrue. This is distinct from rumours which proved to be incorrect but which were spread 
in the belief that they were or could be true. Fundamentally the difference is one of intent: 
did those who spread rumours through the backcountry deliberately spread ideas which 
they knew to be untrue, or were they endeavouring to pass information in good faith?  
                                                          
17
Jean-Noel Kapferer, Rumors p.12. 
18
Talk of Glen to the Cherokee Indians, November.20
th
 , 1750, Affidavit of Herman Geiger, May 11
th
, 
1751, Affidavit of William Turner,May 25
th
, I751 (sworn before James Francis), Deposition of James 
Francis before Alexander Gordon JulyI 1
st
, I751, Affidavit of Charles Banks, June 1
st
 , I751 (sworn 
before Roger Gibson), Affidavit of James Beamer, July 12th, I751, all in William McDowell, Jr., (ed.), 
Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, May 21 1750-August 7 1754, (1958, Columbia, SC),hereafter 
DRIA 1750-54, pp. 22-23, 23-24, 24-26, 26-29, 113, 184-87. 
16 
 
 
The area in which we can most clearly deduce examples of lies being used with deliberate 
intent is in diplomatic meetings. In the highly competitive arena of colonial and 
intercultural diplomacy, where, as has been noted above, no one group held a monopoly 
on power, participants rarely missed an opportunity to denigrate or plant suspicions 
against their rivals. Among the colonial powers the French, British and Spanish continually 
intrigued amongst the Indian Nations. Representatives of the European imperial powers 
competed wherever their territories bordered those of a powerful Indian nation. In the 
south east, the fiercest competition was between the ancient European rivals, France and 
Britain. British and French officials, traders and even settlers were highly active in 
spreading rumours which might cast doubt upon the intentions of their rivals.19 In one 
conference with the Cherokees in 1756 the French pushed a number of lines designed to 
play upon fears common among Indian peoples. They accused the British of plotting to 
invade Cherokee land, warning that ‘already thirty Horses laden with Irons have been sent 
into your Nation: The Uses they are to be put you may easily guess is to the enslaving your 
Women and Children after having knocked all the Men on the Head’. They also claimed 
that the food ‘the Governor gave them [the Cherokees] when they went to Charles Town 
which was mixed with something that was sure to kill some of them before they returned 
to their Nation’.20 Generally there is no evidence that the British engaged in these sorts of 
large scale conspiracies during peace time if for no other reason than that they lacked the 
capability to ‘knock all the Men on the Head’. The British colonies could not raise anything 
like the number of men necessary to invade the Cherokee Nation.21 In fact the form of 
                                                          
19
For examples,the  see Speech of Governor Gabriel Johnstone to the colonial Assembly, and the 
speech by Governor James Glen to the Cherokees and the Catawbas, April 30
th
 1745, printed in SCG, 
, April 19
th
 1740 and May 6
th
 1745. 
20
‘Abstract of a Talk between the Governor of New Orleans and the Cherokee and Shawnese 
Indians’, 4
th
 December 1756, McDowell, DRIA, 1754-65, p.368. 
21
William Bull then Lt. Governor of the South Carolina claimed that South Carolina could raise 
between 3000 and 4000 troops, mostly militia many of whom would have to remain in the colony to 
17 
 
warfare suggested by the French (restricting violence to the men and capturing the women 
and children) sounds very close to that practised by a variety of Indian tribes. It seems 
unlikely that the French were basing their assertions on actual intelligence of British 
intentions. Despite this, what the suggestion would do is play upon Cherokee fears of a 
British attack, as will be seen below. 
 
In some senses lies worked along very similar principles to the wider genre of rumours. To 
be believed and to be ‘successful’ lies generally needed to draw on elements which were 
either true or at least widely accepted. In the case of the French claims at the 1756 
conference a widespread fear among Cherokees and other Indian groups that Europeans 
were planning to attack and enslave them and that going to the colonial capital would lead 
to death of the leading men of the nation. Indeed, the death of Indians from diseases 
caught while in the colonial capitals could often destroy the diplomatic corps of a town or 
even a nation. For example in 1749, Governor Glen wrote regretfully to the Lords of Trade 
about the high mortality rates of a Cherokee delegation sent to Charlestown. Glen and his 
representatives had had to struggle just to get the Cherokees to town as ‘the Captain of the 
Albama Fort and the Governor of Moville Spread Reports that they were sent for to Charles 
Town to be Sacrificed, they also hired a Gang of Three score Indians to fall upon some of 
the out Towns of the Cherokees’.22  
 
Having eventually brought the Cherokee leaders into the colony Glen made sure that ‘great 
care was also taken to hire Convenient houses for them a Mile or twos distance from Town 
where they might have the benefit of fresh air and wholesome water and plenty of food of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
defend against a possible slave uprising. William Bull ‘Representation to the Lords Commissioners of 
Trade and Plantations, 25 May 1738, James Glen Papers, 1738-1777, University of South Carolina 
Libraries, Digital Archive, http://library.sc.edu/digital/collections/glen.html, (July 20
th
, 2012). 
22
 Glen to Lords of Trade, December 28
th
 1749, CO5.372, p.168-72. 
18 
 
the best kind’.23 Despite this ‘many of them very soon fell Sick, and tho they were attended 
by the best Physicians here, yet they began to drop off’. Deaths continued on the road back 
to Cherokee country and, Glen lamented, ‘they all give out that what told them by the 
French was too true’.24 French intrigues among the Indians were often effective because 
they referred to events of which Indians had direct experience. Nonetheless in general it is 
often difficult to differentiate between direct lies and the simple passing of rumour. In fact 
an absolute understanding of the truth or falsity of each rumour that circulated in the 
backcountry would not necessarily prove particularly enlightening. Whether true or false, a 
rumour had an impact. 
 
The terms that contemporaries used to describe the information which flowed around the 
backcountry were varied and usually highly dependent on context. Contemporary 
conceptions of the ways that information passed through the backcountry emphasised the 
agency of those who told others of events. Any outbreak of tension of violence or increase 
in tension was generally blamed on some outside instigator, whether known or not. In 1757 
Daniel Pepper complained to Governor William Lyttelton of the ‘Sett of idle Vagrants who 
came into the Nation in the Station of Beaver Catchers, who frequently raise bad Blood 
between the white People and Indians by telling them Lies’.25 As noted above, colonial 
officials had a strong suspicion about any of those Indians that they considered ‘low’ or 
otherwise suspect and often accused them of stirring up rumours and encouraging the 
Indians against them. At the same time colonial officials habitually viewed the actions of 
Indian nations with reference to the competition between the imperial powers, blaming 
trouble in Indian country on the actions of the French or Spanish.26 Officials were 
                                                          
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Daniel Pepper to Gov. Lyttelton, 30
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constantly on the lookout to see how Britain’s imperial rivals might try to influence the 
Indians against them.  
 
In communications to or from government officials, ‘intelligences’ generally referred to 
information relating to the diplomatic situation in Indian country and the disposition of the 
various Indian Nations beyond the borders of the British colonies. ‘Intelligence’ was 
repeatedly acknowledged as a critical resource for colonial and imperial leaders and their 
attempts to acquire reliable sources of it often held a significant note of desperation.27 The 
question of what information represented accurate intelligences and which sources could 
be trusted was a constant concern for contemporaries and remains an important question 
when considering rumour.  
 
A further question remains: how do we as observers of the colonial backcountry 
differentiate rumour and understand its significance? Rumour is a difficult concept to judge 
in the sources of this period. By its very nature rumour often existed as oral culture only, 
passed by word of mouth in Cherokee villages, on the roads of Indian country or by visitors 
in tiny backcountry settlements and left unrecorded. Nevertheless elements and echoes of 
rumour have entered the official records. Colonial and imperial leaders regularly received 
letters from representatives in the backcountry, letters carried news from backcountry 
settlers to friends and family in the more settled areas of the colonies and colonial 
newspapers drew heavily on any scrap of news from whatever source they could find. 
 
In any culture with access to literacy, a proportion of rumours will make their way into the 
written record. Writing is, of course, first and foremost a way of storing information and 
rumour is certainly a form of information.  In a historical context these were the rumours 
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that survived for use in historical analysis of the period. For example the rumour of January 
1755 that several traders among the Cherokees had been killed arrived in Charlestown by 
runner. The rumour was quickly forwarded to other colonies and went on to be repeated in 
at least three colonial newspapers as far north as Boston, therefore this rumour has come 
down to us in a clear written form.28 Equally, rumours that served a particular political or 
diplomatic purpose were often repeated enthusiastically and recorded in letters and 
reports. During the American Revolution rumours about a supposed alliance between 
Indians and royalist officials against rebels in the backcountry were regularly repeated and 
became so accepted that when the Cherokees launched an attack on backcountry 
settlements many in the colonies immediately blamed the Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
John Stuart who was forced to go on the run.29 In this case the rumour was reproduced so 
often that many historians into the twentieth century took it as fact.30 On the other hand 
rumours which were considered to be less newsworthy by those in power, such as political 
leaders, military commanders or newspaper editors, would have most often existed only in 
oral form. In particular this includes the kind of everyday gossip between settlers and 
Indians that would constitute rumour in the second sense defined by the dictionary. The 
main surviving records of life in backcountry communities come from travel accounts by 
men who did not generally become closely embedded in those communities.31 The other 
major source of information on backcountry communities was letters written by traders or 
backcountry military leaders. These reports largely focused on military and political matters 
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and did not include information on local gossip.  This makes reconstructing the more day to 
day occurrences of gossip and rumour centred around local events and personalities in 
backcountry regions of the colony (occurrences that the sociological studies noted below 
suggest were a likely part of day to day life), extremely difficult. Often we only get indirect 
suggestions of rumour existing in this way. These suggestions are, ironically, most visible at 
times of crisis. For example in 1759, a Cherokee woman overheard a group of Cherokee 
warriors planning an attack on the backcountry. Deciding to warn the white women with 
whom she had visited and traded for years she purportedly walked some ninety six miles in 
twenty four hours warning the settlements as she went.32 While this incident does not 
provide direct evidence of gossiping it does suggest a close association based around 
friendly communication and trading.  
 
 In interactions between Indians and Europeans the situation is further complicated by the 
fact that the records of one society have survived in a form that is often privileged by 
historians. The words of Cherokees are usually recorded only in the documents of colonial 
officials and translated by at least one interpreter. Each of these interpreters could also be 
pursuing their own agendas affecting the message finally recorded in print. All this may 
prompt the question of what can be learned from rumour as a subject? This is especially 
the case when we consider that so much has been lost and so much else must pass through 
many layers of agenda and calculation before we can even begin to analyse it. 
Nevertheless, rumour can offer a way to think about the perceptions which historical actors 
held, as the historian Mark Bloch put it, rumours can tell us about a group’s ‘collective 
consciousness’.33 In the sense that these perceptions shaped the decisions that these 
actors made an understanding of rumour can go a long way to illuminate the reality of a 
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situation. A careful examination of the language used in letters, reports and newspapers 
can reveal the presence and in some cases the source of rumour.  
 
While it is difficult to trace the majority of rumours in the backcountry definitively back to 
their source it is often possible to trace the impacts and, to an extent, the progress of those 
rumours. The clearest trace that rumour left in the written record was often the impact 
that it had on the behaviour of those subjected to it. For example, in tracing rumours that 
swirled around the backcountry at the beginning of the Cherokee War there is often little 
direct evidence of rumours which reached isolated communities. But, considering the 
actions of the colonists in these communities in fleeing to more secure locations it is 
reasonable to assume that they were reacting to rumours of Indian attack which were 
typical of the region in the course of the war.34 For example in 1760, as the conflict which 
was known to the British as the Cherokee War escalated, within a month of attacks by 
Cherokee war parties commencing almost all the settlements west of the Brush River had 
been abandoned.35 This did not mean that every settlement in the backcountry had been 
struck by Cherokee raiders. There simply were not enough Cherokee warriors to do this. 
But the panicked stories of the violence that had occurred combined with rumours of 
potential attacks to follow were enough to drive large numbers of British settlers east in 
search of safety.36  The tracing of rumours requires a combination of deduction and 
imagination and the use of all available sources to reconstruct a complex and often sparsely 
recorded reality. 
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Sociologists and anthropologists have carried out a considerable amount of research on 
rumour.37 In particular this thesis will draw on the work of Tomatsu Shibutani. Shibutani 
viewed rumour as ‘improvised news’, a tool which individuals and groups used to 
understand their surroundings. Shibutani also notes the subjective nature not only of 
rumour but of news in general. This characterization of rumour seems to me to provide a 
particularly useful way of looking at rumour in the context of the eighteenth century 
backcountry.. The eighteenth century backcountry was an environment in which a myriad 
of groups tried to decipher and deal with one another. These peoples were separated by 
culture, distance and language.  As such it is not surprising that there were many events 
and actions that were alien and strange to those observing them. Rumours sprang up as 
people attempted to find explanations for events outside their understanding. In 1750 for 
example Governor Glen believed that he had reconciled the Cherokee with their 
neighbours the Creek Confederacy. After the conclusion of the peace, much to Glen’s 
surprise and alarm Creek warriors ‘burnt to the Ground two Towns of the Cherokees, killed 
most of the inhabitants on the spot and carried the rest into slavery’. Faced with these 
reports of violence Glen quickly latched on to rumours that the French had ‘endeavoured 
to defeat the Good Ends that I proposed by a Peace , and have rekindled the War’.38 The 
rumours of French intrigue allowed the British to make sense of events that they could not 
otherwise comprehend. In short, they used rumour to advance understanding.  
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The presence of rumour can also be very clearly seen in the reports passed through the 
backcountry and the colonies, which clearly served a purpose in supplying a form of news.39 
At the same time rumour can also be recognized in the newspapers of the day which relied 
heavily on these reports, rumour became both improvised and literal news.40 Rumours 
were reported undifferentiated from news, partly because there was really no way to 
separate news from rumours in any meaningful way, and partly because they served much 
the same purpose as any other form of news, allowing individuals to come to an 
understanding of what was going on.  
 
Another way that sociological research can help us conceptualize and understand rumour is 
through its understanding of networks. Networks exist as the pathways along which 
information and rumour pass. These networks were certainly in place in the eighteenth 
century backcountry.41 The evidence of those networks that existed in this era is 
fragmentary and incomplete. Nevertheless, these methods of studying networks are useful 
in giving an overview of networks in the backcountry and how they interwove with one 
another. The picture that emerges is one in which informal networks based around 
common ties to particular groups within European or Indian society create the central 
nodes through which information was collated. Mark Granovetter’s work on the 
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importance of ‘weak’ ties within networks in the passing of information is an interesting 
development for a consideration of the ways that information networks function. A 
common assumption might be that strong links make for the most effective networks, that 
people are more likely to pass information to those with whom they have strong regular 
ties. Granovetter argues that this is not wholly the case, that weak ties allow information to 
pass between more closed groups. Furthermore he argues that if an individual or group 
lacks weak ties to other groups it will consequently be starved of information and doomed 
to stagnate.42 This is a theory with significant applicability for the eighteenth century 
backcountry. The ability of individuals to successfully create a network depended on their 
capabilities in dealing with a wide variety of different individuals. For example a deerskin 
trader seeking to set up a network for his business needed to be able to maintain links to 
his Cherokee customers including young hunters and women as well as the local headmen 
who provided protection and support in the event of a disagreement with any nearby 
Cherokees. At the same time the putative trader had to keep his contacts with those who 
he relied upon for the supply end of his business, the storekeepers who supplied his goods 
and often furnished him with credit, the packhorse men who transported his goods and the 
deerskins he acquired.43 It was this wide range of relationships which provided the trader 
with capacity to make a living by trading in furs. It was this same network which allowed 
traders to gather information, often in the form of rumour, and use it to further their own 
ends. 44 
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There has also been significant historiographical scholarship on rumour particularly in the 
context of early modern Europe. Within these studies rumour is often seen as a weapon of 
the powerless, a way to covertly undermine or criticize those in power. Bernard Capp’s 
When Gossips Meet, for example, explores the role of rumour and gossip in the lives of 
women.45 He shows the ways that women in the highly patriarchal society of early modern 
England responded to their ostensibly disenfranchised position. Capp describes the role of 
women’s networks of mutual support and the ways that rumours could be used by these 
networks to exert a degree of agency which women would not otherwise be able to attain. 
Studies of early modern rumour also raise questions about the subversive nature of rumour 
which, given the complex interplay of influence and power in backcountry society could be 
used to explore the nature of authority in the backcountry.  The frustration of colonial 
officials with their backcountry sources suggests that rumour offered a level of power and 
agency to non-elite groups within the backcountry, forcing colonial elites to rely upon these 
individuals.46  
 
Georges Lefebvre’s seminal work on the French Revolution suggests the power of rumour 
to ignite an almost hysterical level of fear when combined with widespread deprivation and 
insecurity.47 Lefebvre examines France in the years following the French Revolution, a land 
afflicted with widespread poverty and economic uncertainty, also suffering from major 
political and social upheavals as the Revolutionaries sought to develop a new governmental 
format to replace the royal government. Furthermore, France was increasingly threatened 
by the possibility that the other major powers might combine against it and invade 
(perhaps aided by devotees of the old regime) in an attempt to reinstitute royal 
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government. In this time of both uncertainty and want Lefebvre demonstrates the paths 
that a number of particularly widespread rumours took through large areas of France. 
Lefebvre shows convincingly that in these times rumours which played upon fears of attack 
by brigands in the pay of unknown aristocrats were able to quickly catch the imagination of 
many throughout France. Lefebvre was able to trace the progress of these rumours by the 
day and even at some points by the hour.48 While the scale of the current study does not 
allow for a similarly detailed tracing of rumour through the eighteenth century backcountry 
within this work I have traced the transmission and impact of a wide variety of rumours 
and information  
 
There have been some explorations of rumours in colonial North America.  Gregory Evans 
Dowd has written an excellent article exploring a rumour panic in South Carolina. Dowd has 
also written an article on rumours of the return of the French to North America following 
their expulsion in the Seven Years War. Dowd traced the rumour during Pontiac’s war and 
argued that it was used by the Indians to attempt to manipulate and draw the French back 
into engagement with North America as a counterweight to the victorious British.49 Dowd’s 
work makes clear the powerful and unpredictable impact of rumour in intercultural 
relations. 
 
Peter Silver has focused on fear as a determining factor in the backcountry of the British 
middle colonies from the mid-eighteenth century.50 Fear is an important part of the growth 
of many rumours and certainly held an important place in the growth of rumours in the 
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south-eastern backcountry. At the same time it is important not to discount the links which 
did exist between people and cultures in eighteenth century North America. More recently 
a number of scholars have begun to study the role of rumour and information in 
backcountry life at various points in the colonial era. Tom Arne Midtrød has explored the 
role of rumour in the Hudson Valley and the widespread networks of communication that 
encompassed Indian communities. Midtrød argues that even small Indian communities 
who lived close to the European colonial centres were linked by channels of rumour and 
information to much wider networks of Indian communities throughout North 
America.51Alejandra Dubcovsky has reconstructed much of a network of information 
surrounding the Creek town of Coweta. Dubcovsky’s work explores the ways that 
information was used by the leaders of Coweta in an attempt to bolster the power of 
themselves and their town.52 
 
There have been a large number of important studies made about rumour. Through the 
disciplines of sociology and history a large number of important facets of rumour have 
emerged. At the same time historians of colonial North America have begun to explore the 
ways that rumour impacted on colonial societies both European and American Indian. 
However no-one has as yet explored the impact of rumour on the relationship between a 
European and an Indian society over a long period. This is perhaps a result of the difficulty 
of finding detailed information on rumours in the existing sources. The existing discussions 
of rumour between Indians and Europeans have tended to focus on particular events or to 
explore rumour as a small facet in other aspects of white-Indian relations.  This thesis will 
explore the ways that the relationship between the British and the Cherokees changed 
under the pressures and exactions of rumour and at the same time how the changing 
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circumstances of the eighteenth century backcountry affected the role of rumour. It is this 
process that will form the body of this thesis.   
 
To achieve this aim this study will focus in particular on the surviving sources of rumour and 
news in the colonial backcountry. Many of these sources have been mentioned already; 
correspondence between government officials of various sorts and with civilians, 
newspaper articles of the era and the records of government organisations. While, as 
noted above, these sources have their problems and limitations I believe they provide the 
best extant records of the communications that were going on the British and the 
Cherokees. In order to extract information about rumour from these sources I focussed in 
particular on identifying content which included information or claims which the author of 
the document would have needed to source from others. For example in contemporary 
newspaper articles it was common for the newspapers publishers to note that they were 
‘informed’ of particular events by a source, often at a significant remove.53 Similarly in 
letters to their superiors, colonial officials regularly noted that that were informed or had 
received information about events a considerable distance away.  
 
Drawing together this wide variety of reports and information I began to consider and 
evaluate how certain the authors of the documents might be of the information they were 
communicating. Through this it became apparent that much of the information these 
accounts relied upon was partial and uncertain and that this uncertainty spread throughout 
the different formats of information transmission studied.  This led me to focus on placing 
these rumours in a context as a better way of understanding and evaluating them. By 
looking at these rumours and exchanges and in particular by seeking to understand how 
they related to the actions taken by individuals and groups we can better understand how 
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rumour effected the backcountry. At this stage then, in order to understand the context in 
which rumour worked in the eighteenth century backcountry, it is necessary to understand 
the various societies that existed in the region.  
 
The Cherokees 
 
The river, the ‘Long Man, Yunwi Gunahita’ was a central feature of life for Cherokee 
society, ‘a giant with his head in the foothills of the mountains and his foot far down in the 
lowlands, pressing always, restless and without stop’.54 Rivers were the Cherokee link to 
the outside world, their stretching tendrils carrying people, goods and information into and 
out of their mountain home. The townhouses where councils were held and decisions were 
made were often situated by river banks with access to the running water the Cherokees 
used in purification rituals. In this way the rivers were the paths along which new things, 
new ideas, goods and visitors arrived in the Cherokee country but also the buffer which 
protected the townspeople from malign influences which might be brought in by these new 
arrivals.55 
 
These rivers positioned the Cherokees as part of a wide ranging network which stretched 
throughout the colonial southeast in the mid-eighteenth century.  As well as internal 
networks of trails and watercourses which linked Cherokee towns to one another there 
were larger transport networks which stretched vast distances. These networks connected 
the Cherokees both to the French in Louisiana but also to a number of other Indian nations. 
The Cherokees were situated along the main artery of the road and river system that 
became known as the Great Warrior Path. This was one of a number of major routes that 
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passed through the Cherokee country and linked the Indians of the Detroit region and the 
Great Lakes with the south eastern confederacies. If followed far enough this path linked all 
these eastern Indians with communities at least as far west as present day Texas and New 
Mexico.56 
 
The Cherokees were at different times both the enemy and ally of most of the major Indian 
confederations in the southeast in the eighteenth century.57 Even in the late colonial period 
these connections were widespread. John Stuart, Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the 
southern colonies remarked that ‘in every town in the Cherokee Nation, are beloved men 
appointed by the Creeks, Chickasaw, Catawbas and other nations with whom they are at 
peace’.58 The Cherokees then occupied a central place within the great web of networks 
that linked the various Indian societies of the southeast. The networks that Cherokees 
developed were not unusual or limited to the post contact era.59 These networks were 
critical, both in the ways that Cherokees dealt with the outside world and in the passing of 
rumour throughout the region. 
 
By the mid eighteenth century, the Cherokee Indians had been in contact with Europeans 
for well over a century. Shielded to a certain extent by their inland mountain homeland, 
they were able to weather the impacts of Old World diseases and the influx of European 
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settlers rather better than many of the eastern tribes.60 As the large, centralised 
Mississippian cultures of the pre-contact southeast began to spin into collapse (possibly in 
part as the result of the violent entradas of early Spanish conquistadors), the Cherokees’ 
inaccessible homeland allowed them to maintain a certain degree of unity.61 While the 
tribes of the piedmont and tidewater regions of the south east were mostly extinct or 
scattered by the eighteenth century the Cherokees held on to their homeland and 
continued to present a significant barrier to colonial expansion. Nevertheless the numbers 
of Cherokees had suffered repeated blows. While the Cherokees’ location gave a chance 
for their population to recover from the diseases that ravaged their towns, a succession of 
epidemics took a brutal toll on Cherokee numbers.62 In 1697 a devastating smallpox 
epidemic ravaged the coastal tribes and it seems likely that this wave of infection pushed 
west to have an impact upon the Cherokees who were just beginning to make tentative 
contacts with the British.  In 1738 a smallpox outbreak killed perhaps half the population of 
the Cherokee towns leaving them with a combined population of between 11,000 and 
9,000.63 Despite these losses, the Cherokees were in a region in which many other Indian 
societies had practically disappeared making them almost by default, a significant force in 
the eighteenth century southeast. Thus the Cherokee relationship to the British was not 
one in which the British held a significantly greater power than the Indians. 
 
Towns were the basic political unit of the Cherokee confederacy. Towns were to a certain 
extent autonomous political units and Europeans learned that for an agreement to have 
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any weight it needed to be concluded with a large number of town headmen.64 The 
confederacy was split into four sections, called by the British the Lower, the Valley, the 
Upper and the Overhill Cherokees. These sections were in many senses separate nations 
and it was quite possible for one section to be at war with an outside group while another 
was at peace.65 This widely diffused political organisation was a nightmare for European 
leaders looking to find a leader with whom they could conclude treaties and agreements. 
This was a central reason for British attempts, beginning in 1730 with the arrival in the 
Cherokee country of Alexander Cuming to assign the title of ‘Emperor’ on a Cherokee 
headman.66 This title meant little to the Cherokees but gave the British a figure to focus 
their attention on and allowed the headman Moytoy and his family to gain gifts from the 
British and act the role of brokers for other Cherokee sections. 
 
The internal politics of the Cherokees was based on consensus. The power of individual 
headmen was based on their ability to hold the approval and support of groups and 
individuals in their towns and section and would last only as long as they could maintain 
this. As John Stuart noted ‘the greatest among them would through the least partiality 
forever forfeit the good opinion of his townsmen upon which alone his influence and 
power depends’.67 South Carolina found itself caught in the middle of just such a tussle in 
1754 when colonial officials negotiated with the headman known as the Raven, an 
agreement which gave them, (or so they thought) a cession of land around Fort Prince 
George for the garrison to grow crops. The officials quickly found that the Raven had 
apparently absconded with the goods which were intended to secure the agreement of the 
various groups of towns people near the fort; ‘They denyed us the Liberty of Planting 
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anything for some time til I had a talk with the Real Headman that is on this River’. The 
Cherokee argued ‘that the Raven had acted beyond what he should have done, and kept 
nothing for the town where the Fort is settled’ and therefore had lost his legitimacy to the 
people of the town by stealing the majority of the goods for himself. In response to this 
they disavowed his negotiations. The Lower Cherokee headmen even refused initially to 
hear a text of a speech the Raven had made to Governor Glen of South Carolina.68 The 
fluidity of this system led to continuing problems for European governments looking for 
Cherokee negotiators who could or would speak for the entire confederacy.  
 
Within Cherokee discussions a premium was placed upon the right of each speaker to say 
their piece in an atmosphere of respectful silence.69 The Cherokees were dismayed when 
this courtesy was not seen in meetings with colonial representatives. As the headmen 
Skiagusta reminded the British at one council it was ‘not our custom like the white people 
to talk altogether, but when one is done another begins’.70 When there were 
disagreements those who disagreed with the decision made by the council kept quiet or 
withdrew from the council to avoid conflict. Political life in the Cherokee confederacy 
depended on a complex interplay of groupings and loyalties and, on a fundamental level, 
questions of who spoke and who was prepared to listen to them. 71 
 
All these aspects of Cherokee society made rumour a potentially critical factor in 
relationships in the Cherokee country. The geographical situation of the Cherokees, at the 
centre of a continent spanning network of American Indian peoples who interacted with 
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one another through trade, diplomacy and war, meant that the arrival of news and 
information from significant distances was by no means a novelty for the Cherokees. At the 
same time the Cherokees’ relatively protected homeland allowed them to face the 
advancing tide of British settlement from a position of strength. In this situation neither the 
British nor the Cherokees held an absolute advantage. They needed to deal with one 
another and this encouraged the development of rumours about what each group might 
do. Furthermore, the impracticality of attempting to achieve goals through the simple 
application of power encouraged British and Cherokee leaders to seek more indirect ways 
of pursuing their aims, as will be detailed below. The decentralized nature of Cherokee 
political power, while a constant irritation for British officials, was also important in the 
development of rumour. The interplay of different interest groups and factions within 
Cherokee society provided a fertile ground for the use of rumour and information as a tool 
in the internal and external politics of the Cherokee confederacy.   
 
Colonial arrivals 
 
The Cherokee were in contact with representatives of the British colonies from the late 
seventeenth century onwards. By the mid-eighteenth century a   number of British colonies 
bordered the Cherokees’ homeland. The closest was South Carolina. Originally charted in 
1663 and settled by a group of plantation owners from the British colony on Barbados 
South Carolina became a prosperous plantation society dominated by large land owners.72 
South Carolina’s main rival for links with the Cherokees was Virginia. For decades before 
the founding of Carolina Virginian traders had extended their reach into the lands 
controlled by the Cherokees and had enjoyed a profitable trade with the Indian nations of 
the south east. The establishment of a viable colony in Carolina left the Virginians at a 
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disadvantage and their influence in the south east began to wane significantly following the 
Yamasee War.73 Nevertheless, the stream of settlers moving south into the backcountry 
from Virginia and Pennsylvania continued to give Virginia an important stake in the south 
east. Periodically the two colonies clashed over trade or relations with the Indians. Indeed 
the association between Virginia and these backcountry settlers was so strong that 
throughout the colonial era Indians used the term ‘Virginians’ to refer to rapacious and 
violent settlers.  
 
In 1732 Georgia was founded by settlers led by the charismatic James Oglethorpe and 
became the southernmost of the Britain’s mainland colonies.74 The Georgians established a 
strong relationship with the Creeks and attempted to extend their authority over the Indian 
trade of the much of the south east. In a series of confrontations in the courts of London 
and the backcountry of the south east the Georgians clashed with South Carolinian and 
Virginian traders and the controversy came close to violence.75 Nevertheless, by the early 
1740s this disagreement had settled down and while traders of different colonies still 
competed fiercely they generally did so covertly, making rumour all the more important.  
 
European kings and governments may have made grandiose claims of dominion over the 
vast interior of North America but in reality across much of the continent royal control 
extended only to the relatively small areas controlled by the troops and colonists of the 
colonial power. As Daniel Richter makes clear, most of America was still Indian country  
throughout the colonial era.76 In a practical sense European rulers understood this fact and 
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worked to project their power beyond the areas which they were able to directly control by 
more subtle methods.  
 
 A primary source of power in this situation was information. In a landscape covering 
thousands of square miles, with limited road infrastructure and slow transport speeds 
accurate information was the difference between success and failure. On a more local 
level, for European colonists in the backcountry and Indian townspeople it was, quite 
literally, a matter of life and death. Warfare in the backcountry generally centred around 
small scale, guerrilla style attacks on isolated individuals and small groups. Failure to escape 
sufficiently quickly before the arrival of an attack could lead to large numbers of deaths on 
all sides. For example, in 1760 there was a general massacre of traders living near to the 
Creek Indians. Some eleven traders were killed in one day and those who escaped did so as 
a result of information supplied to them by Creek headmen and women with whom they 
had developed friendships.77 Equally, most examples of Indian casualties during the 
periodic expeditions that the British mounted against Indian towns were of individuals or 
small groups who had not been able to flee in time. For example, one journal of an 
expedition in 1776 against the Cherokee records that only a number of lone women and 
black slaves who had remained near the towns were captured by the expedition while the 
vast majority of Cherokees were long gone by the time the colonial militia arrived.78 
 
 
The social structures of these colonial and American Indian societies were an important 
factor in understanding rumour in the eighteenth century. Much to the frustration of many 
British officials very often the most accurate and considered information available came 
                                                          
77
Joshua A. Piker, Okfuskee, A Creek Indian town in Colonial America, (Cambridge MA, 2004) p.135. 
78
Arthur Fairies Journal of the Expedition against the Cherokees 1776, South Carolina State Archives, 
Columbia, SC. 
38 
 
from individuals whom many British leaders were predisposed to have very little respect 
for. These people included traders, backwoodsmen and even women. Traders provided a 
natural source of information for colonial leaders. They were generally the first white men 
to arrive in Indian country. They quickly learned Indian languages and often married into 
prominent Indian families. Traders lived a significant portion of the year in the towns where 
they did business.79 Similarly backcountry settlers on the edge of British settlement often 
found themselves forced to interact with Indian communities to survive.80 Even settlers 
who clashed with the Cherokees were able on some occasions to develop close links to 
Cherokee communities. For example, Patrick Calhoun of the Long Cane settlement was able 
in 1759, on the eve of war, to ride through and reconnoitre the Lower and Middle 
Cherokee settlements without danger.81 
 
While it was more unusual for women to be in direct contact with colonial officials there 
are scattered examples of Indian women who are credited with providing information to 
colonists and allowing them to escape impending attack.82 It also seems likely that 
women’s role in passing rumours and information was partially concealed from the written 
record as white men living amongst the Indians may well have drawn much of their 
information from female friends and acquaintances, something which would have been 
unlikely to show up in the official record. This is suggested by an account of a meeting 
between Cherokee headmen and representatives of the Creek confederation at the Lower 
Cherokee town of Keowee. At the beginning of the conference the Cherokee speakers told 
their guests ‘that they [the Creeks] might speak freely, as whatever they said would not be 
discovered, as there were no Women in the Town House, and at the same time strictly 
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charging the young Men not to discover what they heard over to their Wives, declaring that 
the first that was found to divulge it should die’.83 This emphasis on the women as 
spreaders of rumour, possibly in connection to marriages and liaisons with white men 
suggests that women may have had an important role in disseminating information across 
intercultural boundaries.84 It is also possible that this reference to women merely 
represents the assumptions of male Cherokees and Creeks suspicious of the things which 
women discussed while they were not around.   
 
The importance of these people who had had little or no place in European society was a 
difficult adjustment for many British leaders. South Carolina’s Governor Glen, whose 
governorship lasted from 1743 to 1756, was known for his generally effective diplomatic 
abilities when dealing with Cherokee representatives and Indians in general. Nevertheless 
it is clear that he was also dependent on people who he considered inferiors; after a spate 
of rumours and panics in the colony he complained bitterly of the ‘low Indian Traders and 
Packhorsemen who frequently impose upon the Government by Lying Letters, and false 
reports’. Glen claimed that ‘the Authors names were enough to Brand them & it was no 
difficult matter to detect the Prejudice and Interest that dictated them’ suggesting that he 
felt that there was something particularly contemptible about the traders which made the 
statements that they made immediately suspect.85 Despite this aversion Glen and those 
like him were regularly required to depend on traders for both information and for their 
influence with the Indian tribes into which these relatively marginal figures in colonial 
society were married and among whom they could exercise considerable influence. Indeed 
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Daniel Pepper, South Carolina’s agent to the Creeks, even complained that traders were 
not spending enough of the year in Indian country and ‘their not attending has been of 
great Disadvantage to me, as I must expect my Intelligence from them, as I cannot possibly 
be every where’.86 This tension between the necessity of maintaining an effective network 
of informants and of the fear and contempt that many colonial officials felt for those whom 
they relied upon for information was a constant feature of the correspondence between 
leaders in the backcountry and colonies. 
 
‘Honour and Honesty are the Same’, Truth, rumour and social status. 
 
Much of this mistrust was tied to understandings of the relationship between status and 
truth in European society. Within the moral universe of British gentlemen, which the 
majority of imperial and colonial administrators either emerged from or aspired to 
emulate, there was arguably no greater sin than that of lying. This principle was traced back 
at least as far as the Greek and early Christian philosophers. The idea was well established 
by the Tudor period and held that truthfulness was fundamental to gentility. Indeed in 
some writings part of the definition of a gentleman was based on the idea that his word 
was strong enough to be taken as the truth without supporting evidence.87 There was a 
supporting dual role for truth in this, a gentleman’s word was taken as truth because of his 
gentility and he was accounted a gentleman because he spoke the truth.88 The gentleman 
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was seen as being independent and having no cause to lie to seek advantage, his word 
could be trusted. As Daniel Defoe put it in the 1720’s, ‘honesty and honour are the same’.89 
Shakespeare made the idea of honesty as an inherited trait more explicit by claiming that 
‘No legacy is so rich as honesty’.90 
 
The increased colonisation of North America presented a challenge to conventional notions 
of gentility. The leaders of the colonies firmly believed that they were gentlemen and 
sought to fulfil the gentlemanly ideals. The question of how much the environment of the 
colonies allowed for a gentlemanly way of life and for the cultivation of gentlemanly virtues 
was an extremely vexing question for colonial officials. In the backcountry, far from the 
centres of what they thought of as civilization those who aspired to gentleman status may 
well have held particularly close to notions of gentlemen’s privileged access to truth and 
honesty. 
 
There were some people who were considered to be outside the bounds of gentility. This 
included, most notably, commoners, servants or slaves, and women. Fundamentally this 
definition of `trust’ or `honesty’ was based on concepts of dependency. Common men were 
dependent on their employers or landlords, servants were dependent on their masters and 
women were dependent on their husbands or fathers. Within early modern understanding 
these groups all lacked the capability to make decisions for themselves. As such their word 
could not in itself be considered reliable evidence. Gentlemen also considered artisans and 
merchants inherently unreliable as witnesses as they were dependent for their income on a 
trade or on the movement of goods and were therefore dependent on the actions of 
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others.  These individuals lacked honour, as gentlemen understood it and hence their 
honesty was uncertain. 91 
 
This conception of dependence could be easily extended in the North American colonies to 
slaves on colonial plantations, people who were theoretically dependent on their masters 
for everything, up to and including life. While the degree of slave dependence was in truth 
much more variable than this, as many slaves attained a significant amount of de-facto 
independence, the official understanding of slaves was that they were simply a form of 
property.92 The idea of dependency could also be extended to many of those who might be 
the regular conduits of information in this era, as noted above traders, backcountry settlers 
and women. The assumption of female dependency and untruthfulness was expressed in 
Europe in highly effective institutional mechanisms of exclusion which were so widespread 
as not to require elaborate justification in European society.93 The role of women within 
many American Indian societies, wherein for example women might have a role within 
council decisions was, if anything, seen as a symptom of Indian degeneracy rather than 
triggering a re-examination of European attitudes towards women.  
 
Traders and packhorsemen were merchants, and merchants forced to operate at what 
many Europeans considered to be the end of the world. They were continually indebted to 
coastal or European merchants and often moving from colony to colony to escape their 
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creditors. This image of traders would certainly not promote the idea of traders as being 
within the sphere of trustworthy gentlemen. Frontier settlers, while they might work their 
own land and be free of a master were generally considered to be of a lower class than 
those involved in the imperial or colonial hierarchy and were hence perhaps not 
gentlemen. This placed an extra element of uncertainty for colonial officials in their quest 
to acquire useful and reliable information to deal with the Cherokees. The majority of the 
information available was conveyed by people whom European gentlemen were 
conditioned from a young age to mistrust. 
 
The extension of this theory of independence and honesty to American Indians was more 
ambiguous. Many Indian tribes were clearly not under the command of European masters 
and seemed to many Europeans to live in a state of practical anarchy (however inaccurate 
this viewpoint may have been). Despite this, in seeking to assert their claims over territory 
in the North American interior European leaders stressed the degree to which American 
Indian peoples were ‘dependent’ on European crowns. 94  This was usually emphasised in 
favour of their own crown and played down in the case of their rivals, as for example the 
British claims, put forward in the lead up to the Seven Years War which argued that Britain 
had a right to vast areas in the Ohio Valley based upon highly dubious claims of conquest 
by the Iroquois Five Nations.95 This dependency narrative may also have had an impact on 
conceptions of trade relationships in the colonial era. There was an extremely strong belief 
among British and colonial elites that the trade in British goods had made the Indians 
dependent on British good will for goods which, it was believed, the Indians could not do 
without. Governor William Henry Lyttelton of South Carolina sought to play upon this as 
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tensions rose between the British colonies and the Cherokee, he warned the Cherokees not 
to risk war with the British. ‘You are few and soon will be in want of everything when once 
the Trade is withdrawn from You,’ he instructed the Cherokee in 1758.96 In more recent 
discussions there has been a greater emphasis on the limits of Indian need for European 
goods. Tom Hatley, in his discussion of Cherokee-South Carolina relations, argued that 
during the first half of the eighteenth century the Cherokees gained enough firearms and 
other European goods that their dependence upon such a trade may have in fact lessened 
in the later eighteenth century and been superseded by a trade in goods that Europeans 
considered of relatively low value such as paint and trinkets and that the uses to which 
these goods were put were often outside the understanding of most Europeans. It seems 
certain that the Cherokees desired a trade, whether they were dependent on it is a more 
open question.97 
 
This concept of Indian ‘dependence’ played into the ideas held by eighteenth century 
British gentlemen that those they viewed as dependent were inherently dishonest and 
prone to lying, including Indians. The Charlestown merchant Henry Laurens complained, 
writing as Cherokee and British negotiators sought to bring the two year war between the 
Cherokees and South Carolina to a close, that ‘The minds of those wretches [the 
Cherokees] were prepared to receive impressions from such tales: their own natural 
treachery & deceitfulness create jealousy & suspicion of other people’98 Laurens was ready 
to admit in the next sentence that the colonial authority had given the Cherokees every 
reason to be nervous of being told lies. At the same time his frustrated exclamation betrays 
his feeling that on a basic level Indians were inferiors who were prone to untruth in a way 
that European and white American gentlemen such as himself were not (ignoring the fact 
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that the exigencies of intercultural diplomacy might well cause such gentlemen to lie). The 
construction of this gentlemanly code of honesty and honour had important ramifications 
for rumour in the backcountry. As noted above the realities of rumour and information in 
the backcountry forced colonial leaders to rely on people they considered fundamentally 
untrustworthy. This could lead to an especially sceptical attitude being taken towards 
information emanating from the backcountry. 
 
Indian conceptions of honesty and truth are more difficult to trace, in large part because of 
the difficulties with sources noted above. However, it certainly seems highly probable that 
Indian diplomatic and political culture viewed lying as unacceptable. Indian councils placed 
a great deal of emphasis on the words used and oratory was one of the most highly prized 
skills in a leader. Indians certainly reacted to lying by their opposite numbers with at least 
as much passion as whites did. As Cherokees and the British groped towards a resolution of 
their conflict in the early 1760s, the Cherokees’ senior diplomat, the Little Carpenter, 
vented his frustrations at the South Carolinians; ‘remonstrating to Capt. McIntosh in very 
warm terms, [the Little Carpenter] went so far as to say, “That all the World were Liars, but 
he thought the people of Carolina were the greatest’.99 Clearly then lying was an important 
sin for the Cherokees when it came to diplomatic relations. Indians used a variety of rituals 
and exchanges to affirm the truthfulness of the words spoken, from various rituals 
involving the ornamental peace pipes to the exchanging of presents, including ceremonial 
beads. These ceremonies gave the talks validity much as the signatures on a European 
treaty affirmed the truth of the words written in that treaty. There may also have been an 
element of this in Indian ceremonies that made visiting dignitaries and negotiators fictive 
kin or community members during negotiations. For example South Carolina Indian 
commissioner George Chicken was put through a welcoming ceremony when he visited the 
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Cherokees that brought him into the Cherokee community, not to mention the ubiquitous 
use of kin terms (most commonly ‘Brother’ or ‘Father’) that posited a notion of shared 
identity.100 The importance of clan and community relationships may have tied to notions 
of truthfulness, which the construction of these fictive relationships allowed Indians to 
accept the words offered by Europeans as truthful. Of course, both European and Indian 
conceptions of truth were undercut by the realities of life in a contested landscape, 
gentlemen did speak untruths and ‘brothers’ did lie to, fight and sometimes kill one 
another.  
 
Uses of Rumour 
As noted above rumour, suggestion and outright lies were important tools for Europeans in 
negotiating with Indians. This was also true for Indians in these negotiations. Many Indian 
headmen became adept at playing the rival imperial powers off against one another. For 
example, the Cherokees regularly used a method of having a number of their headmen 
accept ambassadors from the French while they were also negotiating with the British. In 
1754, senior figures such as Attakullakulla, known to the British as the Little Carpenter, 
were said to be considering going to the French colonies and at the last minute decided 
instead to fight them.101 This change of heart was duly reported by British traders among 
the Cherokees and a flurry of activity among British representatives to the Cherokees. Glen 
sent a messenger carrying a speech or ‘talk’ declaring that: 
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I am glad that the Little Carpenter did not listen to their insidious proposals for it is 
more than probable that had he suffered himself to have been  [illegible] by them 
he would never again have Seen his own Country; but would Either have been 
Killed by them or Kept  in Captivity’102 
 
The Little Carpenter had clearly got the Carolinians’ attention. To what degree this was 
intended as a diplomatic gambit designed to draw concessions from the British is uncertain. 
The manoeuvre could also have been an issue of the internal politics of Cherokee society 
with competition between pro-British and pro-French factions in Indian society struggling 
for control. European contemporaries believed that these changes in policy represented 
the inherently unstable nature of Indians, that Indians could not be trusted to keep their 
word (conveniently ignoring their own preparedness to shift alliances when it suited 
them).103 Certainly the internal politics and power dynamics of Cherokee society could 
influence the decisions made by headmen and lead to changes in policy which seem 
arbitrary when seen from outside. Cherokees were primarily interested in defending the 
power and territory of their people and this desire became increasingly important as 
European colonies became more powerful and assertive in their dealings with the 
Cherokees and white settlement began to encroach on Cherokee lands. Attakullakulla was 
also, it must be noted, a consummate diplomat and politician and given that he did not 
actually at this time go to meet with the French the most likely interpretation of these 
events is that he was simply looking for leverage to use in his diplomatic manoeuvring with 
the British. 
 
Some Cherokees used the possibility that they might shift their attentions to the French 
even more directly. Shortly after Attakullkulla’s manoeuvres several Cherokees approached 
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Sergeant Harrison, commander of a small British fort in Cherokee country and expressed 
anger that the ammunition that they had been promised had failed to materialize; they 
threatened to go to the French for supplies. Alarmed, Harrison gave them some 
ammunition from the fort’s own supply. The Sergeant blamed traders from Virginia for 
implanting ‘these Notions in their Heads but I can’t find no certain proof of that’.104 The 
Cherokees involved were not identified, suggesting that they were less senior figures. I 
would argue that if anyone put ‘these Notions in their Heads’ it was most likely a more 
senior headman intending to bait the British for their failure to provide the Cherokees with 
the ammunition they desired. At the same time this group could have been simply a band 
of Cherokees who were seeking to gain material benefits from the presence of the British 
fort by intimating the possibility of going to the French. Regardless these events suggest 
that many Indians well understood the uses of suggestion and rumour whether at the 
micro level of the local town and fort or the larger international stage of diplomatic 
relations.  
 
Indian headmen were also not above spreading rumours about other factions of the 
Cherokee Nation in order to secure their own purposes with the British. In December 1756 
the headman Ostenaca of Tomotly (known to the British as Judge’s Friend) visited Raymond 
Demere. His talk seems to have served two purposes. First, he made extravagant 
proclamations of his loyalty to the British declaring ‘he looks on the White People to be his 
absolute Brothers, as having only two Fathers, God & the King’.105 Second, he made vague, 
non-committal accusations against other factions within the Cherokee nation; ‘He says, he 
does not know but all the Over Hills Towns may join the French, but that will always be the 
same & that he will send off Runners to other parts of the Nation , & that he believes all the 
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Nation will not join them’. This was most likely an attempt to raise suspicions against 
Attakullakulla, Ostenaca’s rival for diplomatic influence in the nation given that this was the 
region from which Attakullakulla drew much of his support. There was clearly a world of 
internal politics and rivalry ongoing within Indian societies of which we only get echoes. 
Colonial officials also clearly understood that Indians might attempt to cast aspersions on 
one another in order to monopolise European goods and support. They bestowed gifts and 
titles on headmen who they wished to influence and bolster. While Europeans were never 
able to dictate power within Indian societies as they would have liked, the goods that 
European support provided were important enough that Indian headmen competed for 
support from the European powers and connived to control the flow of information to the 
colonies just as the colonists tried to do the same to the Indians. 
 
There is also evidence of individual whites in Indian country attempting to spread rumours 
among the Indians for their own purposes. In his reply to a talk sent by Lyttelton in mid 
1759, Attakullkulla claimed that ‘Formerly he says there was Talks and lies going about, 
which then People believed not from their People alone, but from White People likewise 
that came amongst them, and those Lies used to Occasion meetings every day’.106 For 
those Europeans who viewed the Indians as inherently inferior there was often the 
assumption that a white man must have incited the Indians to suspect British motives and 
actions. As noted above, Sergeant Harrison believed that someone must have incited the 
Indians who came to his fort demanding ammunition, and eventually blamed a pair of 
traders from Virginia (on the information of another trader) and noted that ‘the Indians 
themselves want him to be gone from them and [say] that Smith and him [Virginia traders] 
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are Lyars and will not tell the Truth’.107 The Cherokees it seemed were quite happy to let 
the British believe that other whites (possibly traders who had failed to live up to Cherokee 
expectations) were responsible for outbreaks of trouble.  
 
Rumour could also be an extremely effective weapon of war and was used with particular 
success by Indian war parties against the isolated settlers of the colonial backcountry. 
Raiding parties of Indians and white partisans did infiltrate the backcountry in wartime and 
their attacks were often marked by brutal acts of violence, including scalping and post-
mortem mutilation.108 Nevertheless, the size of these parties was usually small and in some 
cases only two or three warriors were able to launch a string of raids that sent whole areas 
of the backcountry reeling back towards the coast. Indeed the widespread fear induced by 
these attacks was an important strategic advantage, allowing small numbers of fighters to 
cause chaos and destruction out of all proportion to their numbers. During the Cherokee 
war a string of attacks sent the settlers of the Long Canes region fleeing to the safety of 
Fort More to the east. But a group of some 150 settlers were caught by a Cherokee war 
party.  The male settlers were overcome with terror and fled leaving the settler women and 
children to their attackers. The Cherokees took 23 scalps and as many prisoners and 
scattered the remnants of the refugee party into the woods. A little over a month later, 
another party was massacred with the loss of 23 lives.109 The violence of these attacks was 
in large part intended to evoke the kind of fear that drove the Long Canes settlers to 
abandon their women and children. The sheer brutality of these attacks meant that 
although only a small number of colonial settlers were ever the victims of actual Indian 
violence the very idea of Indian attack was enough to strike terror into most colonists. 
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Nevertheless, this aspect of rumour, as a deliberate tool for meeting particular ends, was 
only part of the story. Rumours spread in ways that were impossible to control and difficult 
to predict. This was no less a problem in the eighteenth century than it is today. Colonial 
leaders regularly lamented the willingness of the wider population to believe rumours and 
stories damaging to government authority. As Colonel Montgomery lamented in 1760 ‘I 
cannot help or prevent the fears of the People, but there is no Indian Settlement within 
160 Miles of Ninety Six, and if they cannot be guarded against at that distance, one should 
imagine that People would be safe no where’.110 This sort of sporadic panic was a regular 
feature of life in the colonies in this era. Rumours could be an almost seasonal affair in the 
British colonies and countering the affects of these rumours was a prime concern for 
colonial officials.111 
 
There are rumours which flared up without a clear agenda being involved and even a 
superficial examination of the rumours which have grown in more recent eras shows the 
possibility of rumours being produced by simple uncertainty and anxiety. It seems 
unrealistic to believe that similar processes were not occurring in the eighteenth century 
backcountry.  Indeed returning once again to the events at Hiwassee in 1757 when the 
magistrate from Ninety Six seized the goods of an Indian trader. Cherokees in the area 
‘were frighted, run to Highwasee, and Natalee Towns, alarmed the Women and those that 
were not gone a hunting, and said that the white People were coming to carry them 
away’.112    From this rumour which does not seem to have been deliberately propagated 
from any purpose other than genuine fear on the part of the Indians a widespread panic 
spread throughout the Overhill Cherokee towns. 
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Rumour, the ways that it emerged, how it spread and the reactions of the various 
inhabitants of the south-eastern colonial backcountry to it are therefore the subject of this 
thesis. As has been noted above many disciplines have put forward ideas about the nature 
of rumour. The concept of rumour as ‘improvised news’ posited by Shibutani is, I believe, 
particularly useful for understanding rumour in a historical context. Rumour was an 
important component of a wider world of information which could be used to explain and 
make comprehensible events which were often strange and fearful. Rumour in the south-
eastern backcountry also needs to be understood as an important factor in, as well as the 
product of, the interactions of a wide range of competing peoples and interest groups in an 
uncertain and dangerous environment.  
 
By the late 1730s the British had made tentative contacts with the Cherokee Nation and 
the various British colonies were seeking to take advantage of the considerable economic 
bounty that trade with this large American Indian nation could bring. This thesis will 
explore this process. The thesis will follow a chronological format. This format allows the 
exploration of the role of rumour over the course of a turbulent and very important half 
century. In the space of these fifty years the Cherokees and British went from being curious 
strangers trading goods and alliance to two violently opposed groups who could no longer 
understand or engage with one another. This change was shaped by the events of that half 
century, through the course of a massive expansion westward by white settlers, the end of 
French involvement in North America, the shattering violence of the Cherokee war and 
finally, the American Revolution. The first chapter will begin in the late 1730s and early 
1740s with the beginnings of regular contact between the British and the Cherokees. This 
era saw a period of relatively amicable relations between the two peoples. Both Cherokees 
and British saw advantages in their alliance. This did not mean that rumour did not play an 
important part in the politics of the backcountry in this era. British fears of their European 
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rivals in the region and of the large numbers of enslaved blacks who were the engine of the 
southern colonial economies meant that rumour and fear were still constant features of 
colonial life. The Cherokees did become the subject of rumours in the colonies which 
suggested that they might take part in a conspiracy against the British with either the slaves 
or other enemies of Britain. On the whole this era was time when rumour could be used 
either to increase tensions between the Cherokees and the British or to smooth them over.  
 
The second chapter will discuss the changes that occurred in the backcountry in the 1750s. 
This era saw increasing interactions between Cherokees and British colonists as settlers 
flooded into the backcountry. This led to increased tensions throughout the 1750s but did 
not lead to a decisive break. Diplomats on both sides were able to keep their respective 
societies in a precarious harmony through much of the decade. The 1750s also saw a 
change in colonial leadership. James Glen was replaced by William Henry Lyttelton as 
Governor of South Carolina. Where Glen had been able to manage the powerful forces of 
rumour and suspicion, Lyttelton failed to do so. This became an important contributing 
factor in the outbreak of the Cherokee War. The Cherokee War was emblematic of the 
power of rumour in the British-Cherokee relationship, not to mention being a shattering 
experience for many in both societies. The third chapter will explore the post-war colonial 
landscape as the British and the Cherokees sought to re-establish their relationship that 
had been so badly damaged by war. Fear and suspicion were significant barriers to friendly 
relations between the two peoples.  
 
The fourth chapter will explore the years leading up to the American Revolution. In this 
period British officials were regularly alarmed by rumours of a widespread alliance between 
Indian peoples stretching across North America. This alliance was thought to be a direct 
threat to British interests. At the same time, as white settlements continued to move into 
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Cherokee territory fault lines also began to open up between Cherokees. The crux of this 
division was the question of how to deal with the threat to Cherokee interests of the 
increasingly overbearing British settlers. Older headmen insisted on a policy of diplomacy 
including ceding land to the whites to maintain the peace. Younger warriors and hunters 
viewed this as appeasement and slow death. Then, as the rift between the British and some 
of their American subjects flared into war, the Americans began to believe that the British 
were conspiring with the Indians and with rebellious slaves in a grand conspiracy against 
the rebels. This became a key plank in the Patriot recruitment strategy in the South. This 
swirling sea of tensions and mistrust exploded when rumours reached the Cherokee towns 
of the success of a Indian-British alliance in the north in driving back the hated settlers. This 
decided many of the younger generation of Cherokees for resistance and sparked the 
beginning of a war which would finally break apart the old system of rumour and 
diplomacy. Throughout the thesis I will discuss the mechanisms of rumour, how it was used 
by individuals and groups within the backcountry, and how it impacted upon the decisions 
of Cherokees and Britons throughout the era. At the end of the 1730s Cherokees and 
British colonists were about to begin a decades long interaction, one in which rumour 
would play an important role.   
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Chapter 1: Cherokees, the British and the arrival of James Glen 
 
In the late 1730s and 1740s the Cherokees and the South eastern British colonies enjoyed a 
relatively amicable relationship. The colonies were far enough from the Cherokees that 
they did not constitute a direct and present danger to the Indians’ land. The contacts 
between the British and the Cherokees in the 1740s were, compared to later years, 
relatively minor and non-confrontational. Regular clashes were not yet occurring in the 
back country. Large numbers of British settlers had not yet entered Cherokee lands and the 
enmities which would mark later years had not yet flared up.113 The goods supplied by 
British traders were a valuable resource to the Cherokees and both groups saw advantages 
in their relationship.  The Cherokees’ decision to side with the Carolinians in the Yamasee 
war of 1715 was seen by colonists as an encouraging sign of their disposition towards the 
colony.114  
 
This is not to say that rumour and fear did not have a significant impact on the relationship 
between the British and the Cherokees. The relationship, as with much of life in the 
colonies at this time was suffused with rumour.115 The distance and relatively minimal 
contact between the two peoples made the Cherokees an unknown quantity for the British. 
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British leaders were not certain what the Cherokees would do in the event of an invasion or 
a slave insurrection.  
 
This very uncertainty was an important reason behind the fear that British colonists felt 
about the Cherokees. The role of improvised news became an important facet of the 
relationship as Britons and Cherokees sought to understand who these outsiders were, 
what they wanted and what they might do. In answering this question, British colonists 
looked to wider anxieties that were a regular feature of life in the south-eastern colonies. 
 
The fears of British colonists centred on several key dangers, which the colonists saw as 
absolute, existential threats. The first of these threats was the danger of attack by Britain’s 
imperial rivals, France and Spain. The proximity of the Spanish in Florida made them a 
constant concern. Part of the rationale for the foundation of Georgia had been to protect 
South Carolina from incursions by the Spanish and the South Carolinians had 
enthusiastically supported this.116 France was a slightly more removed, but no less serious 
threat with its colonies in Canada and Louisiana and an active presence in the backcountry 
of most of North America. The dangers that these rivals presented to the British colonies in 
North America was never far from the minds of British colonists. Such threats were, as will 
be discussed below, regular subjects of rumour and speculation. 
 
Even more worrying for colonists in the plantation economies of the southeast was the 
possibility of a slave revolt. Slave labour was such a central feature of these economies that 
any threat to it represented a threat to the way of life of slave holding whites, generally the 
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most powerful and economically successful section of the colonial population.117 Also, 
given the prevalence of slaves in many areas of the British colonies, they carried out the 
vast majority of domestic work in slave owning households. There was an uncomfortable 
awareness among slave owners that their chattels were in a position to do them significant 
harm. Rumours and panics about slave insurrection were a regular fact of life in the south 
eastern colonies.118 
 
It was in the context of these rumours and fears that concerns about the Cherokees took 
shape in the British colonies.119 When rumours about the Cherokees surfaced in this era 
they commonly connected the Indians to a suspected conspiracy with slaves or rival 
empires. This conception of the Cherokees as adjuncts to other threats to the British 
colonies was the main focus for early rumours among the British about the Cherokees. The 
idea that various enemies might conspire against them became a pattern for later British 
rumours and came increasingly to the fore as the British began to confront the powerful 
Indian groups of the south-eastern backcountry. This chapter will introduce a number of 
the key mechanics through which rumour and information spread which would continue to 
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be important throughout the colonial era. It will then explore how the fears of British 
colonists affected the relationship between the British and the Cherokees in the 1740s. 
Finally the chapter will discuss the role of rumour and information in Cherokee-British 
diplomacy. 
 
The study of rumour in this burgeoning relationship in the mid-eighteenth century, reveals 
very different societies struggling to come to an understanding of one another. With so 
much unknown about the other, Cherokees and British colonists filled the gaps in their 
knowledge with rumour and fears. These early years showed the importance of rumour as 
part of a continuing dialogue between different groups within the backcountry. But as well 
as rumour as a disruptive and frightening factor the 1740s show rumour in a more benign 
guise, as a process of everyday life and a part of doing business. Handled correctly and in 
the right circumstances, rumour could even help to smooth over problems and ease the 
path of diplomacy. 
 
‘The Convenience of a Trader’ Deerskin traders and information networks. 
 
By the 1740s there were British colonists who had strong and close ties with the Cherokees. 
The primary link between the British and the Cherokees in the 1740s were the deerskin 
traders. It was through the traders that information about events in the Cherokee country 
reached the British colonies. By the early 1740s the numbers making a living from the 
deerskin trade were considerable. In 1740 the number of those involved in the trade in 
Augusta, Georgia, including ‘traders, pack-horse-men, servants, townsmen and others 
depending on that business,’ were ‘moderately computed about six hundred white men, 
who live by their trade’.120 Deerskin traders became a fixture of most Indian towns, to the 
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point that Edmond Atkin (who would go on to become Superintendent for Indian Affairs) in 
discussing possible options for reforming the trade warned against the idea of restricting 
traders to towns of a certain size for fear of angering the Cherokees and Creeks ‘who have 
been always used to have the Convenience of a Trader in most of their Towns’.121 Traders 
became a part of daily life within all Indian nations with whom the British had contact.122 As 
such, the traders were ideally placed to feed information between the colonies and the 
Cherokees. In the 1740s and early 1750’s before the construction of permanent forts close 
to the Cherokees the traders provided a primary pathway for information between the two 
societies. The traders wrote regularly to their contacts in the interior of the colony and 
became regular correspondents with colonial officials.123 
 
As has been noted above, the physical transmission of information was extremely difficult 
in the backcountry. It required the presence of a network along which the information 
could be passed. Traders had the advantage that their economic activities began to create 
a network almost as soon as they embarked upon a trading career. The networks of the 
deerskin traders provided an effective framework for the transmission of information. The 
contents of one letter sent from the trader and colonial agent, Ludovic Grant at the town of 
Tomotly to Governor James Glen at Charlestown in 1754 provides a clear example of the 
informational role that many traders played. In the letter Grant notes that ‘According to 
your Excellency’s order to Continue my Intelligence as formerly, before the Fort was 
settled. I have taken this opportunity to Inform your Excellency, of what has come to my 
Knowledge this winter’. This clearly shows that this arrangement was an on-going and well 
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established one and that Glen had specifically solicited Grant’s help in providing 
information of goings on in the Cherokee territory.124 
 
Grant’s letter to Glen synthesised information from a wide variety of sources, describing a 
fight and the arrival of a number of Northward Indians at the town of Chota, and goings on 
in the Lower Cherokee towns and the newly constructed fort at Keowee.125 His acquisition 
of information on a killing at the town of Kettewa is particularly revealing. Grant had been 
at the house of William Butler, another trader when the brother of the headman Ostenaca 
arrived carrying messages from the headman of Kettewa. The messenger then advised him 
of the goings on at the town. This raises some interesting possibilities. The messenger was 
most likely not expecting to meet with Grant, although he may have planned to advise 
William Butler of the killing at Kettewa and Butler might well have decided to pass news of 
such import on to other traders or even the colonial officials.  
 
There were numerous examples of other traders providing information to contacts in the 
colonies. In 1746 it was primarily the warning of traders that alarmed the British about 
possible French intrigues and gave impetus to Glen’s diplomatic push.  Several months later 
traders among the Cherokees also sent word ‘that all is quiet in the Nation; and that only 
one Frenchman, and he a Fellow of no note, had been there this Fall’.126 That they 
volunteered information that little was going on suggests that they had been contacted by 
colonial officials anxious about earlier warnings and seeking an update on events. 
 
The informational networks that traders provided could also transmit rumours that were 
damaging to the relationship between the Cherokee and the British. In the early 1740s a 
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rumour emerged that a group of traders had acquired 30,000 acres of land from the 
Cherokees which led to a small land run.127 In late 1743 William Bull Lt. Governor of South 
Carolina became aware that ‘a Silver Mine hath been opened, and that Several Persons are 
now working upon the same, in the Cherokee Nation’. Bull promptly issued a proclamation 
‘hereby strictly forbidding and prohibiting all persons whatever from running out any Land 
in the Cherokee Nation, or any Nation of Indians, on any Colour or Pretence whatever’ and 
at the same time forbidding ‘opening or working any Mine , of what Kind soever, in any of 
the Indian Nations within this Province , until his Majesty’s Pleasure shall be signified 
thereupon’.128 This rumour and the problems it caused clearly made a long lasting 
impression on the Cherokees. Decades later, William Bartram remarked that the Cherokees 
‘are extremely jealous of white people travelling about their mountains, especially if they 
should be seen peeping in amongst the rocks, or digging up the earth’129 
 
Central to the gathering of information that traders like Grant engaged in was the creation 
and maintenance of trust. In order to enter the trade colonists had first to secure a licence 
to do so from at least one colony, a process which generally required a belief on the part of 
colonial officials that the individuals were trustworthy and the posting of a significant bond 
for good behaviour. While it was possible for individuals to enter the trade without a 
licence, colonial officials pursued such individuals, as they were outside the control of 
officialdom and likely to stir up trouble.130 
 
The new trader had then to secure supplies. This generally required either significant 
amounts of capital (which the majority of traders did not have at the outset of their 
careers), or an agreement with an established storekeeper to supply him with trade goods 
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on credit. The largest merchant who became explicitly involved in the Indian trade was 
Samuel Eveliegh of Charlestown who supplied a large number of traders with goods and 
also maintained connections within the imperial apparatus. When the founding of Georgia 
was planned in 1731 Eveleigh became a key figure in helping the nascent colony by using 
his contacts among the traders to ensure a welcome for the first colonists and extending a 
line of credit to the organisers of the colony. As a trader became more successful, he might 
gain a licence to trade at a number of Indian towns. As his operation expanded, it would 
become impossible for him to run all the parts of his business personally. This required the 
employment of others. The most common employees in the trade were packhorse men, 
who handled the trains of packhorses which transported goods on the long journey into 
Indian country and deerskins back to the coastal ports where they could be sold to 
merchants who would export them to Europe.131 The trader then was simply one link in a 
much wider economic network.  
 
That was merely the colonial side of the business. Arguably more vital was the trader’s 
ability to secure the trust of the Indian headmen on whose word their ability to settle and 
trade peaceably in the town depended. At the same time the traders needed to trust the 
Indians to whom they sold their goods. Traditionally the deerskin traders advanced goods 
to Indian hunters on credit and collected what they were owed at the close of the hunting 
season when (all being well) the Indians should have hunted the deerskins to pay off their 
debts. The deerskin trade then (like many businesses in the early modern era) was 
fundamentally predicated on trust.132 Merchants trusted that the traders to whom they 
advanced goods would return with deerskins to discharge their debts. Colonial officials 
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trusted that traders would act in the best interests of the colony and would not indulge in 
practises that endangered the colony’s relationship with the Indian confederacies. Traders 
trusted that their customers would bring them deerskins and that their employees would 
serve their interests loyally. This was true both in terms of the day to day functioning of the 
network and for its utility as a way of passing information and rumour. 
 
Unfortunately all these forms of trust could collapse very easily. Ludovic Grant told the 
story of what could happen when that trust broke down in February 1754. Barnard Hughe, 
a trader who operated at the Cherokee town of Kettewa, came through the town with one 
of his employees ‘Debt Hunting’. Turning homeward at the end of the day the two men 
‘mett near to his house, an Indian (Catuchea by name (English the Tail)[sic] who owed him 
four Wieght of Leather’. Catuchea had clearly owed Hughe this debt for some time. At the 
start of the hunting season it seemed that Hughe ‘refused to Trust him [Catuchea] 
Ammunition in the Fall to Kill his Debt, and having but little  Powder he had killed but few 
Deer, and had laid them out to Cloath himself’. Catuchea tried to bargain with the trader 
promising ‘that he would pay him in the Summer or the first he killed should be [Hughe’s]’. 
Hughe, though, was having none of it. He abused the Cherokee calling him names and tried 
to seize his gun which the Indian was carrying, in lieu of the debt, ‘the Indian being 
unwilling to part from it, they both fell upon him with their Horse Whips, and with the Lash 
and Butt ends thereof Cutt and bruised the fellow very much and broke his Gun’. This, it 
seems, was particularly upsetting for the Cherokee as he intended ‘to go to war the next 
day the Enemy having killed a woman 2 Days before belonging to Kettawa’. Bloody, 
bruised, in pain and certainly feeling thoroughly humiliated, Catuchea dashed into a nearby 
house and returned with a gun with which he charged his attackers. Hughe’s employee was 
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closest and took the musket ball, which killed him instantly.133 This incident clearly shows 
the kind of assumptions and assurances on which the deerskin trade depended and the 
violent repercussions that could occur when they were not met. Hughe had relied upon the 
Indian to whom he advanced goods paying his debt and when he failed to do so he felt 
justified in seizing the man’s gun as payment. Catuchea on the other hand had suffered 
both with the accumulated weight of his debts and the fact that Hughe was not prepared 
to advance him the ammunition he needed to meet his obligations. Then, adding injury to 
insult, the trader beat him and took away the item he most needed, both to pay off his 
debts and to fulfil his role as a warrior. In this sense, then, although Catuchea’s thoughts 
are not recorded it may well be that he felt that Hughe had betrayed his trust in him as 
well. There was also a wider agreement, that the traders would not beat Indians over 
questions of debt, which Hughe violated in his treatment of Catuchea, a fact that 
Catuchea’s relations argued in their defence of his actions. As has been shown above it was 
these same fragile bonds of trust which were vital to the passing of information.  
 
Besides these questions of trust the possibilities of trade available with the Indians could 
lead to problems in the colonies. Horse stealing increasingly became a problem. 
Packhorsemen were accused in the South Carolina Gazette of stealing horses while in the 
colonies and selling them once they reached Indian country. Admittedly this may have 
been more a function of lawlessness than an issue of Indian affairs. In the same report, it 
was claimed that many horses were being stolen by ‘travelling Jockeys, who, as there is 
great reason to believe, exchange the horses of different Provinces, and what Horses they 
steal in Virginia or other Northern Colonies they dispose of here and in return carry back 
some of ours’.134 Indeed it could be argued that this suggests that packhorse men were 
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simply being blamed for thefts committed by inter-colonial horse thieves. However the 
belief that horses were being stolen and transported to Indian country was widespread.  
 
There were also those who sought to do to Indians what was believed that they did to 
colonists. In 1745 two Cherokee headmen complained to the South Carolina colonial 
Council that a man named ‘Burgess’ and others had stolen horses from them. The Council 
appears to have agreed with them, as they ordered measures to return the horses or 
compensate the Cherokees. Whether this was due to a genuine belief in the truth of the 
Cherokee allegations or a desire, as the Council put it, ‘to Preserve Peace & good 
Neighbourhood with the Indians’ is not clear. This does seem to have been the first time 
that such allegations had been made, or at the very least the first time that colonial officials 
had accepted such claims. The council remarked that ‘As this Seems, to be the First 
instance of the kind that has happened, So I am of Opinion Some Vigourous measures 
should be Takin[sic]  to make an Example of the First Trangressors’ and thereby ‘prevent 
others Falling into the Like pernicious practices’.135 The colonial government was certainly 
keen to quash any attempts at horse theft wherever they could find it. 
 
The deerskin trade and the traders who supplied it were an important facet of the contacts 
between the British and the Cherokees. Traders established wide ranging networks to 
facilitate their economic activities and integration into Indian society. Those same networks 
were the conduits through which information (including rumours) could flow between the 
British and the Cherokees. These networks were fundamentally built on trust, a vital but 
fragile resource. Lack of trust could impede communication between the Cherokees and 
the British and also disrupt the relationship between traders and other British colonial 
leaders. A symptom of this mistrust was the links made between those associated with the 
                                                          
135
 South Carolina Council to James Glen, 16
th
 July 1745, ‘Notes from Miscellaneos  Papers of His 
majesty’s Council’, State Archives, Columbia, SC. 
66 
 
trade and the theft of horses. In the end the traders were a vital but problematic link 
between the British and the Cherokees. 
 
‘Containing The Freshest Advices Foreign and Domestick’: Colonial newspapers 
 
One of the most effective ways of spreading information throughout the colonies in this era 
was through colonial newspapers. Newspapers were generally issued weekly and carried a 
mixture of foreign and inter-colonial news, articles, and advertisements. Colonial 
newspapers were distributed, both to colonists in their individual colonies and more widely 
throughout British America. This made them a great conduit for rumour and information to 
flow around the colonies.136 Colonial newspapers were quite prepared to openly lift entire 
articles from newspapers sent from other colonies and even from their local rivals. For 
example the New York Gazette of November 20th 1749 included an article regarding ‘the 
horrid Practise of poisoning white People by the Negroes’. The same article was reprinted 
in the Pennsylvania Gazette of November 23rd and then in the Boston Post-Boy of 
December 4th. Most likely these articles were reprinted from despatches sent from the 
southern colonies. This highlights the most important point about newspapers in respect of 
this study, they were filled with rumour. Newspapers printed reports, letters, opinions and 
rumours, often with little or no comment or verification on the part of the paper’s 
editors.137  
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 These newspapers were by no means entirely objective. There was a definite method to 
the information that they felt should be published in the colonies. The South Carolina 
Gazette, the oldest newspaper in the south-eastern colonies, was, in the late 1730s and 
1740s, very firmly focussed eastward in its fears and interests. The paper had a wide range 
of correspondents, both in Britain and on the continent supplying it with information on 
metropolitan and European affairs on almost a weekly basis. On March 8th 1739 for 
example the weekly edition of the paper included correspondence from Stockholm, 
forwarding information from Vienna, Trier and Madrid and from London with news from 
Amsterdam and Jamaica.138 Hardly a week went by without some form of dispatch from 
London or some other major European city. The paper also included regular dispatches 
from the other British coastal colonies. Speeches made by the Governors of North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia appeared on the front cover of the Gazette within a few weeks of 
each other in February 1739.139 It is  clear that Peter Timothy, the Gazette’s long time 
proprietor and editor was firmly convinced that his readers should receive detailed 
information on events in Europe and in South Carolina’s sister colonies.  
 
In this he seems to have been firmly in concert with the establishment of the colony. In 
April 1739, the Gazette carried an advertisement detailing attempts to set up a postal 
system between South Carolina and the Northern colonies. The colonial Assembly had 
voted two hundred pounds a year to fund the service and ‘Several Gentlemen of this Place 
have generously agreed to support the remaining Expence as far as Cape Fear’. It was 
intended that the Post would travel a roughly monthly circuit covering the settlements of 
George-Town, Cape Fear and Edenton, on to the northern colonies and then back to 
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Charlestown.140 While the post route covered an impressive distance, it is notable that it 
did not include any route into the interior of the colony. Indeed in the next issue of the 
Gazette Timothy noted some problems with forwarding the Gazette to subscribers at 
Goose Creek and Ashley Ferry, two locations a relatively short distance inland, certainly 
much closer than the northern regions to which the provincial Assembly was spending a 
considerable amount of money to maintain links.141 
The lack of information from the inland areas of the colony that got to colonists is notable 
in the Gazette of this era. There are very few references either to Indian confederations or 
the backcountry settlements of the colony in the early 1740s. Many of the mentions of 
contact with Native Americans do not even name a specific tribe or confederation, 
referring vaguely and generically  to ‘Indians’ most often in the context of the Indian allies 
of the Spanish. There are a number of possible explanations for this. First and perhaps most 
plausibly, the Gazette was first and foremost a Charlestown paper. Charlestown was a 
coastal settlement and the maritime networks of the British Atlantic were critical to the 
economic prosperity of the town and the success of its most prominent citizens, with 
whom Timothy associated and sympathised. As such the most clear and present danger to 
the paper’s constituency would have been the French and Spanish privateers who proved 
extremely active in harassing British shipping and whose activities were a prominent 
feature of the Gazette’s news pages. Every Gazette included information on the ships 
arriving at Charlestown Harbour, their Captains and their port of embarkation. Reports of 
the political and environmental conditions encountered by ships arriving in Charlestown 
were also eagerly sought. With the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739 the Gazette also 
took an increasing interest in the actions of privateers, both the attacks made by those 
operating under the flag of France or Spain and in those outfitted in support of the British. 
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In one issue in December 1739, the Gazette included information on four separate captures 
of Spanish vessels.142 
 
Second, there is the possibility that local news and intelligence was being communicated 
via other channels and therefore Timothy may have felt it would be redundant to fill the 
pages of the Gazette with information on local events. While it is probable that there was 
an existing network of oral culture and written communication that spread news of events 
locally this is speculative. Such networks existed in practically all societies and given the 
prevalence of rumour in the colonies it would be remarkable if such a network did not exist 
in South Carolina at this time. Despite this it seems equally unlikely that the South Carolina 
Gazette would forgo including local news purely on the basis that there were other 
methods of spreading information.  
 
Finally there was a strong element of political control over the content of colonial 
newspapers. As noted above, colonial newspapers were not free presses, the Gazette was 
subsidized by and was ‘the voice of the local political establishment’.143 Peter Timothy 
himself was a member of the colonial assembly. The Gazette printed, what the political 
establishment wanted it to print and as such may well not have taken an interest in 
concerns about the interior of the colony. For the colonial elite there were perhaps far 
worse things to be worried about. 
 
The War of Jenkins’ Ear 
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One of the things that colonial elites worried about was the on-going war with Spain. This 
war provides an early example of the way that rumours acted upon the minds of British 
leaders and colonists at times of crisis. The War of Jenkins’ Ear began in 1739, ostensibly as 
a result of ‘Spanish depredations upon British Subjects’, most famously the mistreatment 
of an English ship’s captain by Spanish coast guards who were said to have cut off his ear in 
1731 and who, legend has it, displayed the severed ear to a committee of the House of 
Commons when called to give evidence. 144 The war was a great source of fear for many 
colonists and became the context in which many of the rumours of the 1740s developed. 
 
While the major battles of this war happened far from the south eastern colonies, the war 
was a regular part of the public discourse of the colonies and could cause considerable 
panic. As noted above reports of privateer actions in the Atlantic and battles in Europe 
were eagerly reported in colonial newspapers. These naval engagements clearly had a 
significant impact on the minds of colonists and colonial officials during the war particularly 
in Charlestown and other ports. In 1746 a rumour surfaced in the colony that there was a 
Spanish privateer prowling the waters around Charlestown, a prospect that terrified the 
ships’ captains then in port. For several days, ships sailing from Charlestown spied a sail of 
what they believed to be the Spanish privateer and fled back to the safety of the port. But, 
as it transpired, according to the story given by a ship arrived in Charlestown, the sail 
belonged to a Brigantine out of Madeira whose captain had become lost on the Carolina 
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coast and was bewildered that every ship he sought to approach to confirm his position 
fled at the sight of his ship.145 
 
The possibility of Spanish invasion or attack also provides some early examples of news 
from the interior of the colony being reported by the South Carolina Gazette. In December 
of 1739 the Gazette reported that ‘Tis reported in Town that the Spaniards at St. Augustine, 
together with several Indians have destroy’d Several English Families near Georgia’, a 
rumour that the paper confirmed as true in the next edition of the paper.146  The fear of 
these raids was amplified for many in the colony by the methods employed by Indian war 
parties. In 1741, news reached Charlestown of an attack on ‘one of the out Forts of Georgia 
near St. Symonds (garrisoned with Twelve Men and a Serjeant)’, by Indian allies of the 
Spanish.  The attackers were successful in killing several soldiers, ‘they kill’d Four Men 
whose Heads they cut off and carried away together with Four other Prisoners and 
wounded a Woman and Child’.147 It was not only the high casualty rate of this attack - two 
thirds of the fort’s garrison being killed or captured - which would have caused 
consternation within colonial circles, but the post mortem mutilation of the dead. 
Furthermore this was a military fort, manned by troops, generally considered to be the best 
military defensive military measure that Europeans could muster against Indian attack. 
That such a structure could be so utterly vulnerable to so gruesome an attack excited 
tremendous fear among British colonists. The fear that these attacks could come from 
Indians who were reputed to know the colonies better than the colonists did themselves 
was a source of particular worry. In remarking on French and Spanish attempts to 
‘debauch’ Britain’s allies Gabriel Johnstone, governor of North Carolina warned that ‘I cant 
forbear desiring you to consider what mischievous consequences might happen if these 
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People who know the most Secret and shortest Avenue into the very heart of that country 
should be seduced by or join any foreign Indians’.148 Consider it the colonists certainly did. 
The prominent reprinting of Johnstone’s speech in the South Carolina Gazette makes clear 
that these sort of ideas made for good copy in the newspapers.  
 
British Fears and Inter-colonial rivalries. 
The possibility of these raids was something that the colonial authorities had feared for 
some time. William Bull had written to the Lords of Trade in May of 1738, as tensions 
between the various European powers began to rise. He warned that while ‘At the time this 
Memorial was presented the Court of Spain seemed content to have Matters settled 
between the two Crowns in the way of Treaty and accommodation’ but that due to ‘what 
has since happened and the repeated advices we have received from sevl. Parts, the 
Inhabitants of Carolina as well Georgia have just reason to be under the most uneasy 
apprehensions’.149 Bull’s phrasing suggests that the these fears were not limited to the 
colonial elite in Charlestown and that the more inland areas of the colony were providing 
the ‘repeated advices’ that were motivating the colonial leadership to appeal for help to 
the imperial government.  
 
Bull’s reports give a detailed account of some of the rumours of impending war which may 
have been circulating in Charlestown. They warned of a Franco-Spanish conspiracy and ‘the 
Dangers we have just reason to apprehend His Majesty’s Dominions will be exposed to in 
these parts, from the Extensive designs, which ‘tis very Evident both the French and 
Spaniards have in View’.150 Bull claimed that the French and Spanish were seeking an 
alliance against the British and that the French had encouraged the Five Nation Iroquois to 
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attack the Indian nations to the west and south of the British colonies, while he does not 
specifically name the Cherokees as victims of Iroquois aggression it seems likely given they 
would have been in the path of any raiding parties coming south and the Cherokees were 
often the targets of Iroquois wars. Bull further described a possible expedition by the 
French against the Chickasaws, who had been the targets of repeated attacks by the French 
and their allies since the early eighteenth century. In particular, Bull warned that one 
thousand French troops had been sent south from Canada to take part in the attack, an 
overwhelming number given that the Chickasaws at this time had perhaps four or five 
hundred fighters in total.151 Bull warned that even if the French only intended to use these 
troops in defeating the Chickasaws ‘it would still have an influence that will certainly prove 
of the worst consequence to all the Settlements near the Frontiers of North America’. He 
argued that an invasion of this magnitude against an Indian Nation by the French ‘will 
infallibly Strike such a Terror amongst all other Indians who are alliance with the English 
that it will render their Friendship very precarious , if not wholly Secure them to the 
French’.  This was something of profound existential consequence to the British colonies ‘if 
our Indians are either conquer’d or destroy’d  by the French , or gain’d by Art or Terror to 
their Interest, the Dangers to which the English Settlements will be exposed – are too 
Obvious to stand in need of any remark or Explanation’.152 In this analysis Bull shows a 
shrewd understanding of the realities of war and politics in the backcountry. A force of one 
thousand trained and well armed men was a significant factor in the balance of power in 
the colonial south-east and most Indian Nations would be unable to stop a force of that 
size in its tracks. Faced with such an army the Indians would be likely to do what they were 
often extremely good at, attempt to ally themselves to or placate the French, a possibility 
which struck terror into the British colonists.   
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Having suggested the impact that a thousand trained troops could make in the 
backcountry, Bull then claimed that an expedition of seven thousand men, mostly regulars, 
were to leave Havana. Furthermore, these troops would be likely to be backed by fifteen 
hundred French troops and their Indian allies. Bull speculated darkly that such a force could 
not be intended only to invade Georgia as the Spanish were suggesting.  Faced with such a 
force Bull believed that South Carolina and Georgia could raise between them only three to 
four thousand men, mostly militia who would be thinly stretched throughout the colonies. 
To make matters worse, Bull believed that the planters and large slave owners were likely, 
when danger threatened, to focus their efforts on moving themselves and their slaves 
north as far as possible from the threat of Spanish attack, meaning not only 
impoverishment for the colony but the loss of many of the colonies richest individuals, 
traditionally the leaders of the local militias. 
 
The details of this report are illustrative of the uncertainty of the information that colonial 
leaders had to work with. Bull offered no clarification or source for his claim of an 
impending attack or for the makeup of the expedition. The likelihood is that he based the 
claim on ‘advices’ received from sources in the backcountry or among the Indian towns 
and, in the case of the claimed massive Spanish invasion force, from ships arriving in 
Charlestown. Bull was basing his reports and entreaties on the rumours which were 
circulating within the colony and which were intended to fill the gap in knowledge about 
what was happening to the west of the British colonies. For the British the most logical 
answer to this question was that their enemies were conspiring against them. These 
numbers were huge for a military force in the south-eastern colonies, especially given that 
the French and Spanish outposts in the southeast had always been erratically supplied and 
lightly manned at the best of times. Indeed in 1740 it was claimed in British circles that ‘as 
that Place )St. Augustine) [sic] is not able to make any defence, and 5 or 6 hundred Men 
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would be able to take it’.153 That the weakness of the Spanish position in Florida was so 
widely known raises the possibility that Bull was overemphasising the danger in order to 
secure resources from the imperial government. At the same time the fear of invasion by 
Britain’s rivals and more particularly by the possibility of Indian Nations switching their 
alliance from Britain to her enemies was certainly extremely real.  
 
The warnings offered by Bull were echoed several years later in a petition to the King. The 
petition warned of an impending invasion by more than four and a half thousand Spanish 
troops, a number that the militia simply could not cope with especially given that ‘part of 
them must be left in time of alarm in their Several districts to guard against any 
insurrection which might otherwise possibly be made at the same time by their slaves’.154 
Clearly then, these concerns and rumours were an on-going feature of life in the British 
colonies. 
 
The British and their allies were also extremely active in raiding the Spanish and French 
during wartime. In November of 1741, for example a ‘Party of Indians’ captured ‘the 
Lieutenant of Don Pedro’s Troop and a private Man, which Prisoners say, that the Gov. Of 
the Havannah has sent to St. Augustine for Assistance, from which you may judge their 
Condition’.155 The capture of prisoners was the major route for intelligence gathering 
during the war. In March of 1742 a letter from Frederica noted that ‘From St. Augustine we 
have had no news since the taking of the 5 Yamasee... however we hope soon to hear from 
thence either by Prisoners or Deserters’.156 The acquisition of information seems to have 
been a central advantage of this style of warfare for European and colonial officials who 
lacked other methods of discovering the situation outside their own domain. The hunger 
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for information was widespread and news could in some cases be rapidly disseminated, 
even if it might be seen as detrimental to the British cause. The South Carolina Gazette 
reported a letter in April 1745, from Fort Frederica on the Georgia coast, which disclosed, 
‘That the Indian Scouts from that Garrison have lately made a Tour towards St. Augustine, 
in which Harbour they desern’d upwards of 30, some said 50 sail of Vessels’. Such a sight 
was highly alarming. This was the case both to the Indians, ‘most agree d that their 
numbers was so great as to resemble rather a Cloud or a Forest’ and to the Georgia 
colonists, ‘as there is rarely above 7 or 8 Vessels in that Harbour, this uncommon number 
of Ships gives the Georgians some Apprehensions of an Invasion from the French and 
Spanish’157  
 
The British had some success in recruiting Cherokees into the raiding parties and invasion 
forces that they sent against the Spanish. In September 1739, Thomas Eyre had been 
despatched to Augusta carrying a number of commissions to recruit various Indian 
confederacies to join the British in an attack on St. Augustine.  His own commission ordered 
him to attempt to recruit as many Cherokees as possible. On arriving at Toogaloo the 
headmen of a number of nearby towns congregated to hear his speech. At this stage these 
Cherokee headmen do not seem to have been keen to recommend large numbers of their 
countrymen to join with the British in an attack on heavily fortified enemies far to the 
south. They argued that ‘they had lost most of their young men by the Small pox, that the 
living were Scarcely Sufficient to bury the dead, that those few who remained alive were 
out hunting’. Nevertheless they did agree that if Eyre returned in three months time those 
who could would go with him against the Spanish.158  
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Eyre returned in January 1740 and met with greater success. In April 1740, the South 
Carolina Gazette excitedly reported that several colonial officers had arrived in Uchee 
Indian town near Savannah ‘with a large party of the Chief Warriours of the Cherokee 
Indians, there are great Numbers to follow them but those, being impatient for War came 
first several of them have killed 20 or 30 men with their own Hands, different battles’.159 
The involvement of the Cherokees in an attack on Britain’s enemies was something that 
was eagerly looked for in the colony especially as there was clearly significant concern that 
the Spanish might succeed in persuading Britain’s Indian allies into turning on the colonies. 
Only a week before, the Gazette had printed a speech by North Carolina Governor Gabriel 
Johnstone to the colonial assembly in which the Governor warned the assembly ‘that the 
French and Spaniards have, taken of late, uncommon pains to Debauch all the friendly 
Indians, who live in the neighbourhood of his Majesties Dominions all over America, from 
their Friendship and Alliance with his subjects’. That this warning came from a colony to the 
north may even have added to anxiety amongst those in South Carolina and Georgia, which 
were and thought of themselves as, vulnerable, frontier provinces and the likely initial 
target of any Indian war that their enemies might unleash. Johnstone further amplified the 
threat by insinuating that ‘I found our Indians last summer highly discontented and even 
threatening to leave the Province , because they are not allowed to hunt within the 
Settlements’.160 As discussed above the fear of war made by Indians in league with the 
Spanish or French was a continuing fear for British colonies and the securing of Indian allies 
to carry out similar raids on the French and Spanish acted as a confidence boost to many in 
the colony.  
 
‘Our peculiar Case’ Slave Rebellion and colonial fears  
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While the threat of an attack by other European powers or their Indian allies was a source 
of dread and excited rumour, the biggest single fear to afflict the south eastern colonies 
was that of potential slave rebellion. While large scale organised slave insurrections were 
relatively rare in North America, the fear of slave violence was very much a clear and 
continuing factor in colonial discourse. A regular feature of correspondence and public 
discourse in this era in the southern colonies was a serious concern over the possibility of 
slave rebellion. The South Carolina Colonial Assembly perhaps summed it up best in their 
report following the British attack on St. Augustine:   
 
‘With Regret we bewailed our peculiar Case, that we could not enjoy the Benefits 
of Peace like the rest of Mankind; and that our own Industry should be the Means 
of taking from us all the Sweets of Life, and of rendering us liable to the loss of our 
Lives and Fortunes’161 
 
Leaving aside the obvious irony of this lament it does give an insight into the concerns and 
preoccupation of southerners (particularly slaveholders) in this era. The colonists were in 
the difficult position of desiring the prosperity that plantation slavery had brought them 
while fearing the very slaves whose labour made possible their fortunes. Slave labour was a 
central, defining, feature of economic life in Virginia, North and South Carolina and, despite 
an initial prohibition placed on slavery by the Trustees who funded and ruled the colony for 
its first two decades of existence, Georgia.162 Rice agriculture relied on slave knowledge of 
rice cultivation, slaves wielded the axes that cleared woodland and the shovels and picks 
that diverted the swamps into productive rice growing land. Slaves also carried out jobs 
                                                          
161
 South Carolina Colonial Assembly, ‘Report of the Committee of both Houses to Enquire into the 
late Expedition against St. Augustine’, (Charlestown, SC, 1743), microfilm, South Carolina State 
Archives, Columbia, South Carolina. 
162
 On the development of slavery see Philip D Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the 
Eighteenth-Century Chesepeake and Lowcountry (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), Betty Wood, Slavery in 
Colonial Georgia, 1730-1775 (Athens, GA, 1984). 
79 
 
which took them beyond the centres of their master’s power. They acted as navigators, 
messengers and guides.163 The ubiquity of slaves in the southern colonies made the 
possibility of their resistance a truly fearful prospect for their owners. 
 
While large scale organised rebellion by slaves was a rare occurrence in colonial North 
America, South Carolina was the site of the Stono Rebellion, the largest slave rebellion in 
mainland colonial North America. On September 9th 1739, a group of slaves met at the 
Stono River. They moved on Stono Bridge, seizing guns from a local store, killing five whites 
and burning a house before pushing south. The rebels advanced on a tavern, they spared 
the innkeeper’s life as he was known for being kind to his slaves but killed several others 
and burned four houses.164 The violence and arson served a number of purposes. First, it 
spread terror among whites and may have satisfied the urge to exact some cathartic 
vengeance on those who had mistreated the rebelling slaves. Second, it spread news of the 
revolt to other slaves, particularly through the burning houses which would have been 
highly visible for a significant distance around. 
 
By late afternoon the rebels stopped at Jacksonburough ferry on the Edisto River. As the 
slaves rested at the ferry, Lieutenant Governor Bull arrived with around one hundred 
militiamen. In the ensuing battle the militia defeated the rebels, a group of thirty of whom 
escaped. The militia released those slaves they believed had been coerced into joining the 
rebellion and killed those they considered active rebels. To make the point about the cost 
of rebellion abundantly clear the militia decapitated a few of the executed rebels and stuck 
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their heads on posts as a ghoulish warning.165 There was another battle thirty miles to the 
south the following Sunday when a further group of runaway slaves was defeated by 
colonial militia. For both the rebelling slaves and the vengeful colonial militia a key aim in 
the course of the rebellion was to incite fear among their enemies. Whether by burning 
buildings or by sticking the heads of dead rebels on posts, the important thing was to make 
clear that they controlled the monopoly on violence. 
 
The central events of the Stono Rebellion were over rapidly, occurring over the course of 
approximately a week. But the long term impact on the psyche of southern British slave 
holders and on the society they ruled was considerable. The escaped slaves were not 
eliminated for some time. Perhaps thirty slaves escaped the first battle at the Edisto River, 
a white resident claimed that in the two weeks following the battle the militia forces ‘kill’d 
twenty odd more, and took about 40’, with others coming in voluntarily.166 These numbers 
are difficult to verify, in the whirlwind of events and panic surrounding the violence at 
Stono, a number of conflicting reports have emerged concerning the numbers involved and 
killed in the fighting.  
 
Despite the defeat of the rebellion rumours about the danger of slave revolt continued to 
grip the region. Andrew Leslie, parson of St. Paul parish noted several months after the 
rebellion that ‘several of my principal Parishioners, being apprehensive of Danger from ye 
Rebels Still outstanding carried their Families to Town for Safety, & if y Humour of moving 
continues a little longer, I shall have but a Small Congregation at Church’.167 The spectre of 
surviving veterans of the Stono Rebellion continued to hang over the white population of 
the south-eastern colonies for some time. Some three years after the supposed end of the 
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rebellion, ‘one of the Ringleaders in the late Negro Insurrection’ was seized and executed. 
Interestingly this seems to have been affected by two slaves, ‘Negro Fellows that ran away 
from Mr Grimke’.168 Whether the pair had chosen to abscond with the intention of bringing 
in the Stono ringleader is not clear but it seems possible that they chose to do so in hopes 
of reward (possibly including their freedom, which was granted to one slave for his actions 
during the revolt in defending his master). 
 
Besides the overt violence of bloodbaths like the Stono Rebellion there were also examples 
in the early 1740s of more secretive and (for many whites more fearful) conspiracies. The 
greatest of these occurred in 1741, in New York, the North American city with the second 
highest concentration of slaves after Charlestown. In this conspiracy large numbers of 
slaves and a smaller number of whites were suspected of being involved in a plot to burn 
the city and kill the wealthy inhabitants. The conspiracy span out of a number of robberies 
and arsons which occurred in the winter of 1740-41 and which drew in slaves, the crew of a 
Spanish ship held in New York, white servants, a prostitute and a well- known local 
innkeeper and fence.169  The authorities in New York firmly believed that there was a 
conspiracy between all these marginal people to cause property damage and loss of life in 
the city. Perhaps the most fearful thing about the conspiracy for many slaveholders in the 
southern colonies was the apparent combination between slaves and other groups that the 
slaveholding elites of the colonies considered undesirable. 
 
In August 1741, Boatswain, ‘A Negro-Man Slave’ confessed and was hanged for setting a 
fire with ‘the malicious and Evil Intent of burning down the remaining part of the Town’.170 
Boatswain was arrested following the earlier conviction of Kate, a slave woman who was 
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blamed for letting Boatswain into the house where the fire was set. While Kate had initially 
claimed that no-one else had conspired with her in setting the fire, when faced with the 
prospect of execution for the crime she pointed the finger of accusation at Boatswain. 
While this incident was nowhere near the scale of the events in New York there are a 
number of similarities. There is a similar pattern of slaves being convicted of offences and 
accusing others to gain clemency for themselves. In both cities the suspected conspiracies 
were uncovered in a background of increased tension and traumatic events. In the case of 
South Carolina, the port of Charlestown had suffered from a huge fire which had destroyed 
large areas of the town and caused widespread hardship.  
 
For South Carolinian colonists the horror of this fire was coupled with an intense fear of a 
conspiracy. The colonial authorities were so fearful about this possibility that they placed 
an embargo on all shipping out of the colony for thirty days ‘as it is not known how far this 
Accident may encourage our Negroes and other Enemies to form some dangerous Scheme’ 
with ‘the Ship only allowed to sail which brings this deplorable Advice’.171 With much of the 
city burned and many colonists in distress the colonial authorities were still critically 
concerned to control information about the disaster and keep knowledge of the colonies 
weakened state from reaching those who might want to take advantage of it. Whether the 
insecurity caused by the fire was an element in making Charlestownians more wary of 
possible slave insurrection is uncertain, but incidents both in the colonial era and beyond 
have suggested that insecurity, whether due to war, disease or natural disaster can often 
be a major factor in causing increased levels of anxiety, rumour and panic.   
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Yet the defeat of the Stono Rebellion and subsequent legislation designed to limit slave 
movements and interaction did not calm white anxieties.172 Even years after the rebellion, 
South Carolinians continued to be in extreme fear of interactions between their human 
property. In 1742, the colonial Grand Jury complained ‘We present THE TOO COMMON 
PRACTISE of CRIMINAL CONVERSATION with NEGRO and other SLAVE WENCHES IN THIS 
PROVINCE, as an Enormity and Evil of general Ill-Consequence.’173 Slave interaction was 
clearly a difficult thing for the colony to prohibit. Two years later the Grand Jury 
complained of ‘the Pernicious Practise of the Negroes in Charlestown playing at Dice and 
other Games... likewise the ill consequences which may attend the gathering together such 
great Numbers of Negroes, both in Town and Country at their Burials and on the Sabbath 
Day’.174 Despite their best efforts the colonial authorities were not able to prevent slaves 
from meeting one another. For slave owning colonists this element of conspiracy was a 
central part of their fears about slave insurrection. 
 
 As part of the wider fear of conspiracy among slaves it was generally believed by colonial 
officials and the colonial press, that the Spanish were active in encouraging and supporting 
rebellious slaves. The role of the Spanish in ‘seducing’ the slaves of British colonists into 
running away was a great concern for the British and was often cited as a cause of slave 
rebellion and restiveness. A report claimed that the Spanish had ‘promised Protection and 
Freedom to all Negroes [sic] Slaves that would resort thither [to Saint Augustine]’.175   
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In January 1739, as Charlestown was still reeling from a smallpox epidemic, Lt. Governor 
Bull convened the colonial Assembly. Despite the ongoing threat of disease the primary 
issue which had drawn the delegates to Charlestown was the numbers of slaves that 
seemed to be disappearing. In July of 1739 a Spanish Captain of the Horse arrived in 
Charlestown from St. Augustine, purportedly for the purpose of delivering a letter to 
General Oglethorpe. This claim was greeted with scepticism in South Carolina (not without 
reason, given that Oglethorpe was headquartered in Frederica, significantly to the south). 
Following the Stono Rebellion it was also claimed that there had been a black man among 
the Spanish party who spoke excellent English and it was rumoured that the Spanish ship 
had put into numerous inlets on its return south.176 In late July, the authorities in Georgia 
seized a man that ‘had been skulking in Town’. Following an examination, the Georgians 
were able to convince their prisoner to admit his nationality to be Spanish, the man was 
held as a potential spy and it was claimed that he could have been on the Spanish ship 
when it arrived in Charlestown.177 In April 1739 four slaves stole some horses and rode for 
Florida, killing a white man and evading a large posse. One was killed by British allied 
Indians but others broke through to St. Augustine where they were welcomed by the 
Spanish governor.178  All these incidents served to alarm both the colonial authorities and 
the slave owning polity of the colony. The colonial Assembly voted to employ two new 
scout boats in patrolling the southern coast and offered significant rewards for the capture 
or scalping of runaways. Planters became increasingly nervous about the intentions of their 
slaves. Reverend Lewis Jones of St. Helena parish observed that the numbers of escapees 
following the Spanish proclamation ‘Considerably Encrease the Prejudice of Planters agst 
the Negroes, and Occasion a Strict hand, to be kept over them by their Several Owners’.179  
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Besides more stringent and overbearing treatment of slaves, the colonists sought to 
engender loyalty in their slaves with a programme that allowed slaves to gain their 
freedom for acts of bravery or loyalty. In 1742 when the colony feared a potential invasion, 
they claimed that ‘numbers of the Slaves may be no doubt relyed on for their fidelity, and 
any of them that shall kill an enemy in Sight of [a white man] are (by the Laws of the 
Province) Intitled to their freedom’. The colonial Assembly was so concerned about this 
that they offered to ‘confirm the freedom of all Negroes and Others who have been or shall 
be Slaves to any of the Inhabitants of this Province that already have or shall have after 
having been taken make their escape from his Majesty’s Enemys and return to this 
Province’, a policy that Governor Glen approved declaring, ‘I apprehend it might prevent 
their engaging in the service of the Enemy and be an encouragement to them to desert 
from them’.180 Despite the brutality of the slave system, south-eastern slave owners were 
prepared to try almost anything to prevent their slaves conspiring with the Spanish. 
 
It is certainly the case that the Spanish sought to weaken the British colonies by welcoming 
escaped slaves. The idea of Florida as a potential escape from slavery in British America 
was clearly widespread among slaves in the southern colonies as evidenced by the decision 
of so many escaped slaves to turn south. The British firmly believed that individuals such as 
the traveller arrested in Savannah were responsible for spreading the word of the Spanish 
proclamation among slaves. Following the escape of the slaves mentioned above to St. 
Augustine, General Oglethorpe sent Lieutenant Demere (Raymond Demere, who took 
command of Frederica following Oglethorpe’s departure), to reclaim the slaves from 
Florida. But the Governor of St. Augustine responded by showing Demere orders that he 
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had received from the Spanish government to shelter all runaway slaves.181 This was clearly 
an ongoing problem, a decade later in 1749 a newspaper report claimed that: 
 
‘It seems the Spaniards at St. Augustine, notwithstanding the late general Peace, 
still continue the old Grievance complain’d of by this Province so long since as 2 or 
3 Years before the Commencement of the War, and continued with it, of 
encouraging the Desertion of Slaves to them, from their Owners in this Province, to 
the great Damage and Loss of many of our Planters and other his Majesty’s good 
Subjects, by declaring them free on their Arrival and protecting them as Spanish 
Subjects’  
 
 Around the same time Governor James Glen of South Carolina again despatched Demere 
in an embassy to St. Augustine to demand the return of the slaves of South Carolinian 
planters ‘as those Slaves are the Absolute Property of many of the Planters who live in the 
Outparts of this Government’. On this occasion Glen further attempted to evoke fear 
among the Spanish by warning that the planters ‘Live in great Friendship with the Indian 
Nations around us’ and that ‘You apprehend that Rewards may be Privately offered to 
induce them to Recover those Slaves and there can be no doubt but that they will Seize all 
Negroes indiscriminately and that the Consequences of drawing down Indian Nations to 
the Gates of St. Augustine are too plain to need being enlarged upon’.182 In this situation 
Glen seems to have been aiming to introduce an element of fear into the calculations of 
the Spanish by threatening possible Indian war against Florida. 
 
The place of American Indians in relation to rebelling slaves is less obvious. On the one 
hand many Indians were involved in hunting slaves following escapes or rebellions. 
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Following the Stono Rebellion a number of Indians aided in the attempts to recapture 
fleeing slaves and the Commons committee ordered that they should ‘be severally 
rewarded with a Coat, a Flap, a Hat, a pair of Indian Stockings, a Gun, 2 Pounds of Powder 
& 8 Pounds of Bullets’.183 In 1744 James Glen called on the assistance of the Notchee 
Indians in destroying a settlement of escaped slaves (known as maroons), it seems likely 
that the Notchees would have been rewarded in a similar way to those Indians who 
assisted the colony following Stono.184 This co-opting of Indians as slave catchers extended 
to the Cherokees in their mountainous homeland, the treaty signed by those Cherokees 
who visited London in 1730 included a provision that ‘If any negroes shall run away into the 
woods from their English masters, the Cherokees shall endeavour to apprehend them and 
bring them to the plantation from which they ran away, or to the Governor, and for every 
slave so apprehended and brought back, the Indian that brings him shall receive a gun and 
a matchcoat’.185  
 
Many influential whites were enthused about the antipathy between Indians and blacks. 
John Brickell claimed that Indians had a ‘natural aversion to the Blacks’186 and George 
Milligen Johnston, a colonial physician believed that there was a ‘natural Dislike and 
Antipathy, that subsists between them [Blacks] and our Indian Neighbors’.187 They were 
assiduous in trying to make their claims reality. As well as offering significant rewards for 
the capture of escaped slaves the colonists attempted a number of strategies to ensure 
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suspicion between blacks and Indians. They put in place a number of laws to keep Indians 
and slaves from interacting, preventing Indians from visiting the colony except on official 
business and hurrying headmen to the colonial capital when they did come to the colonies. 
The fear of association between the Indians and black slaves, ‘particularly in regard to their 
talking, and having too great Intercourse with our Slaves, at the outplantations, where they 
camp’ was acute, suggesting that the level of Indian-black hostility was as much a wish as a 
fact.188  
 
In part this fear can be explained by the whites’ belief that, when slaves and Indians talked 
in private they were plotting against the colonies. This was the case as far back as the 
Yamasee War of 1712-15; as the attacking Indians drove the colonists further and further 
back towards the sea, the colonists sought desperately for the assistance of the Cherokees. 
As the Cherokees weighed their options, ‘2 Rogues of negroes run away from ye English 
and came and told them [the Cherokees] a parcel of lies which hindered their coming’  
which almost led to the defeat of South Carolina.189 As the number of black slaves 
multiplied, particularly in the homes and estates of the colonial elites, it became more 
likely that they might overhear something which might cause a breach between the British 
and the Indians. Although the British always accused the slaves of lying in these situations, 
it was quite conceivable for information on genuine British actions to cause a rift with the 
Cherokees. This possibility was, of course, all the more reason for the British to attempt 
everything they could to prevent blacks and Indians from developing a relationship.190  
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These fears were not entirely without foundation. There was clearly some degree of 
interaction between Indians and slaves in the backcountry and some escaped slaves do 
seem to have attempted to carry rumours of British machinations into Indian country. In 
1751 Richard Smith, then trader at Keowee claimed: 
 
‘Three runaway Negroes of Mr Gray’s told the Indians, as they said that the white 
people were coming up to destroy them all, and that they had got some Creek 
Indians to assist them so to do . Which obtained belief and the more for that the 
Old Warrior of Kewee said some Negroes had applied to him, and told him that 
there was in all Plantations  many Negroes more than white people, and that for 
the Sake of Liberty they would join him’191 
 
In the case of the Cherokees, in particular, the colonists feared that, even if the Cherokees 
did not enter into an alliance with escaped slaves, organised parties of maroons would 
succeed in establishing large, self-sustaining communities in the mountainous Cherokee 
homeland where white troops would be unable to move against them. As one colonial 
official warned: 
 
‘In our Quarrels with the Indians, however proper and necessary it may be to give 
them Correction, it can never be in our interest to extirpate them, or to force them 
from their Lands: their Grounds would soon be taken up by runaway Negroes from 
our Settlements, whose Numbers would daily increase and quickly become more 
formidable enemies than Indians can ever be, as they speak our language and 
would never be at a Loss for Intelligence’192 
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Many Indians were also extremely enthusiastic slavers. For the Cherokees this enthusiasm 
had gone back to the days when Indians were still used in significant numbers as slaves and 
the capture of other Indians in war for sale to the colonists as slaves had been a valuable 
trade. Slavery had been a feature of Cherokee life long before the arrival of Europeans 
although it differed markedly from the plantation slavery practiced by British colonists.193  
The Cherokees certainly felt no specific moral objection to the institution of slavery. 
Following the Yamasee war, and the increased realization by whites that Indian slaves 
might represent a particular threat given their greater knowledge of the local environment 
and possible ties to their old lives in the interior, the market for enslaved Indians declined 
rapidly.  
 
Many Indians, including the Cherokees, switched to the capturing of black slaves. The 
rewards for returning escaped slaves were considerable and many Indians took advantage 
of this. A group of Cherokee warriors for example found two black men who had fled 
slavery and had carved a farm out of the forest in what is now east Tennessee.194 The 
Cherokees seized the blacks and returned them to captivity. A further development of the 
practise, followed by some Cherokees was simply to acquire black slaves in one location, 
then resell them in another. The Cherokee slavers gained the slaves either through 
violence, as in the case of one group of Cherokees who ‘took by Force a Negro Boy away 
out of John Geiger’s House, when there were but two Women in it, whom they threatened 
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to shoot as they offered Resistance’, or by promising them their freedom, once they were 
clear of the colonies. A planter in South Carolina complained in 1751 of ‘the half-Breed 
fellow  who came down from the Cherokee Nation in Company with John Maxwell, [who] 
did seduce 6 of my Negroes to run away from me into the Cherokees, from whence they 
might depend upon their freedom’.195 Whether using force or persuasion some Cherokees 
were able to make a significant career in robbing British colonists of their human property. 
 
While the Cherokees in the mid eighteenth century did not operate a plantation system of 
slavery in the same sense of that used in the British colonies they did keep blacks as 
captives within their society. Antoine Bonnefoy, during his captivity in 1739, encountered 
one such group: ‘We found also a negro and a negress who formerly belonged to the 
widow Saussier, and having been sold in 1739 to a Canadian, deserted when on the 
Ouabache, on their way to Canada, and were captured by a troop of Cheraquis who 
brought them to the same village where I found them’.196 
 
On the other hand the Cherokee relationship towards blacks was rather more complex 
than this picture might suggest. It is not clear that the escaped slaves who had been 
captured were actually being held as prisoners. Bonnefoy himself was adopted into a 
Cherokee clan and was allowed to move freely shortly after his arrival in the Cherokee 
town. It is not certain whether or not the same process of adoption might be carried out on 
the escaped slaves. During the journey into the Cherokee country ‘Legras’s Negroe’ was 
released by the Cherokees and told to return to the French. This seems to have been more 
a function of the wound that the man was suffering from rather than an indication of 
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different treatment based upon race.197  As late as the 1770s a black slave woman named 
Molly had been adopted into the Cherokee Deer clan and had taken the name Chickaw. In 
1833 when the descendent of her former owner tried to claim her and her children as 
slaves the Cherokee council declared their intention ‘to resist this oppression and illegal 
wrong attempted to be practised on our Brother and Sister...in carrying into slavery Two of 
whom have been and considered native Cherokee’.198 Given that these events occurred as 
late as the nineteenth century it seems unrealistic to maintain the contention that 
Cherokees held a rigidly racial view of slavery and black slaves. It seems likely that 
Cherokees viewed black captives much as they did whites, as potential adoptees who could 
be brought into Cherokee society if they would add something useful. The central 
difference between white and black captives in Indian societies seems to be that colonial 
society placed such a premium on the return of escaped slaves that the goods offered by 
the British simply made slaves of greater value to Indians as a commodity to be traded to 
the British than as a potential adoptees and new members of their society. 
Slavery, and the attendant fear of slave rebellion, was an ever present concern for 
inhabitants of the south eastern colonies. The ambiguous relationship between the 
Cherokees and black slaves gave further cause for concern as slave-owners sought futilely 
to comprehend and control the interactions between these two potentially hostile groups. 
Along with the fear of attack by Britain’s imperial rivals this created an atmosphere of 
tension and fear. Fear and uncertainty created the ideal environment for rumours to 
emerge. It was through this prism that the British understandings of the Cherokees were 
fed in the 1740s. Concerns about the Cherokees were generally tied to their association 
with slaves or European rivals. 
 
‘An odd sort of fellow’ Christian Priber and British fears. 
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Although he is shrouded in mystery, perhaps the figure who best encapsulates these fears 
and nightmares of the British south eastern colonies was Christian Priber. Priber was born 
in Germany and was highly educated, speaking Latin, French, Spanish, German and English. 
He travelled to South Carolina via England in about 1734 and is thought to have entered 
the Cherokee town of Tellico in 1736. While it has been claimed that Priber went into the 
Cherokee country as an agent of the French, on his arrival there Priber adopted Cherokee 
clothes, learned the language and seems to have gained a position of general trust. Priber 
then set to work putting into execution a plan he claimed  to have been working on for 
twenty years and which he believed had led to his being ejected first from France, then 
Britain and finally South Carolina. Priber hoped to create a new society at the foot of the 
Cherokee mountains. Priber intended that this society should consist of ‘a general society 
of those composing it, in which, beyond the fact that legality should be perfectly observed 
as well as liberty, each would find what he needed’, or as Priber himself termed it ‘the 
Kingdom of Paradise’.  Priber claimed to have significant support for his scheme, that some 
100 Carolina traders had signed up for his scheme and had returned to Carolina to recruit 
more and that the Cherokees were urging him to set up his “Kingdom” on their land.199 
Nonetheless it is not clear how much support Priber actually had for his plan. The Governor 
of South Carolina called on the Cherokees to give Priber up but they refused and seem to 
have adopted him into the nation.  
 
What so alarmed the British about Priber was that he proposed to set up a society ‘of all 
conditions and occupations’ and ‘that in his Republic there would be no superiority; that all 
should be equal there’ that goods were to be held in common and that even women were 
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to enjoy equal rights with men.200 It seems unlikely the British would have tolerated a 
community such as this as a new place of refuge for escaped slaves, especially given the 
place of the community on the edge of Cherokee territory and as a possible staging post for 
maroons looking to establish themselves in the mountains. In the end they would not 
tolerate it. Priber was never to succeed in setting up his community. While travelling to 
Mobile he was captured by Upper Creeks who turned him over to General Oglethorpe at 
Frederica. Oglethorpe described Priber as “an odd sort of fellow” and locked him in jail 
where he died shortly afterwards.  
 
Priber is noteworthy perhaps less for his actual achievements than what he represented to 
the British colonies. Priber’s ‘Kingdom of Paradise’ in between the Cherokees and the 
British was a potential nightmare for the colonial authorities. They foresaw a society where 
the stratifications of rank would count for nothing and where runaway slaves could mix 
with traders and Indians, with the French a shadowy presence in the background.  This 
possibility played upon all the British fears and paranoias. Despite the death of Priber, the 
British continued to live in fear of a conspiracy regardless of their ongoing claims of 
friendship with the Cherokee and other Indians. 
 
James Glen and rumour in Indian diplomacy 
 
Despite the mistrust of Indians in the colonies, there were attempts by British officials to 
engage with the Cherokees, rumour played an important part in these gambits. In this 
context rumour could be a calming influence helping to facilitate agreements between the 
Cherokees and the British. Governor James Glen of South Carolina was a pivotal figure in 
shaping South Carolina’s policy towards the nearby Indian nations. Following his arrival in 
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the colony in 1743, he brought a new degree of energy and determination to the 
prosecution of Indian affairs. Glen would go on, in later years, to emphasise the importance 
of Indian affairs in a book he wrote about the colony that he governed for so long. He 
declared that ‘not only a great Branch of our Trade, but even the Safety of this Province, do 
so much depend upon our continuing in Friendship with the Indians, that I thought it highly 
necessary to gain all the Knowledge I could of them’.201 As part of developing this expertise, 
Glen became adept at using rumour and suggestion in diplomatic relations with his Indian 
neighbours.  
 
In 1745 Glen sought to make a major diplomatic step forward for his colony and invited a 
large number of Cherokee and Catawba headmen to Charlestown including the young 
‘Emperor’, son of Moytoy. Glen spoke at length to the headmen on the virtues of the 
British King and his role as a ‘common father’ to both the British colonists and the Indians. 
He further promised to send more traders into the Cherokee nation to supply them with 
goods. The Cherokee headman Skiagusta, answered on behalf of the young Emperor saying 
that ‘We RED MEN live a great Way from the White People, but yet we live all upon the 
same land ; tho the white People every Day come nearer and nearer and Settling up 
towards us, yet it is all our Land’. In this way Skiagusta voiced Cherokee concerns about the 
beginnings of white encroachment onto Cherokee lands.  
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Still, given the usefulness of European trade goods to the Cherokees, Skiagusta declared 
their willingness to live in amity with the British ‘And as Long as we keep these Papers no 
mischief shall happen to the white People, for the Great King George said, that as long as 
the Sun moves in the Heavens we never should want goods’. The statement was extremely 
carefully worded. the Cherokees would keep the peace, would choose to keep the papers 
given them by the governor and ‘no mischief shall happen to the white People’. 202 But this 
was worded as a Cherokee decision and explicitly tied to the provision of the goods that the 
Cherokee wanted. If the British failed in their promise to provide the Cherokee with a trade 
this peaceful outlook could change.  
 
Glen was extremely active in Indian affairs. At the same time as he met with the Cherokees 
he spoke to the Catawbas and a year later he met with headmen of both nations again at 
Ninety Six. Glen’s theme at Ninety Six was a common one among British officials talking to 
Indians, the untrustworthiness of the French. He warned the Catawbas that ‘The French 
desirous to destroy you and all the Indians in Amity with us, but sensible of their want of 
Strength, have Recourse to Strategem’.203 Glen’s first appeal was to flattery, claiming that 
the French ‘know that your undaunted Courage, added to the Powerful Protection and 
Assistance of the English, would drive them out of your Country, and make them fly before 
you like a Herd of timorous Deer’. At this point the colonial Governor attempted a level of 
impassioned eloquence that he hoped would impress his audience: 
 
‘they therefore attempt you by Cunning, and try to draw you into an Alliance that 
would prove Fatal to you: but oh my Friends, trust not their Treacherous Tongues, 
their Mouths are full of Perfidy and Fraud, and their Lips are accustomed to 
deceive: Arts that I am unacquainted with, Arts that I shall ever be a Stranger to; 
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Let the French Governors pursue the low and dishonourable Methods of deceiving 
you, be mine the glorious Task of telling you Truth’204  
  
Glen returned to this theme, a week later when meeting the representatives of the 
Cherokees, telling them ‘I have been informed and I have good reason to believe, that the 
French (with whom we are now at War) have endeavoured to gain over our Indians to their 
Interest’. Glen’s choice of words was intended to impress his audience with his knowledge 
of events in their country, and may also have been intended to discourage them from 
concealing information from him. The source of this information may have been Yanahe 
Yaiengway of the Catawbas who had accused the Cherokees of harbouring northern 
Indians on their way to attack the Catawba towns and at the same time insinuated that the 
Cherokees were seeking an alliance with the French: ‘I have heard that the Cherokees are 
desirous to make Peace with the French, and am sorry for it: But, let what will happen, we 
will join ourselves with no Nation without your Excellency’s Permission’.205 Once again Glen 
sought to portray the French as dishonest and untrustworthy. He warned that the French 
would mislead the Indians in order to ‘make peace with them, and to withdrew their Hearts 
and Affections from the English, by telling lies and deceiving them’ and he further warned 
the Cherokee ‘I hope my Friends you will not hearken to them, for if you do it may occasion 
much blood’.206 Glen, in his speeches, focused on ideas of honesty and trustworthiness, 
excoriating the French for their perfidy and emphasising the friendship between the 
Indians and the British. 
 
This was a nervous time for Glen and for British interests in general in the southeast. Glen  
firmly believed that the French were attempting to gain influence over the Cherokees and 
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other south eastern Indians. He reported to the Board of Trade, between his meetings with 
the Catawbas and with the Cherokees, that the French had sent emissaries into the 
Cherokee towns and ‘demanded’ leave to set up a fort in the Cherokee country. The 
Cherokee had stalled for time, claiming that they would send down an answer when they 
had had time to consider matters. But the French had warned ‘that they with many more 
of their Countrymen would back next Winter or early in the Spring’.207 The French were 
using the threat of future retribution as leverage to pressure the Cherokees by insinuating 
that they would return in force the next winter. At the same time the French were 
apparently been working among the Creeks and Chickasaws and had convinced some to 
engage in attacks on the Uchees and Catawbas. Given that these tribes lived in close 
proximity to the British colonies this was particularly alarming for the British. 
 
Glen was not only seeking to control the Cherokee perception of events. Glen was so 
alarmed by the events in the backcountry in part because they contradicted his earlier 
claims that Indian affairs in the colony were on a better footing than they had ever been. 
He had claimed that the Indians had changed their term of address to the South Carolina 
governor from the traditional ‘Brother’ to ‘Father’, a term that would immediately appeal 
to the patriarchal British leaders, as one of respect or even subjugation. Given the on-going 
machinations of the French and the uncertainty of the situation in the backcountry, Glen 
felt that his earlier assessment might be called into question and the trust that his 
superiors had in him lessened. In his own defence he argued that, ‘this was a faithful 
account of things as they then stood’ and gave assurance of his future reliability and 
trustworthiness ‘as the face of Affairs seems now to be altered, it is my Duty to acquaint his 
Majesty with their present Situation, which I shall do in this letter with the greatest 
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Submission and with the greatest truth’.208 This narrative of the French as dishonest war 
mongers allowed Glen to use rumour as a tool of international diplomacy. By placing the 
blame for disruptions and problems in the Cherokee-British relationship on the head of the 
French, Glen and his Cherokee counterparts could maintain an atmosphere of amity and 
mutual respect. This maintained Cherokee-British friendship even when events occurred 
which might otherwise threaten the relationship. 
 
In the 1740s the connection between the British and the Cherokee was generally kept at 
arm’s length and remained largely peaceful. A relatively small number of individuals 
provided the primary link between the two societies, mostly those involved in the deerskin 
trade. These individuals became the conduits along which information and rumour passed 
between the Cherokees and the British. Newspapers provided another, increasing 
important, avenue for rumour to spread. Rumour could even act as a positive influence in 
intercultural relations, smoothing over disagreements. Despite the relative amity of these 
connections the beginnings of the themes that would dominate relations between the 
British and the Cherokees can be discerned. British concerns about conspiracy were clearly 
visible, whether that conspiracy was with the slaves in the south eastern colonies or with 
Britain’s imperial rivals. A study of rumour in the 1740s clearly shows how much 
uncertainty existed in the colonial backcountry and how the colonists sought to fill that gap 
with rumour. In these rumours of conspiracy the Cherokees and other Indian peoples were 
generally of secondary importance. But in the coming years they would come to have a 
much greater prominence in the rumours and fears which floated around the British 
colonies and the danger of the Cherokees would have a central place in the imagination of 
the south eastern colonies. 
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Chapter 2. Panic and War: the 1750s 
 
At Charlestown in October of 1759, a large delegation of the more moderate 
Cherokee headmen gathered to engage in a last-ditch attempt to maintain peace with the 
British colony of South Carolina. They knew that to successfully achieve this would require 
a careful use of rumour and suggestion to smooth over the violence that had occurred 
shortly before.209 By this point in time an atmosphere of suspicion and sporadic violence 
had prevailed between the Cherokees and South Carolina for several months, blood had 
been spilled and the trade on which the Cherokees depended for ammunition had been 
halted.210 When they first spoke to Governor William Henry Lyttleton, Occonostota, the 
Great Warrior of the Upper Cherokee towns did all he could to downplay the significance of 
the events that had shaken the Cherokee-Carolina alliance. He declared that ‘there have 
been bad Doings in the Towns thereabouts, but I was not the Beginner of them: good Talks 
have always been and still are at the Governor’s House of Chota, tho there are bad Towns 
near to it but they are few’.211 Occonostota sought to shift the blame for violence as far 
from the Cherokee Nation and especially the centre of his own power as possible: 
 
‘My Governor, old Hop has desired me to inform you, that the killing of the White 
men near Fort Loudoun was owing to Charles McCunningham another white man, 
who persuaded some of the young Men of the Cherokees, that the people of Fort 
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Loudoun were bad & would prevent their having a Trade; therefore advised those 
young men to kill the People that belonged to the Fort’212 
 
Occonostota also blamed Moitoi from the town of Settico for the violence (with some 
justice, as will be seen below). In intimating that the true culpability for the violence lay 
with whites and Cherokees outside his own power base he hoped to present himself as an 
honest broker who could make peace between the nation and the colony. Occonostota 
never attempted to deny that Cherokees had committed the violence that had disturbed 
relations between the Cherokees and the British but within Cherokee understanding this 
admission could be circumvented by claiming that the acts were committed by young men. 
The idea that young men were wild, impulsive and violent was axiomatic in Cherokee 
diplomatic culture; from the perspective of the Cherokee headman ‘Your warriors have 
carried the Hatchet to War against us, we have done the same to them, and both have 
acted like Boys’.213 The Cherokee headmen sought to portray the violence that had been 
committed as the actions of young men on both sides alarmed by individual agent 
provocateurs who had used rumour and suggestion to incite violence. The Cherokees still 
hoped to use rumour, as it had been in earlier years to minimise the damage inflicted on 
the Cherokee-British relationship. In this situation it was the role of older men such as the 
headmen and the Governor to come to an amicable agreement. 
 
Several days later, after considering the talks that the Cherokees had made, Lyttelton 
delivered his reply. The governor lambasted his Cherokee visitors, referring back to 
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previous attacks on frontier settlements. He accused the headmen of double dealing; 
declaring that ‘Tho’ all of you now present talk to me of Peace, yet I received Information 
last Night, that a large Gang lately set out from Settico and are gone over the Mountains to 
Broad River, in Order to kill his Majesty’s Subjects there’.214 The rumours that Lyttelton had 
heard through his sources had fed into his own belief that the Cherokees were not to be 
trusted and his assumption that he needed to take a hard line to achieve the results he 
wanted. Finally, he revealed that he intended to march with an army on the Cherokee 
towns to gain ’Satisfaction’ for the killings of soldiers and settlers. He warned the Indians 
that ‘it is not my Intention to Hurt a hair of your Heads... there is but one Way, by which I 
can insure your Safety; You shall go with my Warriors, that will accompany me to your own 
Country, and they shall protect you; but if you go out of the High Road, and straggle into 
Bye Paths, your Lives may be in Danger’.215 From this point on the Cherokee headmen were 
effectively hostages of Lyttleton’s expedition. 
 
The conference of 1759 and the war which followed it were the end result of the events of 
the 1750s. These events brought about the degradation of the system of intercultural 
diplomacy and rumours that had carried the Cherokees and the British through the 
repeated clashes of the 1740s. As more whites moved into the backcountry, the dangerous 
possibilities of rumour and misunderstanding became more acute. The pressures of 
growing and competing populations encountering one another raised tensions between 
the British and the Cherokees. This increased the potential for violence and created a 
situation where rumours could quickly become the catalyst for further violence and the 
collapse of intercultural relations.  This chapter will explore the fundamental shift within 
the relationship between the British and the Cherokees from the late 1740s to the 
outbreak of war in 1759 and how the relationship got to the point where the Governor of 
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South Carolina would feel justified in taking a peaceful delegation of Cherokee headmen 
hostage. Rumour played an important role in this development, both as an expression of 
the changes that were occurring in intercultural relations and as a powerful factor causing 
those changes.  Rumours, alongside actual acts of violence and confrontation, served to 
undermine the carefully balanced relationship between the Cherokees and their British 
neighbours. Leaders such as James Glen and Attakullakulla had been able to use rumour as 
a tool of diplomacy and limit its more destructive affects. Lyttelton, beset with rumours 
and tales of Indian outrages and determined to confront what he saw as Cherokee 
aggression would be unable to replicate these feats, with disastrous consequences.216 
 
Down at the Crossroads: the early 1750s 
 
Relations between the British and the Cherokees had been by no means perfect in the 
1740s. A state of continuing low-grade unease had pervaded interactions throughout the 
War of Jenkins Ear. Despite this low level tension, the fact was that by 1751 the Cherokees 
and British had been at peace for some thirty five years. The Cherokee British peace had 
endured repeated jolts, strains and clashes but had never completely broken down. For 
several decades the conduits through which the British and the Cherokees encountered 
one another were those of trade and diplomacy. Both these areas of contact allowed 
relatively controlled contact between the two peoples. The arrival of individual traders or 
small diplomatic delegations was unlikely to pose a major threat to the stability of the 
communities they entered. In this situation skilled diplomats among the Cherokees and the 
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British were able to use rumour as a tool to smooth over problems, disagreements and 
dangers. Glen’s demonization of the French in 1746 did more than express British 
prejudices against their imperial rival. They provided a way to explain acts of violence and 
friction between the Cherokees and the British which diverted blame away from both sides 
and onto a third party. This mechanism had been part of a delicate diplomatic system that 
had allowed the British and the Cherokees to avoid direct, open conflict for decades. 
  
Nevertheless there were clear signs that trouble could be easily sparked in the 
backcountry. In 1748, a number of white inhabitants (including the local Justice of the 
Peace, one Mr Haig) were seized near the settlement of Saxe-Gotha. They were carried 
away by, the British believed, ‘French Indians’. The loss of Mr Haig, Glen believed was 
‘irreparable to our New Townships and out-settlements.’ This incident ‘struck such a terror 
into many of our Indian Traders that they sent me repeated expresses to represent the 
danger in which they apprehended themselves to be.’217 This quote clearly demonstrated 
the power of rumours of violence to alarm those beyond the immediate area of the 
violence and heighten tensions. And the traders’ fears were not entirely without 
foundation. The next year Robert Kelly, a British trader among the Cherokees, was killed by 
French allied Indians.218 
 
The backcountry of 1750 was beginning to fill up. A recent influx had brought settlers from 
Germany, Switzerland, Ireland and Britain, many of them unarmed, inexperienced in 
negotiating with Indians and extremely fearful of a possible attack.219 These settlers by 
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their very presence were sure to alarm Cherokees, who had seen the steady westward 
creep of British settlement moving across the piedmont and into their hunting lands. 
Adding to this problem was the fact that these new arrivals had settled themselves, not 
only on Indian land but on an area of the continent where many Indian nations travelled 
regularly, both in war and peace. Cherokee, Creeks, Iroquois, Shawnee and Catawba 
Indians all used this region as a crossing point to attack their enemies. The Cherokees and 
Creeks clashed repeatedly in this region in the late 1740s. In October 1749 George Galphin 
met a party of Creeks on the road who claimed that they were going out to war in response 
to the actions of a gang of Cherokee who had attacked a group of Creek women, killing two 
and capturing four others. Several months later this party returned to the Creek Nation 
having killed two and taken one Cherokee man prisoner, who despite Galphin’s efforts, 
they ‘Bury’d’. In the spring of 1750 a large party of some four hundred Creeks went to war, 
killing somewhere between thirty and forty Cherokees and returning with seven prisoners, 
who they burned.220 
 
Even more disruptive were the parties of Northern Indians, warriors from Iroquoian and 
Algonquian speaking tribes that were based from Pennsylvania to the Great Lakes. Most of 
these warriors came south with the avowed intention of attacking the Catawbas and 
‘Settlement Indians’, South Carolina’s allies in the piedmont.221 To reach their intended 
targets these parties pushed aggressively through both the Cherokee country and the 
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emerging British settlements.222 These were bands of mostly young men, eager to prove 
themselves in their society’s central trial of manhood, far from their families in an arena 
which they had known from childhood as one in which normal rules of harmony and 
community did not apply. Added to this particular cocktail was the not inconsiderable point 
that these men were armed.  
 
Such war parties were a long established part of life along what was one of the most 
prominent indigenous pathways in the southeast.223 The Cherokees had found ways to 
accommodate this volatile traffic and turn its effects away from themselves. The more 
recently arrived settlers in backcountry British America had no such processes in place. In 
spring 1751 Northern Indians drove through the settlements coercing goods and supplies 
from settlers. In April, a settler at the Congarees came across an Indian attacking a bull. 
When the settler and several others pursued the Indian and the band he was with, they 
found no Indians. They did find, however, that several other livestock animals had been 
wounded or killed and mutilated, mostly by having their tongues cut out.224 The only other 
evidence that the pursuing party was able to find were some scraps which may have been 
part of a pass issued to friendly Indians by colonial representatives. Stephen Crell who 
reported the incident believed that one of the signatures on the paper might have 
belonged to John Muller, a tavern keeper near Lancaster, Pennsylvania, whose house was 
known to be frequented by traders.225   In the same year a band of Shawnees attacked a 
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settler family near Saxe Gotha killing four and leaving one woman for dead.226 The brutality 
and strangeness of these attacks and the apparent inability of the settlers to prevent them 
added to the fear and confusion that reigned in the backcountry. Following the killing of 
cattle at Congarees, the Ensign who sought to pursue the perpetrators was only able to 
raise six badly armed men to help. Rumours also began to spread through the area of 
possible violence against settlers; Stephen Crell remarked upon the ‘great Unease and 
Irresolution’ of the local settlers.227   
 
It should be noted that amidst all this violence and uncertainty there were still signs of 
positive and successful relations in the backcountry. This region was both a warpath and a 
crossroads. Mixed European and Indian communities developed at several points in the 
backcountry. Temporary settlements such as the refugee Cherokee community at the 
junction of the North and Holston Rivers named Aurora and more permanent trading and 
hunting communities that developed around the stores at Saluda, Ninety Six and 
Augusta.228 At the same time there were attempts to secure peace among the warring 
Indian communities. In the latter part of 1750, the Creek leader known to the British as the 
Gun Merchant set out with twenty men to make peace with a number of Cherokee towns 
and declared that ‘This is what the Upper Creeks are for and says if the Lower Creeks and 
Lower Cherokees are for War they have Nothing to do with it’.229 
 
Nevertheless, rumours began to circulate that the Cherokees were conniving with or even 
joining the Northern Indians in their campaigns in the southeast. Crell accused the 
Cherokees of harbouring the Northern Indians and of instigating them to damage settlers’ 
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property. Crell believed that this was the reason that the settlers on the Congarees were so 
nervous of confronting the Northerners. If the Cherokees could be persuaded or coerced 
into declaring against the Northerners it might allow the settlers to confront Indian 
aggression.  Crell was aware that these events were not happening in a vacuum. He blamed 
a group in the backcountry centre of Ninety Six for their theft of over one hundred skins 
from the Cherokees. Furthermore he accused James Francis, the local magistrate of being 
complicit in the thefts and failing to pursue the thieves.230 
 
The activities of the French among the Indians of the southeast were also a major source of 
fear for the British in the 1740s and early 1750s.231 In 1750 William Sludders, a trader 
among the Creeks at Ockchoy, writing to Commissioner Pinckney in Charlestown warned 
that the party of traders who had recently set up shop among the Choctaws had been 
forced to flee as those Choctaws who favoured the French threatened their lives and 
property. The alarm was apparently so great that the traders left their goods and 
packhorses and fled ‘singlehorsed to the Chickasaws’. Sludders further noted that ‘it is 
reported that the French is to make two large forts below this and are to have two hundred 
men in each of them’ and that the French were also planning to build another fort in the 
Choctaw country with a similar number of men. Such a force would have been a major 
hindrance to British ambitions in the region, given the numbers of troops usually used by 
European powers in the backcountry.  
 
Despite this concern, such an operation would in fact have represented a vast investment 
for the French colonies, given the difficulty of transporting goods to their North American 
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colonies and up the Mississippi. Added to this would have been the difficulty of persuading 
the local Indians to accept this number of forts in their country, a generally costly and 
uncertain endeavour for Europeans. Sludders admitted that ‘as to the Truth of the Report I 
can’t say’ but argued that ‘I do think that if the French had a Mind to do a Thing of this kind 
they may for I never did see the French take any Thing in Hand among those Indians, but 
what comes to the same End as they intended it’.232 Legends about the power that French 
diplomats wielded over Indians were widespread among British officials. Daniel Pepper’s 
warning to Governor William Henry Lyttelton expresses the belief clearly; ‘Your Excellency 
will see the bloody Designs of the French and how assiduous they are to stir up the Indians 
to War against us by hatching Lyes and using every mean and low Artifice in their Power to 
bring their Schemes to bear’233 What was important in this situation was less the actual 
capabilities of the French but the British perception of French infallability in dealing with 
American Indians. 
 
These rumours were the mainstay of British colonial discourse concerning the French and 
the Indians. British officials took it as an article of faith that the French and the Spanish 
were continually endeavouring to subvert British influence among the Indians.234 The 
presence of these rumours was nothing new. What had begun to change were the 
circumstances in the backcountry. With the increased proximity between the British and 
the Cherokees and disturbing and violent incidents occurring in the backcountry these old 
rumours began to take on an even more sinister appearance. 
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These circumstances were the background to a major diplomatic incident that occurred 
throughout 1751. This incident has been investigated in an excellent article by Gregory 
Evans Dowd.235 My main intent in discussing it is to tie this event to the larger process of 
rumour formation occurring in the colony and Cherokee country throughout this era. As I 
have noted above by the spring of 1751 rumours were circulating in the British settlements 
of a possible conspiracy between the Cherokees and the Northern Indians against South 
Carolina’s Indian allies and a succession of incidents had led to great alarm amongst the 
settlers in the Congarees and around Ninety Six.  
 
At around the same time there may well have been a competing rumour circulating among 
the Cherokee towns that the British were planning an attack against them. In an affidavit 
sworn in May 1751, Herman Geiger, a backcountry store keeper, accused William 
Broadway of spreading rumours among the Cherokees. As Geiger told the story Broadway 
had been travelling up from the colony into the Cherokee towns and when ‘the Indians 
asked him[,] as they generally do, what News below[?]’. Broadway had responded that ‘The 
white Men were raising an Army to cut the Indians all to Pieces’.236 As Dowd has pointed 
out, these versions of events need to be treated with caution. Geiger was basing his 
accusations on hearsay from sources which he did not identify. Coupled with this issue with 
his testimony was the possibility of a local rivalry between Geiger and Broadway’s 
employer James Francis who also ran a store at Ninety Six. While this rivalry is not clearly 
established by the available evidence it is a possibility that the South Carolina authorities 
listening to Geiger’s affidavit had to consider.237 
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At the same time traders were also spreading rumours among the outer inhabitants of 
South Carolina. In January 1751 a letter claiming to be written by ‘the white People of the 
Lower towns’ was sent from Tanissee into the Congarees warning that a party of over 100 
Northern Indians was coming east through the Middle settlements,  ‘And they say they not 
spare neither white nor red that they come across’. The Northerners, it was claimed had 
sent a message, to persuade the people of Tanissee to turn on the whites living among 
them, which the Cherokees refused. Alexander McCloud, employee of one of the trading 
firms in the town carried the news into South Carolina.238 It seems that at least some the 
traders among the Lower Cherokees believed these rumours to be true as they fled their 
towns for the relative safety of the colony. 
 
There were certainly outbursts of violence amid these rumours. On April 13th 1751 a party 
of Lower Cherokees attacked a group of Chickasaws and Lower Creeks at a trading house 
on the Oconee River. In the exchange of shots, several whites present at the trading house 
were wounded and one -Jeremiah Swiney- was killed. A South Carolinian later accused the 
‘half breed Fellow Andrew White’, part of the Cherokee party, of the killing and of mocking 
the groans of the wounded traders.239 The impact of this violence was compounded by an 
attack on Hugh Murphy, a trader, shortly after. Violent incidents such as this, although 
relatively rare, were the source of widespread rumours. The notion of Indians as a 
threatening, alien force that not only brought death and injury but mocked the pain of their 
victims became a staple of white understandings of Indians for decades.240 More 
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importantly the widely spread stories of violence by Indians created an atmosphere of fear 
and horror which led to increasing tension throughout the southern backcountry. 
 
Throughout the spring settlers saw what they thought were small ‘flying parties’ of 
Northern Indians haunting the woods in the area.  William Anderson, at the outlying 
settlement of Monk’s Corner petitioned the government, warned of the damage to settlers’ 
livestock and property by marauding Indians. Anderson believed that the individual 
homesteads of backcountry settlers were too isolated to allow for speedy passing of news 
in the event of an attack and requested two or three alarm guns so that in the event of an 
attack the neighbourhood could be brought together for defence.241 Increasingly, as 
rumours and warnings of attack spread among the British settlements, colonists began to 
feel that the existing systems of defence and warning could no longer protect them. These 
rumours spread the fear of Indian violence far beyond the direct victims.  
 
Some did what they could to dampen down the rumours. One, Skier Rosskee, a trader at 
the Lower Cherokee town of Keowee, wrote to John Dunning that ‘This is to satisfie you, 
and all the white People in the Lower Towns that there is no white Man killed’. Rosskee 
dismissed the stories of traders killed in the Cherokee country arguing that ‘Twas a false 
Report that Murfey was killed’. It seems that the tale of Murphy, wounded in an attack 
after the incident on the Oconee River, had grown to a rumour of his murder. Rosskee also 
argued that rumours of thefts of traders’ goods were exaggerated, that where thefts had 
occurred, Cherokee society had ensured the return of the stolen items. More to the point 
for those living among the Lower Cherokee, Rosskee believed, these events had taken place 
in an entirely different section of Cherokee territory among the Overhills. Rosskee mocked 
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those who had fled the Lower towns; ‘The white People ran away for Nothing out of these 
Parts, for had they a’been killed we would all a’died with them’. John Williams, another 
trader swore out an affidavit at Fort Augusta that the traders who fled the town of Joree in 
late April were in no real danger. Williams furthermore accused three employees of one of 
the fleeing traders of stirring up trouble by encouraging Cherokees to rob him for his supply 
of rum.242 In the charged environment of the early 1750s, as Indians and Europeans sought 
to establish themselves as rightful inhabitants and users of the land in the south eastern 
backcountry, rumours were a central aspect of backcountry culture. 
 
The Panic of 1751 
 
In the face of these alarming rumours the inhabitants of South Carolina’s backcountry did 
what they could to defend themselves; gathering in strong houses, building and 
strengthening small forts and going out armed in parties to work their fields. In response to 
this, Governor Glen and the colonial Council recommended to the colonial Assembly the 
strengthening of the colonial Fort Moore and Fort Congarees and the raising of a small 
troop to patrol the backcountry. Despite major internal divisions in South Carolina’s 
government, Glen was able to engineer an Indian policy under his own leadership. Glen 
was able to succeed in getting Assembly support for several initiatives intended to calm 
relations in the backcountry. This included a mission with the Catawbas to make peace 
between South Carolina’s allies and the Iroquois Six Nations and a show of force intended 
to forestall any possible aggression from the Cherokees.243 Nevertheless, Glen was not able 
to direct South Carolina’s Indian policy entirely to his own liking. The Assembly proposed an 
embargo on the Cherokees as a method of bringing the Indians to terms, Glen was initially 
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opposed to this idea but faced with the increased panic in the backcountry as spring turned 
to summer he agreed to the embargo.244 
 
The embargo was put into force in June when the governor issued a call to all remaining 
traders in the Valley, Middle and Overhills Cherokees to come back to South Carolina. 
Although not universally observed, the embargo had a number of important impacts. First, 
it reassured the colonial authorities that they could bring the Indians to heel using the 
weapon of trade. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the sudden exodus of so many 
traders throughout the Cherokee nation set in motion further rumours in the Cherokee 
country that the British were intending to launch an attack. Cherokees plundered a number 
of trading houses in the Lower towns and abandoned several outlying towns for safer 
habitation deeper in the mountains.245 
 
At least two distinct rumours were active among the Cherokees as the Carolinian embargo 
began to bite. The first came from a Shawnee messenger in July, apparently coming out of 
the Chickasaw settlement on the Savannah River. This rumour warned that over a thousand 
Indians, Catawbas and Creeks, were planning to join the South Carolinians in seizing those 
Cherokee headmen who came down to Charlestown to negotiate an end to the embargo. 
Following this they would then invade the Cherokee country ‘burning and destroying 
everywhere they went’.246 The origins of this rumour, as far as they can be traced, are 
interesting. The news came from an unnamed Shawnee runner passing through the 
Overhills towns. The Shawnees were one of the northern nations that had been pushing 
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through the Cherokee and backcountry to get at the Catawbas. While any assertions about 
the reason for a Shawnee to be passing these kind of alarming rumours to the Cherokee 
are extremely speculative, this rumour may have been a Shawnee attempt to sow discord 
between the Cherokee and the British and keep the Northerners’ access to the path south 
open.  
 
The second major rumour circulating in the Cherokee country claimed that South Carolina’s 
government had written to the leaders of New York to encourage an expedition by the Six 
Nations south against the Cherokees. Dowd argues that this was a variation of a rumour 
that had been widespread in the colonies. This rumour suggested that a large party of 
French allied Indians was moving south to attack one of the southern nations.  While there 
may be some truth to this contention, (the rumours certainly share some similarities in the 
story that they tell), this was not the most probable origin of the rumour.  I see a clearer 
connection for the rumour in the attempts of South Carolina to broker a peace deal 
between their allies the Catawbas and the Six Nations. A deal for which they sought the 
help of New York. Glen had contacted Governor Clinton of New York in late 1750 as part of 
his efforts to secure peace between Britain’s various American Indian allies. Glen proposed 
a joint conference in New York to seal a peace between the Iroquois and the 
Catawbas.Clinton agreed to set the date for the conference for June.247 While the 
conference failed to stop all attacks by Iroquois on the Catawbas, it is easy to see how the 
Cherokees in the fraught spring and summer of 1751 might perceive a conspiracy in the 
delegation of Catawbas and South Carolinians travelling north to meet with representatives 
of New York and the Six Nations. The Northern attacks on the Catawbas had brought 
tensions and violence to the Cherokees’ country but the prospect of peace between the 
two nations was also alarming to the Cherokees. Peaceful relations between the Catawbas 
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and the Northerners could lead to the potential for alliance. Following this, if hostilities 
broke out between the Cherokees and the Northerners, as they had in the past, this would 
leave the Cherokees exposed on two fronts. Worse, if the British were party to this alliance 
this would leave the Cherokees almost surrounded by enemies. The power of this rumour 
lay in its evocation of conspiracy fears, something which the Cherokees were as vulnerable 
to as the British.248    
 
At the same time as this was happening, the South Carolinians were also receiving rumours 
that the French, the great phantom in the minds of British Americans, were behind the 
actions of the Cherokees. The Overhill Cherokees had made peace with some of the 
northern Indian peoples around the Great Lakes and the trader James Adair claimed that 
the Cherokee towns had become ‘a rendezvous of the red pupils of the black Jesuits’.249] 
The rumours of French machinations were not without foundation; after the panic 
Cherokees did admit that the French had been sending them diplomatic communications or 
‘talks’.250 Nevertheless, from the Cherokee perspective this was not an unprecedented 
event. As with other European powers, the French put considerable effort into gaining the 
friendship of the Cherokees. The summer also saw the re-emergence of rumours of a 
possible connection between the Cherokees and South Carolina’s slave population; three 
slaves escaped from South Carolina plantations were said to have encouraged the 
Cherokees to launch an assault upon the British.251 
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These various rumours then emerged in a situation in which whites and Cherokees were 
increasingly in contact with one another in ways that often created competition and 
friction. These different groups occupied many of the same spaces. White settlers were 
moving into areas which had been used by Indians for a variety of purposes for 
generations. Often Indians and whites used the land in ways that placed them at odds with 
one another. Whites around the Congarees and Saluda regions cleared land and introduced 
European cattle onto lands which had been and remained the passing place of Indians 
seeking to make war on distant enemies.252 These new uses of the landscape altered it, 
making white claims of permanent ownership of these lands. This strategy was in direct 
conflict with Cherokee notions of their own stewardship of the land and the use of the land 
by Catawbas and northern Indians passing through on their way to war.253  
 
The introduction of these new forms of use also had practical impacts on the landscape. 
European farming methods and livestock tended to drive out game, possibly depriving 
travelling parties of Indians of a source of food, which may in turn have led to the threats, 
extortion and violence against people, property and livestock which occurred in the 
backcountry in the early 1750s. These attacks against the backcountry and their 
strangeness to Europeans, particularly the mutilation of livestock, with the tongue or 
‘backstrap’ often being taken post mortem, created a strange and unsettling atmosphere 
for settlers in the backcountry. In seeking to understand these events, settlers and colonial 
leaders turned to rumour and the idea of an intended attack upon the colonies as a 
plausible explanation for these strange events and for the actions of the Indians. The 
possibility of an Indian attack held an important place within South Carolinians’ 
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understanding of their own history, most prominently in the Yamasee War of 1715-17, a 
cataclysm which could still be remembered by elderly colonists in the early 1750s.254 
  
The Yamasee War had been an existential threat to South Carolina. The Yamasees, a 
coastal tribe with long standing trading links to South Carolina, struck brutally against the 
outlying British settlements. The British settlements were driven back with the inhabitants 
of the backcountry retreating to the coast. The war turned with the decision of the 
Cherokees to side with the British against the Yamasees. Central to British understandings 
of the war was the idea that the violence had been part of an organised conspiracy. Many 
colonists blamed the Creeks as the ‘authors’ of the war, a belief that continued to have 
currency into the modern era.255 Working on the assumption that the violence must have 
been set in train by Britain’s imperial rivals, South Carolinians also blamed the war on the 
French and Spanish. Several colonists claimed that the Yamasees had sold the plunder they 
had taken from the British in exchange for ‘a constant Supply of Ammunition from the 
Spanish Government’.256 While these assertions lacked evidence they exerted a powerful 
hold over the imagination of British colonists for generations after the war. In 1749 James 
Glen claimed that ‘There is not a person in this Province who remembers the last barbarous 
Indian War, but trembled at the Approach of our Rupture with France… well knowing the 
difficulty of preserving our Indians and preventing their being debauched by the Intrigues 
and large Presents of the French’ .257 The theme of conspiracy became a continual one 
within British colonial notions of events in the backcountry and it is certainly not surprising 
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that they would see the possibility of a conspiracy amongst their enemies and their 
uncertain friends, the Cherokees. 
  
Both colonial and Cherokee leaders sought to dampen down these emerging rumours, 
while at the same time not discounting the idea that they had some validity. These leaders 
knew that these rumours could cause widespread panic among their people and lead to 
outbreaks of violence which could spiral into further panic. But they were not certain 
themselves which rumours were true and which were false. To discount all rumours would 
leave them open to attack. This created the rather contradictory sight of colonial leaders 
sending out diplomatic feelers to the Cherokees while at the same time making 
preparations for a major show of military force against them. A number of Cherokee 
headmen stepped forward to assure Glen of their peaceful intentions and to ascertain 
Carolinian aims. The most important of these were the leading headmen of the Valley and 
Overhill Cherokee sections. These leaders were more insulated from the possibility of 
direct assault by the British colonies than were the Lower towns. This may have allowed 
them to think beyond the plethora of rumours and alarms which circulated in the Lower 
Towns which were most often implicated for associating with the Northern Indians.258  The 
Tacite of Hiawasee in the Valley Towns and Ammouiscositte of Tellico in the Overhill Towns 
in particular were instrumental, writing to Governor Glen to explain the rumours and so 
convince the Carolinians that the situation could and should be resolved. To do this the 
headmen blamed much of the rumouring on agents far from the centre of their own 
power: traders, Northern Indians and the Lower Towns which were still preparing for a 
possible war with the British.259  
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Some Cherokees also attempted to insure themselves against the impact of the South 
Carolina embargo, sending a delegation to Virginia. The Cherokees hoped that these 
representatives would be able to secure supplies from Virginian merchants to replace those 
lost to the embargo.  For an unknown reason Glen had failed to inform his counterparts in 
Virginia of the embargo. The Virginians, confused by the lack of clear information coming 
out of South Carolina but eager to gain a trading link to the populous Cherokees, cautiously 
welcomed the delegation, much to the chagrin of Glen.260  
 
The problem was not calmed until November 1751 when a large party of Cherokees arrived 
at Charlestown.261 The very fact that they were able to move through the South Carolina 
backcountry without causing further alarm amongst white settlers suggests that the 
rumours had begun to subside once again. Rumour was also used to attempt to smooth 
over the tensions which had come so close to exploding that summer. The Cherokee 
headmen attempted to divert British attention away from the problems that had occurred 
by raising the spectre of a common enemy, the Creeks. The Tacite of Hiwasee remarked 
that ‘I have heard that the French encourage their Indians to kill white People, and also 
those of our Nation’. The Cherokee even attempted to gain forgiveness for Andrew White, 
(the only Cherokee who had been confirmed as having killed a South Carolinian), by 
claiming that he had gone to war against the Creeks and brought back a scalp for the 
British.262 Although Glen did not accept this explanation and the Cherokees promised to 
deliver White for punishment, they never did this and the matter was allowed to drop.263 
The panic of 1751 is notable as an indicator of the way that rumour operated and impacted 
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on the Cherokee-British relationship in the early 1750s. While the pressures that had begun 
to strain relations were evidently present and able to exert a powerful hold on the region, 
rumour could also still be used as a mechanism for calming fears. The panic ended with a 
mutually acceptable rumour that the French had been the instigators of the trouble, thus 
allowing relations to return to the state they had been in prior to the panic. The difference 
between this and the events leading up to the Cherokee War are remarkable.  
 
‘Some of the Blood flew upon her Apron’ Violence through the 1750s  
 
After the panic of 1751 subsided, the ongoing violence between the Cherokees and the 
Creeks continued to occasionally impinge upon colonial life. This caused alarm but also a 
certain degree of fascination in the colonies. Details of Indian affairs were popular in 
newspapers in all the colonies, even if, or perhaps especially if, they came from a good 
distance away. For example in early April 1752 word reached Charlestown of an incident in 
which a Creek and a Cherokee party clashed violently. The Cherokees came off worst in the 
fighting and several men, including their leader, were killed and mutilated by the Creeks. 
Versions of this basic narrative were printed in quick succession in newspapers in Boston 
and New York and the story proved so popular that it was reprinted verbatim in several 
papers in the same market.  
 
It was perhaps the lurid details of this event that led to retelling of the story. The victorious 
Creeks not only killed or injured all but one of the Cherokees, but beheaded the corpse of 
the Cherokee headman and hung his body from a tree. To further shock readers, one 
breathless account claimed that a woman travelling with the British officer who wrote the 
story ‘was so near the King when they cut off his Head, that some of the Blood flew upon 
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her Apron’.264 A year later a ‘Gentleman at Augusta’ sent word of a successful raid by 
Malatchi, a Creek headman. Malatchi and his men brought in a prisoner, believed to be a 
Cherokee ‘and the Scalp with Part of the Scull of one they killed. (We have been told, that 
to take Part of the Scull with the Scalp is the greatest Indignity that can be offered to 
Indian, and that they seldom forgive it.)’.265 These reports with their lurid details of injuries 
inflicted on human bodies are somewhat reminiscent of what Peter Silver called ‘the anti-
Indian sublime’, a set of conventions in the description of Indian attacks that focused on a 
gory imagery of barbarous injuries.266  
 
There were admittedly a number of key differences between the stories of Indian war in 
the south east and the violence against settlers in the middle colonies as discussed by 
Silver. The accounts I have mentioned were more concerned with the factual details of the 
events that they described than the writings of the true anti-Indian sublime, discussing the 
numbers on both sides in the battle. The accounts also lack some of the direct appeals to 
readers’ pity that Silver has found in his sources. The key difference was that the accounts I 
have discussed described violence committed by Indians against Indians. As has been 
established, fear of Indian attack was a widespread feature of life on the outer edges of the 
British colonies and rumours derived much of their power from that fear. For colonists the 
description of brutal violence against Indian rather than European bodies may have 
provided a counterpoint to the intense emotional experience of the anti-Indian sublime. In 
this context the description of violence which in the anti-Indian sublime might be used to 
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stir outrage at Indian violence could act as a safety valve, providing nervous colonists with a 
vicarious thrill at violence visited upon Indian bodies.267  
 
‘A house among their houses’: Forts and the Coming of the Cherokee War 
 
The Panic of 1751 signalled a number of important shifts in the policy of South Carolina 
towards the Cherokees. It gave an impetus to colonial efforts to seek an alternative contact 
point in the Cherokee country to the loose networks of traders who had been the colonies’ 
main information source up to this point. Rumours spread by traders had been a significant 
factor in the development of the panic. Certainly, this was the opinion of Governor Glen 
who, even before the crisis held an extremely low opinion of the ‘low Indian Traders and 
Packhorsemen’ who he accused of spreading rumours to further their own interests.268 The 
events of 1751 had done little to alter his opinion of the traders, many of the rumours 
which had so alarmed the backcountry had been delivered by traders. Following the 
trouble of 1751 the idea of placing relations with the Cherokees on a more solid footing, 
particularly with the increased settler presence in the backcountry, became more urgent.  
 
 From the British perspective, a fort acted as a clearing house for information out of the 
Cherokee country. It prevented  the Cherokees from colluding with Carolina’s enemies.  For 
Carolina’s rulers, military outposts could be relied upon in a way that the unrestrained and 
profit-minded traders could not. Furthermore, the forts would act as centres of military 
power with which to overawe the Cherokees if they became a threat to British interests. 
The Cherokees saw the arrangement rather differently. To them the forts were the 
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introduction of British representatives into Cherokee society, just as the Creeks and 
northern Indians might have representatives who lived in Cherokee towns.  As Old Hop put 
it on hearing that South Carolina intended to build a fort among the Overhill towns that he 
represented, he was pleased that Governor Glen ‘had built his house among their houses, 
and there to take him by the hand’.269 To the Cherokees the British forts, with their small 
garrisons and storehouses, were simply a variation on a long established practise in Indian 
diplomacy. 
 
It was not only the Carolinians who sought to set up a direct presence in the Cherokee 
country. The neighbouring colony of Virginia was also invited by the Cherokees to set up a 
fort. So too were the French. From the Cherokee perspective there was nothing irregular in 
inviting representatives of these different colonies and empires to establish homes among 
the Cherokees. Raymond Demere encountered this when he tried to insist on Cherokee 
raids against the French as a quid pro quo for the building of the forts. When Demere took 
the proposal to Old Hop the venerable headman was unreceptive:  
 
‘The first words he spoke to me was “What do you think of our having given up one 
of our towns to the French?” I said I was very sorry to hear it. Then says he, “have 
you not got a great many French amongst you at Charlestown? When I was last 
there I saw a great many myself”’.270  
 
For the Cherokees there was no contradiction in wanting to bring in as many outside 
groups as possible into their alliance.  Particularly after the upheavals and violence of the 
early 1750s; as Old Hop put it ‘it was Good to be at Peace with all Kings’.271As it turned out 
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the South Carolinians remained the only power to hold a fort among the Cherokees by the 
late 1750s, Fort Prince George, built in 1753 at the town of Keowee. The Virginians had 
begun building a fort of their own near Keowee. But frustrated and disillusioned by 
Cherokee unwillingness to join their expeditions in the north against the French and their 
allied Indians they abandoned the project within a few months and a small number of 
Cherokee houses were eventually built within the site of the fort.272  
 
As the South Carolinians set up their fort, it became apparent to the Cherokees that the 
British establishment in their town was fundamentally different from what they had 
envisioned. The fact that these forts were military structures and lacked the presence of 
women and children was particularly concerning. One Cherokee observer remarked ‘A few 
men not exceeding 15 or 20 would be a sufficient number at first, and among them some 
women and children which would alleviate their fears greatly of being made slaves’.273 
These alarming developments also drew upon old fears, most recently manifested in the 
panic of 1751 that a British army was coming to enslave the Cherokees. Rumour and gossip 
could, in concert with the myriad of social understandings and assumptions that underlay 
Indian and European society, play an integral part in political decisions. The forts were 
disturbing for the Cherokees, not because of their physical architecture or European 
technology, but because they lacked the mix of genders and ages that marked a complete 
community. Faced with these strange, completely male organisations in their towns the 
Cherokees settled upon a previously established rumour, that of a threat of slavery, to 
explain them. 
 
In the end the South Carolinian forts were a partial success. The forts did act as 
clearinghouses for the sending of information to the colonial centre. Paul Demere, for 
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example, brother to Raymond and commander at Fort Loudoun in the Overhills section, 
passed on intelligence received from traders such as Samuel Benn at Hiwasee and 
Maximillian Moore as well as runners from the Lower and Middle Cherokees.274 Lachlan 
McIntosh drew information from a plethora of Cherokee correspondents.275 In spite of this, 
the presence of the forts did not prevent experienced traders such as Ludovic Grant and 
James Beamer from writing directly to the colonial governors or assemblies. Much of the 
information transmitted out of the forts still came from traders living in the Cherokee 
towns.276 In terms of the other great aim of fort building, holding Cherokee allegiance to 
Britain secure, the Cherokee forts were largely ineffective.  
 
British fort commanders held Indian allegiance just as long as they were able to fulfil Indian 
ideas about the proper behaviour of allies. The Cherokees were even able to convince 
some of the soldiers to adopt what they would consider the proper behaviour of allies by 
marrying Cherokee women.  At the outbreak of the Cherokee war, several soldiers had 
Cherokee wives. An early warning of the limits of forts in Indian country was given to Glen 
on the eve of the events of 1751, George Cadogan, commander at Fort More wrote to Glen 
in March 1751 and warned him: 
 
‘With regard to my preventing the Indians here from going where and 
when they please to Warr or otherwise, I don’t conceive a possibility of it. 
Presents and Entertainments are the only Means of bring[ing] them to the 
Fort and your Excellency well knows that I have no Fund for such 
Things’277 
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Forts provided a storage area for goods and a certain measure of protection from attacks 
by Indians but were by no means an effective method of overawing a nation such as the 
Cherokees. In 1754 Sergeant Thomas Harrison at Fort Prince George found himself 
confronted with a group of aggrieved Cherokees who had anticipated the arrival of a 
present of ammunition. When the goods failed to arrive, the Cherokees threatened to go to 
the French. To prevent this Hatton was forced to give some ammunition out of the forts 
supply.278 Even after the strengthening of the forts in 1756, a process that temporarily 
crippled the deerskin trade as the government impressed all the horses of the traders 
among the Lower Cherokees, the place of these Carolina transplants into the Cherokee 
country remained insecure. A communication to the new Governor Lyttelton in 1757 said 
of Fort Prince George ‘I may say more properly it’s a Suckling Store than a Fortification’.279 
 
Governor Glen continued to seek a stronger alliance with the Cherokees, both to secure 
greater military cooperation and to gain some diplomatic confirmation of South Carolina’s 
right to Cherokee territory. In May 1755 he sought to convince a large number of Cherokee 
headmen, including Old Hop, to come down to Charlestown to make a formal submission. 
Old Hop claimed that the journey was too far for him, as he was crippled. Attakullakulla and 
Occonostota went instead and proposed a second meeting at Saluda, halfway between the 
colonial capital and Chota. The treaty at Saluda in July 1755 was then a demonstration of 
the lack of South Carolinian dominance in their relations with the Cherokee. Glen was 
forced to put his attempts to acquire a cession of sovereignty from the Cherokees on hold 
in order to meet Attakullakulla’s requests for various agreements relating to trade.  Glen 
sought to claim that the Cherokees had ceded their entire territory to the British. In fact the 
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areas ceded were actually only those lands needed for a fort and a vague sovereignty.280  
This was not the unequivocal submission that Glen had hoped to engineer and in the end 
both the Cherokees and the British behaved as though the events claimed by Glen had 
never happened. Indeed the Secretary of State in London was so unimpressed by the event 
that he recalled Glen. 281   
 
In 1754, the ongoing tensions that had existed for decades between the British and their 
French rivals in North America spilled into open warfare once again. A succession of 
confrontations in the Ohio country finally came to a head with the attack by the Virginia 
militia under Colonel George Washington on outposts in the Ohio Valley.282 The Cherokee 
country and the south-eastern colonies were, for much of the early part of the Seven Years 
War, a backwater, separated from the main action of the campaign. Nevertheless the war 
most definitely had an impact on the region. The outbreak of war gave impetus to the 
widely held belief that the French were intriguing among the Indians of the south-east to 
engineer an attack on the British colonies and colonists in the southern colonies were 
intensely aware of their own vulnerability. The Charlestown merchant Henry Laurens wrote 
to a correspondent that: 
 
‘We that lye the most remote from them of all the English Settlements on 
this Continent feel the effects of their[the French] wicked machinations 
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almost every Year by little Parcells of Indians they encourage to come & 
massacre poor Familys on the back parts of our Settlements’283  
 
 
As with previous wars, the results of battles in faraway places were of great interest to 
colonists in the south.  Remarking on the defeat of General Braddock to several British 
correspondents, Henry Laurens, never shy about proffering his opinion, noted ‘Tis a sad 
affair that General Braddock march’d with such a handful of Men to attack a place that we 
might reasonably suppose would be defended by three times his number’ . Writing a 
month later, following the arrival of news of William Johnson’s partial victory at Crown 
Point, Laurens excitedly wrote giving exact details of the numbers captured or killed. There 
were clearly limits to the ability of southern colonists to satisfy their desire for information 
and practical problems, such as delayed ships and the slow speed of land travel, affected 
the availability of news.  In April 1756 Laurens lamented that ‘We remain as much in the 
dark how matters are going on in Europe as we were Two months ago from whence we 
immagine [sic] that strong Westerly Winds must have prevail’d’.284 In the mid-1750s then 
the war touched but did not heavily strike the southeast. Henry Laurens even felt secure 
enough to gloat that ‘Our Ministry would do well to prosecute a War in America with 
Americans. Only they are not frightned out of their wits at the sight of Indians which by our 
Accounts was the case with your English Veterans’.285 But this immunity was not to last. 
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Blood in the Backcountry 
 
By the late 1750s the relationship between the Cherokees and the British, particularly the 
inhabitants of South Carolina and Virginia had begun to shift markedly from the situation of 
the early 1750s. The continued encroachment by British settlers into Cherokee lands had 
increased tensions and suspicions between the two peoples markedly. The development of 
forts in the Cherokee country had initially seemed to the British to be an effective way of 
rationalizing relations with the Cherokees and to prevent rumour damaging the Cherokee-
British relationship. But the forts had not prevented rumours remaining a decisive factor in 
events. As Cherokees and British settlers came into ever closer proximity the role of 
rumour had begun to shift. 
 
Despite the tensions that had occurred between the Cherokees and the British, colonial 
leaders were able to score a major diplomatic victory in 1758. They managed to recruit 
hundreds of Cherokee warriors to journey northwards to join General Forbes’ expedition 
against Fort Duquesne. Unfortunately, to the Indians’ way of thinking, Forbes was arrogant 
and slow to move. Within Cherokee society war leaders maintained their authority only by 
giving the warriors what they had signed up for, the chance to win glory and loot.286 The 
Cherokees became increasingly dissatisfied with this situation. By the middle of summer 
they had begun to leave en-masse.287 It was on their return that the trouble really began.  
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Settlers along the backcountry of Virginia and North Carolina were terrified of an attack by 
hostile Indians and the sight of parties of heavily armed, war painted Cherokees was 
enough to send rumours racing around the backcountry putting the whole region into 
uproar.288 A party of Virginia militia decided to take advantage of this situation to take the 
scalps of a small group of Valley headmen that were passing through. The militia ambushed 
the Cherokees killing three and wounding one. This survivor, (despite his wounds) managed 
to escape his pursuers and appeared in the Valley towns telling of the massacre. Shortly 
after, another group of Lower Cherokees was confronted by a group of settlers at Goose 
Creek who forced them to lay down their arms and then opened fire killing three and 
wounding another. The surviving Indians seized their weapons and further bloodshed was 
only prevented by the actions of young Beamer, the mixed-race son of the trader James 
Beamer, and James Holmes another messenger among the Cherokees. The two men rode 
between the two groups and kept them from firing on one another.289  
 
The blood of Cherokees, including Cherokees who had recently fought for the British 
against the French, had been spilled. Cherokee law and tradition was very clear: the 
relatives of the dead were bound to avenge their killings. These events were important not 
just for the physical acts of violence that were committed, but for the precedent of 
violence, fear and mistrust that they established in Cherokee British relations. The violence 
in the backcountry confirmed that the backcountry settlers of Virginia and the Cherokees 
were likely to come to blows if they encountered one another. For the Cherokees, rumours 
of these acts of violence brought into question the safety and utility of aiding the British. 
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At this stage, in mid-1758, South Carolina was still on relatively good terms with the 
Cherokees. The most influential Cherokee headmen understood that the killings in the 
backcountry were committed by settlers from Virginia rather than from South Carolina and 
Virginia appealed to South Carolina to act as a broker. Virginia ‘requested his Excellencies 
Interest with, and Influence over those Indians, for settling Amicably the disputes and 
differences between them and the People of Virginia’.290 Governor William Henry Lyttleton, 
who had taken over following the recall of James Glen, invited a number of important 
Cherokee headmen to see him. But by the time the headmen arrived rumours and 
‘intelligences’ reached the governor’s ears of preparations for war in the Cherokee towns 
and of parties setting out to take scalps in the Virginia backcountry. The South Carolina 
Governor’s instinctual response was to issue an ultimatum. While he admitted that 
Cherokees had been killed by Virginians there could be no talk of revenge attacks. The 
Cherokees should apply to the Governor of Virginia. Lyttelton was ‘Confident that he will 
give you every Satisfaction for whatsoever Injuries have been done to You’. Lyttelton also 
agreed to provide presents ‘sufficient to hide the Bones of the dead Men, and wipe away 
the Tears from the Eyes of their Friends’.291 Lyttelton understood the concept of providing 
goods to ‘cover’ the deaths of Indians and was prepared to make recompense for the 
killings of Indians by whites, but he was determined to do so only on his own terms and he 
was certainly not prepared to allow for the Cherokee concept of legal revenge killings. 
Lyttelton warned that if the Cherokees did not recall the war parties:  
 
‘Mark again what I say to You; the Armies of the Great King are strong and mighty; 
His Warriors are without number; Well armed, Well Cloathed; Well fed, & supplied 
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with all the Necessaries of War; But You are few and soon will be in want of 
everything when once the Trade is withdrawn from You’292 
 
This tough stance drew a promise from the Cherokee delegates to recall the revenge 
expeditions but left the underlying outrage and suspicion among Cherokees unresolved.  
Violence in the backcountry continued to cause fear and suspicion between the Cherokees 
and South Carolina into the spring of 1759. Many Cherokee towns continued to seethe with 
anger and grief. This provided a fertile ground for French and Creek diplomats.293 This 
activity set off rumours in South Carolina of the situation that the British feared most, a 
combination between the Cherokees, Creeks and French to attack the British backcountry. 
On March 19th 1759, Lyttelton showed letters to the colonial council from both Captain 
Paul Demere at Fort Loudoun and Ensign McIntosh at Fort Prince George, as well as several 
influential traders in the Cherokee Nation, warning of a projected attack by the French on 
the backcountry forts and that ‘disaffected’ Cherokees might join the French force.294 While 
the French attack force never materialised, the prospect that it might was enough to stir 
the usually sluggish colonial assembly into action.  
 
Demere had informed the Governor that his post was down to three months provisions and 
that his store of goods for presents was almost gone. The council ordered that provisions 
should be provided to ensure that Fort Loudoun never had less than six months provisions 
in store and that goods to the value of £1000 be forwarded to the post. The council also 
ordered a detachment of seventy men with officers to be sent to Fort Prince George 
‘Provided information should be received, that the French certainly intended to attack that 
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Fort’.295 The council knew that rumours of French attack were not an uncommon 
occurrence and were determined not to commit themselves to troop movements unless 
they were confident that such expense was necessary. While the presents may have been 
useful to Demere in strengthening the hand of those sympathetic headmen who could 
keep angry Cherokee warriors from attacking the British, the overall effect of these 
rumours was to heighten tensions between the Cherokees and the British. 
 
‘The Lies which are told to your Excellency’, Diplomacy and Devastation. 
 
In the spring of 1759 the Cherokee warriors who had joined with General Forbes expedition 
began to abandon him. One of the last Cherokee to leave Forbes’ expedition was 
Attakullakulla, turning away towards Williamsburg just a few days before the fall of Fort 
Duquesne. Forbes was outraged at what he saw as desertion in the face of the enemy. He 
had the Cherokees’ senior diplomat arrested. Attakullakulla saw the situation very 
differently, as did most Cherokees.296 Within Cherokee war parties the concept of desertion 
as practised by Europeans did not apply. Members of expeditions were entitled to stay or 
go as they pleased, although the possibility of being thought a coward was an effective 
deterrent to these actions.297  A leader could only hope to keep his party together by 
leading in a way that encouraged followers to stick with him. Attakullakulla and his 
entourage were eventually released and travelled first to Virginia to try to settle matters 
with the Virginia government following the killings in the backcountry, and then to 
Charlestown to meet with Governor Lyttleton.298 
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Lyttelton and the colonial council were aware of what had happened near Fort Duquesne. 
Forbes had written complaining about the perfidy of Attakullakulla. He demanded that the 
headman be treated with ‘Contempt’ if he came to Charlestown. The South Carolinians, 
aware of Attakullakulla’s influence in the nation and alarmed by the violence and tension in 
the backcountry, decided that ‘care should be taken to prevent the little Carpenters leaving 
this place disgusted at this critical Conjuncture’.299 Nonetheless, the South Carolinians 
believed, as Forbes did, in the necessity of subordination in military expeditions and as such 
they felt compelled to challenge Attakullakulla on the issue. Judging by Attakullakulla’s 
quick and determined response he may well have been expecting this and was prepared to 
defend his actions. He declared that he had not intended to join a military expedition but 
had been going to Virginia to settle the matter of the killings in the backcountry.300  
 
On being co-opted into the General’s force, Attakullakulla had provided the most useful 
assistance he could, making contact with the ‘Savannah Indians’, allies of the French and 
persuading them to stand neutral in the coming fight. Furthermore Attakullakulla’s 
contacts had volunteered an important piece of information. The Savannahs told 
Attakullakulla that the French were preparing to abandon the fort and withdraw. 
Attakullakulla took this strategic information to Forbes ‘who seemed to give little Credit to 
the information’. While the general tried to find a source of information he trusted more 
than the Cherokee headman, Attakullakulla decided that with the French pulling out there 
was no point in his putting up with this disagreeable interruption to his primary mission in 
the area and left for Virginia.301 Having given his side of the story Attakullakulla launched an 
attack on his adversary ‘But the Great Warrior [Forbes] has told things that are false of me, 
nor did he after my setting out with me furnish me so much as with a little Paint, so I leave 
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your Excy. To judge of the usage I have met with’.302 Attakullakulla had begun his own 
campaign to control the flow of information and rumour.  
 
Attakullakulla reminded Lyttelton that rumours were a continuing threat to the British-
Cherokee alliance: ‘Many Lies have lately been told concerning a Fort being built or building 
by the French in the Cherokee Nation, I believe it not’. He claimed that, ‘the Southern 
Indians who come into our Nation are always telling Lies, some of them lately told me, that 
the Spaniards had Informed them, that You had determined to cut off the Cherokees, I did 
not believe them, but looked on this, the same as the other Lies’.  Attakullakulla also 
warned that there were always those in the Cherokee Nation who were ready to believe 
these rumours and launch retaliatory attacks ‘Some of the Warriors of my Nation upon 
hearing Storys true or false, are immediately in a Flame but it is not my way’.303 
Furthermore Attakullakulla reminded the Carolinians that he was one of the Cherokee 
leaders best able to keep these rumours from spreading, ‘And in the mean time must beg 
the Favour of your Excellency to take no Account of the Stories which are carried 
backwards and forwards and I shall do the same’.304 Finally Attakullakulla offered the 
governor a symbolic representation of the importance of rumours in the relationship of 
their mutual role in keeping those rumours under control, ‘I have brought two Strings of 
Wampum to his Excellency of equal length, the one denotes the Lies which are told to your 
Excellency, the other the Lies which are told to me’.305 Attakullakulla clearly wanted to 
enshrine the idea of giving little credence to rumours that could damage the alliance as 
well as securing his position as a reliable controller of information within the alliance.  
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Lyttelton considered Attakullakulla’s talk for several days and then returned his reply. 
Lyttelton was equally concerned about rumours and reports passing between the colony 
and the nation. While the South Carolina governor was preparing for a possible conflict 
with the Cherokees he knew that an overt display of aggression would merely lead to 
retaliation and attacks against the already nervous backcountry of his colony. Having sent 
troops to reinforce the garrisons in the Cherokee nation, Lyttelton tried to reassure the 
Cherokee headman about his intentions ‘I lately sent some of my Warriors to your Nation, 
and have since heard that the French or their Friends have reported that they were Dutch 
and English sent by me to cut off the Cherokee, But you know they were English, And I now 
inform You that the reason of sending them was owing to the bad Talks I had received from 
the Creek Nation’.306 By doing this Lyttelton hoped to divert the blame for rising tensions 
away from himself and his colony. The French and the Creeks made convenient scapegoats 
in this situation. Lyttelton also desired to set his talk in symbolic terms. His intention in 
doing this was to appeal to Cherokee diplomatic conventions and try to tie Attakullakulla to 
use his influence to defend British interests among the Cherokees. He therefore used 
wampum beads just as Attakullakulla had done: 
 
‘This String in my Hand, I am now to deliver to You, You may observe it is made all 
of white Beeds excepting three black ones, The white ones denote the Friendship 
which hath long subsisted between the English and Cherokees, and the three black 
ones denote the bad Talks I have heard concerning You the Little Carpenter; I have 
put them upon this String to put you in the Mind of those Talks. When You come to 
see me again, I desire You will bring this String with You (here it was delivered) and 
if I then find You have acted the part of a good and Faithful Brother to the English, 
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as I believe You will, I will pull off those black Beeds with my own Hands and leave 
it all white’ 307 
 
Lyttelton was not completely lacking in diplomatic abilities. In his meeting with 
Attakullakulla he showed a degree of sensitivity to Indian diplomatic conventions and 
concerns as he understood them. Lyttelton also showed an awareness that controlling 
information and perception of events was key to achieving his aims. But, shortly after 
Attakullakulla’s conference at Charlestown, a number of parties of Indians ‘supposed to be 
Cherrockees’ attacked a number of isolated settlements on the Yadkin and Catawba rivers 
killing and scalping entire families. A week later the Settico headman Moitoi appeared in 
the Cherokee nation with at least ten scalps. The timing of these attacks, coming shortly 
after Attakullakulla sent a message to Moitoi requesting him to keep the peace for a time, 
suggests that the raids may have been a deliberate ploy to spark more violence and force a 
confrontation with the Carolinians as well as the Virginians.308 
 
At the same time Cherokee grievances were increasingly coming to the fore. Settlers 
continued to push beyond the agreed limit of white expansion and the actions of some 
British frontier officers alarmed and angered Cherokees. The worst offenders were a group 
of officers at Fort Prince George led by Lieutenant Richard Coytmore. These officers 
regularly treated the Indians with disdain and on several occasions were accused of raping 
Indian women while their husbands were away. This was certainly a major grievance as 
stated by Tistatoe in the conference with Lyttelton in October. Tistatoe complained; ‘Tho’ I 
Love my brethren of the Fort, yet I have found Something bad about them; they have used 
us ill, and the Officer says he is not afraid of us; their bad usage has occasioned our People 
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to do what they have done’.309 There is good reason to believe that there was a great deal 
of justice in these accusations and the actions of the officers at Fort Prince George were 
critical in exacerbating the tensions between the Indians and the British.310  
 
In order to conceal his crimes, Coytmore made a concerted effort to control the news that 
reached Charlestown from the Cherokee country. His actions give a clear demonstration of 
the ways that rumour and information could be used to pursue particular aims. Coytmore 
was quite effective in suppressing knowledge of these actions which went such a long way 
to bringing tensions between the Cherokees and the British to a head. In a letter to 
Lyttelton of August 3rd he said nothing of the threats made against him or the continuing 
importance of boundary encroachments. Instead Coytmore blamed French and Creek 
intrigues for the tensions with the Cherokees.311 
 
A central aspect of Coytmore’s gambit was the news he sent to Charlestown. He warned of 
a meeting between Cherokees and the representatives of the Creek confederacy at Keowee 
in the summer of 1759. Coytmore decided that ‘As I imagined that they would not talk so 
free, was I to send a white person to the Town House, with much difficulty I persuaded a 
young Indian fellow to go, and bring me all the News’.312 The young Indian reported that 
the Creeks had offered the Cherokees an alliance against the English. The Cherokees, 
fearful of what would happen if they broke with the British and the Creeks failed to support 
                                                          
309
 Tistatoe Talk to the Governor and Council at Charlestown, 19
th
 October 1759, CO5/386, f.171. 
310
 Writing his account of the Cherokees some years later, James Adair openly accused the officers 
both of the rapes and of generally behaving in a way that risked ruining relations with the Cherokees 
around the fort, Adair, History of the American Indians, p.246. There were also repeated instances of 
personal clashes between officers of the fort and Indians in the area that would have raised 
tensions. For a narrative of the events around the fort in this period see Oliphant, Peace and War, 
pp.84-88. 
311
 Coytmore to Lyttleton, Fort Prince George, 3
rd
 August 1759, CO5/386, f.127. 
312
 Ibid. 
141 
 
them or even joined with the British against them, tried to make the Creeks commit to an 
attack against the British: 
 
‘We have long been in Friendship with the English, but it now seems as if they 
wanted to desert us, as We have scarce Goods enough come among us to cover us 
from the cold ; and as you are the same sort of People as ourselves, and our 
Brothers, We do not imagine  you would deceive us, by telling us, the French can 
supply  us amply with every necessary; we will therefore join you against the 
English, conditionally, that you will first kill all the white People belonging to the 
English in your Nation’313 
 
Coytmore claimed that he was not the only one to have an inside man at this meeting. 
James Beamer, a trader, knew of the meeting ‘and told me that the person, that informed 
him of it gave him the strictest Charge not to tell it again to any white Person or Indian, for 
(as my informer likewise told me) he said he risqued his life by mentioning it’.314 In earlier 
times, a warning like this from a trader such as Beamer might have acted to alert colonial 
officials to a potential problem with the Cherokee alliance. At the same time such a rumour 
would allow the deflection of blame away from the British or the Cherokee towards French 
and Creek provocateurs as it had in 1751. By contrast in the hands of Coytmore the rumour 
became a way to deflect blame for acts he might have committed against Cherokees. By 
warning of these machinations between the Cherokees and the Creeks, Coytmore hoped to 
turn the focus of his superiors away from the crimes he and his fellow officers had 
committed towards a conspiracy between the Indians. 
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Lyttelton believed Coytmore’s version of events in the Lower Cherokee Towns and his fear 
of a possible conspiracy against the British colonies added to his anger at actual violence 
committed against white settlers. When the Cherokee delegates brought their complaints 
to Charlestown in October Lyttelton saw this as further evidence of Cherokee double 
dealing and an attempt to divert his attention from the central issue of bringing the 
Cherokees to heel and obtaining ‘satisfaction’ for the outrages committed in the 
backcountry. 
 
This string of events throughout 1758 and 1759 were part of a steadily accumulating tide of 
clashes, tensions and mishaps that built up in the backcountry in the late 1750s. Occasional 
acts of violence or officials abusing positions of authority at the outer edge of British power 
were not unknown. But in 1750s these matters came to a head as the British and the 
Cherokees came into increasing contact in the backcountry. Rumour had always been a 
factor in the relationship between the British and the Cherokee but in this environment it 
began to take on a particularly frightening aspect. These months also saw the attempts of 
leaders such as Attakullakulla to shape the diplomatic discourse and smooth over the 
cracks in the British-Cherokee relationship. Governor Lyttelton made some attempts to 
follow these practices, but in the end his own rigidity and willingness to be swayed by the 
tide of rumour and fear which swept across the backcountry led him to forgo all diplomatic 
manoeuvres and seize the Cherokee negotiators. As the situation began to spiral 
increasingly out of control the potential for rumour to cause a serious rupture in Cherokee 
British relations became more acute. 
 
 
Prelude to War: The Embargo and the last negotiations  
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As early as May 1759, just after the meeting between Attakullkulla and Lyttelton and well 
before Coytmore’s dire warnings, Lyttelton began to give orders for supplies of goods to 
the Cherokees to be impounded.315 In August when the colonial Council issued an official 
order to stop the trade of goods into the Nation, Coytmore enthusiastically seized all the 
guns, ammunition and flints that he could lay his hands on.316 By September 1759, the 
Cherokees were thoroughly alarmed that the supply of ammunition appeared to have 
stopped. At this stage a rumour that had been a periodic cause for alarm in Cherokee 
townhouses for years came to the fore. Trapped behind the walls of Fort Loudoun, Demere 
saw what was happening and the danger that it posed to his command and his very life. He 
wrote a warning to his colleague at Fort Prince George:  
 
‘[I] can assure you that the Indians over here were peaceable until they heard the 
Ammunition was stopt, and then they grew very uneasy, and the Messengers 
which old Hop and the Standing Turkey had sent to the Alabama Fort returning at 
the same took that opportunity to tell them that the time was now come for the 
English to cut them off, which they might plainly see by their stopping the 
Ammunition, this made them worse’317  
 
Demere could see the damage that the combination of the trade embargo and the re-
emergence of rumours of a British assault on the Cherokees could do to relations between 
the communities. He was also able to maintain some links with sources in the Cherokee 
community, remarking on an abortive attempt to cut off a party sent to bring in the fort’s 
cattle he claimed that he was ‘credibly informed that was their Errand, and that they were 
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set on by Judges Friend who is at the Head of all this mischief’.318 Despite the threatening 
atmosphere and actual acts of violence committed around the fort, Demere continued to 
believe that a peaceful resolution was still possible. In an addendum to his letter to 
Coytmore he wrote that ‘I hope as soon as the Little Carpenter comes who I am sure is well 
intentioned for the English he will make up everything, and the reason they committed 
these things was, because they expected him soon, because they had promised the French 
three Scalps for Ammunition’.319 Isolated far from support or reinforcements, Demere had 
no choice but to hope that the return of Attakullakulla would calm the situation. 
 
Thus, the tensions which had strained relations between the Cherokees and South 
Carolinians had reached a fever pitch by October 1759 when the Cherokee headmen 
arrived in Charlestown. Lyttelton was suspicious. He had been alarmed by the fear fuelled 
rumours that had emerged in the previous year and was determined to assert his authority 
over proceedings. His concerns about a possible conspiracy between the French and 
Cherokees were stoked by the information being fed to Charlestown by Coytmore, as he 
sought to cover his criminal activity. Those Cherokee headmen who wished to maintain 
peace with the British found it increasingly difficult to contain the anger of their 
countrymen at the actions of backcountry whites. This anger was inflamed by the fearful 
nature of the rumours loudly proclaimed by the French and their sympathisers. By this 
stage, determined for war, Lyttelton demanded a price for peace far greater than had ever 
been required before. The demands went beyond anything that the headmen in 
Charlestown could deliver or that the people of the towns would accept. Lyttelton called 
for the surrender of one Cherokee killer for every white person killed by the Cherokees 
since 1758. In demanding this Lyttelton was making the price of peace the death of men 
who had been fulfilling the obligations to clan and family in gaining vengeance for their 
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dead kin. Furthermore, many of the headmen seized by the South Carolinians were among 
the more powerful of the moderate faction and had no relationship to the Cherokees 
whose surrender the governor sought. In this final act, which he hoped would prevent 
further violence by Cherokees, Lyttelton simply gave credence to the rumours and fears 
that were sweeping through Cherokee country, that the British were not to be trusted and 
that any attempt to negotiate would lead to kidnap and slavery. And so the Cherokees and 
the South Carolinians slid into war. 
 
The outbreak of war in 1759 was built on the foundation of rumours and fears which had 
existed in intercultural relations for decades. The fear of conspiracy which had flared up 
regularly in the relationship between Indians and the British came once again to the fore. 
Faced with a confusing, tense and potentially dangerous situation, rumours emerged 
among both the Cherokees and the British to explain the events that were going on around 
them.320 In this opaque environment conspiracy rumours were a long established and 
familiar explanation for events. Rumours were a central mechanism in the outbreak of the 
war.   
 
This begs the question, why did war break out now? If these tensions had existed 
throughout the Cherokee-British relationship why did they erupt in 1759? To a certain 
extent the causes were a matter of demographics. The arrival of so many settlers from the 
backcountry of Virginia and Pennsylvania put new pressures on a relationship that was 
already contentious and vulnerable to rumour. As settlers and Cherokees began to 
compete for the same lands and resources it is clear that more strain would be placed on 
the fragile alliance between the two peoples.321  
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But the way that individuals reacted to events was also critical.  While the outbreaks of 
violence in the backcountry at this time were certainly significant they were not 
unprecedented. Events such as the Panic of 1751 had led to similar bouts of fear fuelled 
rumouring. Keeping these outbreaks under control took adroit handling and a good 
understanding of the interaction between information and the limits of physical power in 
the colonial backcountry. Lyttelton did not have those abilities. While Lyttelton attempted 
to observe the niceties of Indian diplomacy as he understood them he reacted to rumours 
of violence by attempting to demand submission and recompense from Cherokee 
headmen. These headmen were neither able nor willing to satisfy him. His highhanded and 
inflammatory actions also exacerbated problems with rumours in the Cherokee country. To 
Cherokees hearing the news that a large delegation of headmen on a peace mission had 
been taken hostage immediately began to suspect that the British were planning a similar 
fate for all of them. 
 
Lyttelton’s War Begins  
 
Lyttelton carried his captives westward through the backcountry to Fort Prince George at 
Keowee. On reaching the fort, Lyttelton entered negotiations with Attakullakulla, the most 
senior Cherokee diplomat in the area. Three of the most senior hostages, Occonostota, 
Tistatoe and the Warrior of Estatoe were released in exchange for two Cherokee hostages 
but Lyttelton kept 22 of the Cherokees as hostages for the surrender of an equal number of 
‘murderers’ of whites and Attakullakulla agreed that any Frenchmen entering the Cherokee 
country would be killed or captured. The truth, however, was that there was no way that 
the Cherokee Nation as a whole would agree to such terms. The South Carolinians held the 
upper hand while so many Cherokee leaders were held hostage in the fort but they lacked 
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the power to impose such terms on an undefeated nation who had suffered so many 
provocations. Lyttelton’s fellow Governor, Henry Ellis of Georgia, saw that the treaty was 
‘too mortifying to be observed by the Cherokees’.322  
 
Having achieved this questionable victory, Lyttelton began to withdraw towards 
Charlestown, as the Cherokees seethed and searched for way to free their compatriots. In 
the meantime violence against those whites who could be reached picked up. Around 13th 
January, 1760, John Kelly, a trader was killed at Notally. But, Kelly’s killers were not 
satisfied with simply killing him. His body was dismembered and placed on bushes around 
town. This was the first of a string of assaults in early 1760.The highly stylized and gory 
display seems calculated to produce a strong response among backcountry whites and to 
make clear that Lyttelton’s expedition had not cowed the Cherokees. This was followed by 
attacks on other traders and colonists and by the end of January all but one of the 
settlements down as far as the Brush River had been destroyed. The impact was rapid and 
unsurprising, traders and backcountry settlers fled en-masse for the colony.By March South 
Carolina settlement had been rolled back some one hundred miles.323 
 
One such group of settlers were the inhabitants of Long Cane, a region on the edge of 
British settlement near to the Cherokees. On the first of February, as a group of settlers 
were attempting to flee to Augusta they were attacked  by a party of over 100 Middle 
Cherokee warriors and over 50 men, women and children were killed or captured. This 
massacre was to become the defining act of brutality, at least for South Carolinians, in a 
war in which brutal violence was common. Not long after the end of the war Patrick 
Calhoun, a leading Long Canes settler, who had lost several family members in the attack, 
erected a stone monument to the victims of the massacre. In bold letters upon the stone 
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Calhoun had carved that his mother and the other victims ‘was here murdered by the 
Indians’.324 The Long Canes massacre remained a powerful example of the violence which 
could be visited upon settlers by the Indians.  
 
The settlers caught in the bloody ambush by that backcountry stream had not always been 
in such an antagonistic relationship with the Cherokees. At least some of the Long Canes 
settlers came west and south seeking land and protection. The most famous of the settlers 
were the members of the Calhoun family.325  The Calhouns first appeared in the public 
records in Augusta County, Virginia. In September 1746 the four Calhoun brothers, James, 
Ezekiel, William and Patrick, were accused of being ‘divulgers of false news to the great 
detriment of the inhabitants of the colony and it was ordered [by the court] that they be 
committed for the November Court’.326 For the rest of the 1740s and early 1750s the 
brothers won contracts to build infrastructure, gained appointment to local public office 
and acquired land. James also continued in a lengthy and embittered court case against 
James Patton, the man who had originally accused the brothers of spreading rumours. As 
the Seven Years War heated up, French-allied Indians struck along the backcountry of many 
of the colonies of British North America. Augusta County was no exception to the violence. 
A letter written from the county in December 1755 gives an idea of the violence and fear of 
this time: 
 
‘Our Situation in this Country has long been most melancholly; you have heard 
some Parts of our Distress from the public News Papers, and it is but a Part of them 
has hitherto reached the Ears of the Public. Were we to enter into a minute Detail 
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of the miserable Circumstances, to which great Numbers of the Inhabitants, in 
several Parts of the Country are reduced, by those Scenes of  Blood and Violence, 
that have open’d to this Land of Horror and Desolation, they would be sufficient to 
excite Compassion in every one who has the least Share of Humanity’.327    
 
As noted above, large numbers of Cherokees came north as allies of the British to counter 
the French allied Indians. These Cherokee visitors made a good impression on many of their 
Virginian allies. The correspondent from Augusta County noted that, ‘Some of the Cherokee 
Indians are come into our Assistance, and we have a Prospect of a much greater Number in 
the Spring, if those already arriv’d meets with such Usage as gives them Encouragement’.328 
It is likely that the Calhouns encountered some of the Cherokees at this time (John Calhoun 
was a captain in the county militia and as local landowners the other brothers were also 
likely to have been active in the militia). In fact around this time, all four Calhoun brothers 
with their widowed sister and mother embarked for South Carolina, arriving in February 
1756 at Long Canes.329  
 
It seems that there was, at least initially, significant goodwill between the Cherokees and 
the new arrivals. It is interesting that, as noted above, the Calhouns came to the edge of 
Cherokee country shortly after parties of Cherokees had come encountered them while 
protecting the backcountry of Virginia. While there is no direct proof that these Cherokees 
invited the Calhouns and their neighbours to move south, the Long Canes settlers claimed 
that they had come to South Carolina ‘with the Consent and approbation of the Cherokee 
Indians of the lower Towns’. The Long Canes settlers claimed that after their arrival at the 
Long Canes, ‘they had lived some time in a good understanding and Friendship with the 
                                                          
327
 New York Mercury, February 16 1756, in Evans Digital. 
328
 Ibid. 
329
 Salley, Calhoun Family, p.2. 
150 
 
Indians who treated them with all possible Civility and good usage’. Nevertheless things 
soured quite quickly. The Long Canes settlers’ ‘Horses and fat Cattle were taken & carried 
away by the Indians’. The settlers blamed this on some other backcountry whites who they 
accused of telling the Cherokees that the land of the Long Canes had never been properly 
sold to the colony. After an appeal to Governor Glen the settlers once again ‘for sometime 
thereafter lived quiet & free from any disturbances and depredations of any kind’ until 
September 1756 ‘when the same Report was propagated by some Evil minded White 
People in regard to the Land settled by the Petitioners being the Property of the Indians’. 
Once again the settlers appealed to the Governor and insisted that: 
 
‘Notwithstanding [the attacks] the Petitioners had done everything in their power 
to gain the Friendship & good will of the said Indians and had also given money to 
support those very white people who the Petitioners were credibly informed had 
instigated the Indians to commit the said Robberys’330 
 
While the settlers may have been overstating their own willingness and ability to 
accommodate the Cherokees (tension was clearly evident in the attacks on settler cattle 
and horses) they did remain on reasonably good terms with many Cherokees. There was a 
steady trading economy built on the exchange of spirits distilled by the settlers for 
Cherokee horses and travel between the settlements was routine. In 1759, as the colony 
and the Cherokees slid towards war, Patrick Calhoun was able to travel into the Lower 
Towns and observe unmolested ‘a private meeting of their old men in the woods as I rode 
between two of their towns’ and even rode as far up as the Middle towns.331 It seems 
unlikely that Calhoun did this without alerting the Cherokee to his presence, further 
suggesting the links between the Cherokees and the settlers were still amicable.  
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None of this activity, however, helped the settlers when their wagon train was caught by a 
large Cherokee raiding party after some of the wagons became stuck in a bog. The survivors 
fled to Augusta and inside a week the news had reached Charlestown, further spreading 
panic.332 The survivors of attacks in the backcountry carried the news with them as they 
sought to reach safety. The news became a contagion as settlers fled towards the more 
settled part of the colony in a ‘tourrant’ of refugees.333 Rumour was an important factor 
both in drawing the Long Canes settlers into the region and in driving them, terrified, onto 
the road back east. 
 
Throughout the winter and spring of 1760, Cherokee raiding parties pounded the 
backcountry. Settlers from South Carolina fled both east towards the sea and north 
towards Virginia and Pennsylvania. As well as the possibility of violent attack by Cherokee 
raiders the widespread panic caused massive dislocation among backcountry communities 
and disrupted patterns of trade and subsistence which the inhabitants were relying on. 
George Milligen, who lived through the war, stated, several years later that ‘Many who fled 
into the Woods, for Safety, lost themselves and miserably perished... the luckiest, who 
escaped the Indians and gained the lower Settlements, were reduced, from Affluence, 
Plenty and Independence, to Poverty, Beggary, and Want’. Millgen claimed that ‘every 
Hour brought to Charles-town Accounts of Ravages, Depredation, Scalpings, and Ruin’.334 
While Milligen may have been being somewhat hyperbolic, there was clearly regular 
information carried into the colonial heartland by terrified refugee or messengers from the 
small forts that held out in the backcountry. Patrick Calhoun, who had just lost several 
close family members in the Long Canes Massacre wrote to Governor Lyttelton begging for 
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relief for some four hundred refugees who had sheltered at New Windsor with trader John 
Tobler. From the Waxhaw settlements, the former missionary William Richardson warned 
that ‘if some speedy assistance is not afforded the frontiers will, we are afraid, be 
immediately deserted with the prospect of a famine as our crops are poor’.335 Rumour and 
fear were becoming overwhelmingly important factors in the life of the backcountry. 
 
Death at Fort Prince George and Montgomery’s Cherokee campaign 
 
Back at Fort Prince George and Keowee the Cherokees were locked in a stand-off with the 
fort’s garrison. The British could not move outside the fort but with the number of 
Cherokee headmen held as hostages the Cherokees could not directly attack the Fort. In 
the meantime smallpox killed many on both sides. The impasse was broken by mid 
February when Occonostota lured Coytmore out of the fort with an interpreter and Ensign 
Bell, possibly with the help of two Cherokee women. Concealed Cherokee gunmen opened 
fire hitting Coytmore and Bell. Although the three men made it back into the fort, 
Coytmore was mortally wounded and died shortly after.336  
 
What happened next within the walls of the fort is uncertain. The officer who took over 
after Coytmore’s death, Lieutenant Milne, insisted that he had sought only to have the 
hostages put in irons but that the Cherokees had drawn concealed weapons and killed the 
first soldier through the door. Milne claimed that despite his own best efforts, the enraged 
soldiers had then massacred the Cherokees.337 This account stretches credulity, given the 
length of time that the Cherokees had been prisoners it seems unlikely that they would 
have been in a position to conceal knives and hatchets. This may well have been a gambit 
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for the consumption of the colony and especially Milne’s superiors, to absolve him of guilt 
for this act that was sure to lead to further bloodshed. Regardless of the circumstances, the 
hostages were dead and open warfare was tearing across the backcountry. Those 
Cherokees who had argued for peace were silenced in the surge of revenge fuelled 
violence. 
 
Faced with this explosion of violence, Sir Jeffery Amherst, the commander-in-chief of the 
British forces in North America, was forced, against his own wishes, to send a detachment 
of troops to South Carolina. The troops were under the command of Colonel Archibald 
Montgomery and included more than 1300 British regulars. Amherst intended that this 
force should strike the Cherokees, wreaking fast and brutal vengeance upon the Indians ‘by 
Destroying their Towns’ quickly and returning quickly north where the war with the French 
still continued. 338 
 
On landing in Charlestown on 1st April 1760 the British commanders found that Governor 
Lyttelton was imminently departing. The Governor refused to impress wagons for the 
regular’s expedition and sailed for a new post in Jamaica four days later. Montgomery and 
his second in command, James Grant, tried unsuccessfully to acquire the necessary 
infrastructure for the expedition and had to threaten the colonial assembly with 
abandonment if it did not assist the expedition. Fearful of a possible slave insurrection and 
attack by the Creeks the colonial elite insisted on keeping much of the militia in the colony. 
Frustrated and angered, the British leaders pushed their expedition slowly into the 
backcountry. 
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The British commanders were disgusted with the colonials’ attitude (Montgomery at one 
point lamented that, ‘Such a Set of People I never saw’). This may explain the lack of 
information sent by the expedition back to the colony. The lack of information was such 
that the South Carolina Gazette felt obliged to print a disclaimer that: 
 
‘as no person in this province is yet legally appointed by authority sole vendor, 
publisher, collector of authentic intelligence, we flatter ourselves that the public 
will not suppose us excluded, precluded from such nor disregard the advises we 
shall give them from the Army marching to the Cherokees... altho’ they should not 
be dated from the camp’339 
 
The Gazette  was desperate to assure readers of its authenticity, of the reliability of its 
news gathering. This incident reveals the importance for the newspapers of maintaining a 
reputation for reliability as well as providing up to date information as speedily as possible. 
The tension between these two imperatives is clearly apparent in the editorial printed in 
the Gazette. The reliance that colonial newspapers had upon rumour for their information 
added to the motivation they had to ensure that their information came from reliable 
sources (or at least to give the impression that their information came from such sources). 
The ability of the expedition commanders to withhold information about the events in the 
Cherokee country from those at the coast was a potent power that they held over those in 
the colonies. The incident also makes clear that the information arriving from the 
expedition was not all given equal weight. While the necessities of supplying the expedition 
meant that a certain amount of information would trickle back to the colony through the 
waggon drivers and other suppliers, the colony’s major newspaper at least seemed keen to 
take its information from more official sources. 
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On the other side of the frontier, the Cherokees seem to have been, at least initially, in the 
dark as well. When Montgomery’s troops first reached the Lower towns they encountered 
only sporadic resistance. They burned the towns of Estatoe, Toxaway, Qualatchee, 
Conasatche and Little Keowee in the one sudden and brutal sweep through the Lower 
Towns.340 This was a stunning blow against the Lower towns and it sent Lower Cherokee 
refugees streaming into the Middle towns carrying warnings of the approaching British. The 
British commanders realised their good fortune in destroying so many Cherokee towns so 
quickly. Grant remarked that ‘if they had not been surprised, the very Country we have just 
been in was impracticable’.341 This judgement was vindicated as the expedition moved 
towards the Middle towns in order to relieve Fort Loudoun which was then under siege. At 
the small town of Echoe, the Cherokees attacked the British from high ground. In the midst 
of the fighting, as the British struggled to use their accustomed platoon firing system 
against the Indians spread out through the wooded mountainous terrain, the Cherokees 
brought into play a number of psychological tactics designed to un-nerve their opponents. 
They called out to the British using ‘very insulting language’ a tactic designed to dishearten 
their enemies and show contempt for them. The Cherokees also attempted to spark South 
Carolinian fears of a conspiracy. Early reports of the fighting claimed that the Creeks had 
joined the Cherokees, a great fear of the South Carolinians. The Cherokees seem to have 
been very much aware of this. In later clashes the Cherokee warriors were heard to call out 
‘Coweeta’, one of the chief Creek towns, to the British troops. In the battle at Echoe the 
British lost twenty killed and some seventy wounded. The wounded were a particular 
problem as they could not move with any kind of speed and needed guarding against the 
possibility of a Cherokee attack. Realising that he could not attack the Middle towns and 
                                                          
340
 Hatley, Dividing Path, p.130-31, Oliphant, Peace and War, pp.123-26. 
341
 Grant, to Bull, June, 1760, CO5/377. 
156 
 
cover his own lines of supply and retreat Montgomery abandoned his objective within a 
day of the fight at Echoe.342  
 
Montgomery’s expedition had a number of important impacts on Cherokee and British 
understandings of the war and of their relationship to one another. The expedition showed 
the significant barriers that faced European expeditions against the Cherokees. The British 
expedition had great difficulty manoeuvring in the mountainous terrain of the Cherokee 
country. At the same time the expedition demonstrated the vulnerability of Cherokee 
towns to unexpected attacks. In terms of understanding the importance of information in 
the colonies the expedition made clear the vital practical and psychological demand for 
information present in the colonies and in Indian country. By withholding his dispatches 
about the expedition from the colonists Montgomery was showing thorough contempt for 
those who had refused to aid his expedition. For the Cherokees, no other incident in the 
colonial era showed so clearly the importance of being informed of the movements of the 
invading whites. 
 
‘All the World were Liars’: The Expedition of 1761 and continuing tensions 
 
As his orders had stated, Montgomery wasted no time staying in Charlestown following the 
decision to abort the attack on the Middle towns.  Within a month of the battle at Echoe, 
Montgomery and most of his troops were embarked for the north. This set off a fresh wave 
of fear filled rumours throughout the remaining backcountry settlements and the survivors 
pinned down in fortified houses. Ironically this had a chilling effect on attempts by South 
Carolina’s most vulnerable outposts to communicate and co-ordinate their efforts. Lachlan 
Shaw, now in command at Fort Prince George, wrote that he could find no-one willing to 
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make the journey between Augusta and Orangeburg, lamenting that ‘if I was to give one 
hundred Guineas to a person to cross the country... I could not get any person to undertake 
it’. At Fort Loudoun in the Overhill towns, the only messenger willing to risk his life carrying 
dispatches to the interior of the colony was Abram, a black man and runaway slave.343 
 
In the summer of 1760 Abram brought word of the fall of Fort Loudoun.  The colonial 
troops left the fort under a flag of truce, hoping to be escorted to Virginia and safety, but 
the column was attacked and Paul Demere, the commander and thirty two of the troops 
were killed and the rest divided among the attackers as slaves. One French report of the 
attack claimed that the Cherokees who killed Demere ‘have put earth in his mouth, saying, 
You dog since you are so very greedy of earth be satisfied and gorged with it; they have 
done the same to others’.344 This account suggests the acting out of Cherokee fears about 
the voracious appetite of British settlers for their lands on the bodies of the unfortunate 
garrison of Fort Loudoun.  
 
In response to these attacks, South Carolina began raising troops and lobbying for a joint 
expedition against the Cherokees with the British military and Virginia. The newly formed 
South Carolina regiment spent a miserable winter at Congarees waiting on the arrival of 
British and colonial reinforcements. As spring arrived Grant returned to the south-eastern 
colonies bringing with him his regiment. With what remained of the South Carolina 
regiment Grant invaded the Cherokee Middle towns. Where Montgomery’s expedition had 
wrought its destruction in one fast and sudden sweep Grant’s moved steadily and 
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systematically. Part of this was a result of the practicalities of moving a large force into the 
Cherokee mountains while under attack by parties of Cherokees. Grant himself claimed 
that the passage into the Cherokee Middle towns was worse than that through the Alps, 
which he had experienced.345 Nevertheless, Grant pushed relentlessly forward, burning 
Cherokee towns and destroying all the stores he could find for over a month. The 
Cherokees themselves though were rarely seen, the slow progress of the expedition 
allowed the news of incoming danger to spread throughout the Middle towns and the 
Cherokee’s had fled long before Grant’s men reached each town. After thirty two days of 
destruction Grant drew back to Ninety Six to await the Cherokees response. 
 
The power of the expedition did not prevent rumours swirling around the backcountry and 
the colony about its demise. An express sent down to Ninety Six by Grant returned 
unexpectedly to warn that ‘our Friends were very uneasy on our Account having been told 
that we had been surrounded by the Indians, & almost all cut off, the remaining few being 
only just able to throw themselves into Fort Loudoun’. Grant did not help this rumour-filled 
atmosphere giving specific instructions to those messengers sent back to the colony not to 
discuss the status of the expedition with the colonists.346  
 
Despite the lack of decisive battles, the expedition clearly had a significant impact on the 
Cherokees. They put forward Attakullakulla, now returned to prominence with the 
diminishing returns of war becoming apparent, to arrange a cease fire.  But there was 
clearly a plethora of rumours swirling around the Cherokee country and the belief of the 
Cherokee negotiators that they could get a reasonable response from the British hung by a 
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thread. Attakullakulla was warned at Keowee that Grant, now carrying the moniker ‘The 
Dreadful Warrior’: 
 
‘had halted all his Warriors at Ninety six, & built there two strong houses, in which 
he designed to confine all the Cherokees , that should come there on their way to 
Town, their Men in one apartment & the Women in the other; so that they should 
neither go up or down the Country’.347  
 
Alarmed by this and worried by reports that his own warriors had not arrived, 
Attakullakulla confronted Captain Lachlan McIntosh, an experienced interpreter who had 
been given command of Fort Prince George. Attakullakulla declared that ‘all the World 
were Liars, but he thought the people of Carolina were the greatest, that his friend Colonel 
Bird & the people in Virginia had told him as much &ca’.  Fearing for his own credibility, 
Attakullakulla complained that ‘all the assurances which he had given to his country-men of 
safety, in case they would once more in our power, would be retorted on him as new 
Lies’.348 Although McIntosh was able to convince Attakullakulla that these reports were 
incorrect, the fact that the Cherokees’ senior diplomat could be so panicked by a rumour 
suggests the level of uncertainty that existed in Cherokee society at this time. 
 
That some whites had a hand in this uncertainty seems clear. Charles Gunninghame, an 
unlicensed trader who had profited handsomely from the embargo on official trade to the 
Cherokees was one. During a preliminary meeting to agree terms and to send a Cherokee 
embassy to Charlestown, Gunninghame carried bloodcurdling warnings to the Cherokee 
headmen that it was a trap, that Charlestown was filled with smallpox and that the 
Cherokees were being sent there to die of the disease. All the headmen but Attakullakulla 
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and a few followers fled. Shortly they sent a messenger with two stray horses and a white 
turkey as a token ‘to shew me that their hearts are straight tho’ they are afraid’. An 
exasperated Grant seized Gunninghame and clapped him in irons.349 As the treaty 
negotiations went on it was known that traders and packhorsemen with Georgia licenses 
and no licenses at all had slipped back into the Cherokee nation and some South Carolinian 
leaders believed that it was ‘highly probable that they [the Cherokees] were prompted by 
Villains of our own Country and Colour? We know that there have been & still are amongst 
them such person capable of the most hellish Acts’.350 But these individuals, would not 
have been able to have the impact that they had had it not been for very real fears that the 
Cherokees held of British intentions, Lyttleton’s seizure of the Cherokee delegation in 
Charlestown, coupled with the actions of officers such as Coytmore had created a strong 
apprehension among Cherokees that if they went to the colonies at this time, they might 
very well not come back. 
 
So with unease, suspicion and more than a little fear the Cherokees and South Carolinians 
finally came to terms, thus bringing the war to a close. The Cherokees were not defeated; 
Grant had never brought them decisively to battle and they remained a potent military 
force. But three years of fighting and the brutal assaults on sections within the Cherokee 
nation had taken their toll. The Cherokee headmen were very much determined for peace. 
The final treaty placed the border of colonial settlement at Forty Mile River, a considerable 
loss of hunting land to the Lower Towns, but the humiliating terms of the treaty signed 
with Lyttelton two years earlier were gone. Peace of a kind once again reigned. But there 
were signs that not all were happy with the way that the treaty had ended matters. The 
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pseudonym ‘Philopatrios’ was used to pen a succession of scathing attacks on Grant and his 
Indian policy and Grant himself was booed whenever he went out in public.351 
 
As if to make clear that the peace had not effaced all the violence and fear that had built up 
in the previous two years the Cherokee headmen, on their return from signing the treaty 
were robbed of their goods, including the small number of goods given to them at the 
treaty signing. When the British officer travelling with the headmen apologised profusely 
and offered to procure satisfaction for them, the Cherokees replied that ‘we believe it to be 
so, & you see that there is some bad amongst the White people too’.352 The backcountry 
was still as volatile as it had been before the war and rumour would still play a strong role 
in its outlook. 
 
The 1750s marked a sea change in the way that rumour operated in the backcountry. The 
surge southwards and westward by settlers from Europe and the northern colonies 
changed the dynamic of the backcountry. Clashes became more frequent and more difficult 
to resolve. The presence of British settlers on land that had been a traditional pathway of 
Indian war-parties created a situation that was ripe for violence. This change affected the 
role of rumour in the backcountry. In earlier decades rumour had been a tool which could 
be used to smooth over the differences between Cherokees and the British. The Panic of 
1751 provides an important example, both of how things had changed and of the 
continuities that still existed. The panic flared up due to rumours fanned by the tensions 
and actual acts of violence that had occurred in the increasingly crowded backcountry. At 
the same time the crisis was soothed by the judicious use of rumour, in this case by 
rumours suggested by Cherokee headmen of French machinations and Creek violence. 
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But these techniques required diplomatic skill and a flexible personality. When trouble 
again flared in 1758-59 the new Governor of South Carolina lacked those capabilities. Faced 
with violence in the backcountry and dark rumours of more dreadful conspiracies Lyttelton 
opted for forceful demands backed by military force. His decision to effectively seize a large 
Cherokee peace delegation gave credence to long held Cherokee fears about the British 
and sparked outbreaks of violence which made further war inevitable. Throughout the war 
itself rumour continued to act as an important mechanic, spreading fears of impending 
attack throughout the colonies and the Cherokee country. Even as the war came to a close 
rumours among the Cherokees of a British plot to enslave or kill them came close to 
derailing the peace agreement.  
 
The role of rumour in colonial affairs had shifted. The relationship between the Cherokee 
and the British had always been uncertain and fragile but rumour had been able to heal 
relations as well as damage them. With the outbreak of open war the situation changed. 
The Cherokees and the British were now divided by the war. The old system no longer 
worked. A new way of dealing with one another would have to be found. Rumour remained 
important for relations in the backcountry but it was becoming an increasingly destructive 
and uncontrollable force. 
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Chapter 3: Negotiating a New Backcountry 
 
The early 1760s was a time of transition in the backcountry. With the expulsion of the 
French from North America and the shifting possessions of the British and Spanish empires, 
old alliances began to change and Indian nations such as the Cherokee who had made use 
of a foreign policy of playing the various European colonies against one another were 
forced to seek a new strategy to protect themselves.353 The colonies too were adjusting to 
a new reality. Had the Cherokee War been enough to humble the powerful Indian nations 
on the colonies’ borders? What was the place of the colonies in an imperial order which no 
longer faced the French colonies across North America? How would the backcountry 
integrate with the coastal regions of the colonies? The violence and dislocation of the 
Cherokee War had left both the Cherokee and the inhabitants of South Carolina shaken and 
fearful. In this environment rumour could once again play a decisive role in the decision 
making process of both peoples. In the early 1760s colonists, imperial officials and 
Cherokees all sought new certainties in an uncertain world. 
 
This chapter will explore the ways that the Cherokees and the British sought to rebuild and 
strengthen their communities in the years following the conclusion of the war. As the 
Cherokees and British emerged from the war both peoples sought to secure themselves 
and recover from two years of intermittent violence. The relationship between the 
Cherokees and the British had shifted decisively. The relative amity that had existed 
through the 1740s had been destroyed by the increased immigration into the backcountry 
and the attendant violence and mistrust that resulted. Cherokee and British leaders had for 
some time succeeded in using rumour to deflect the increasing tensions in the backcountry. 
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This ended with the disastrous actions of Lt. Coytmore and Governor Lyttelton. The new 
problem for the British and the Cherokee was how to deal with one another now that the 
old methods of interaction had failed. In South Carolina this manifested itself as an 
argument about the meaning of the Cherokee war. Factions for and against Colonel Grant 
whose campaign had brought the war to a close argued vehemently about how the war 
had gone, how the participants had behaved and how the Cherokees now acted towards 
the colony. The control of information became key, both to deciding how the events of 
previous years should be interpreted and in shaping the future. In the backcountry the 
Cherokees also sought to secure their position and recover from the war. Cherokees and 
British colonists sought to reinterpret their relationship to one another and their place 
within the wider backcountry society. As will be discussed below, these interpretations 
were highly contested making rumour an important tool in the arsenal of anyone who 
would exercise power in the colonies or in Indian country. At the same time, in such an 
unsettled situation, uncontrolled rumour remained an important factor in events.  
 
Debating the peace 
 
 The close of the Cherokee War gave the appearance of calm in the south-eastern colonies. 
Reports from the returning army gave the impression that the cessations of hostility had 
brought peace to the backcountry: ‘By Gentlemen arrived in town from the army, we learn 
that every thing continues quiet to the Westward; and that the Cherokees behave with 
great humility and submissiveness’.354 Indeed, it was claimed in newspaper reports that the 
Cherokees were in such dire straits that the main danger that they posed was to property. 
The same report claimed that while Fort Prince George had now been supplied with 
enough provisions to last up to a year Cherokees had stolen ‘13 out of 23 head of black 
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cattle there; which, if true, shews they are very hungry’.355 Some reports also claimed that 
backcountry encounters between whites and Cherokees had resumed peacefully. For 
example, the headman Tistatoe had come back into the Lower Towns with some of his 
people with the intention of repopulating some of those towns which had been destroyed 
in the British campaigns in the war. On arriving in the Lower Towns in need of supplies 
some of the Cherokees ‘left their baggage with capt McIntosh and went out to hunt for 
subsistence: Some parties of them were met by the white people, and they behaved on all 
such occasions as friends’.356  
 
Notwithstanding these reports, there was also a willingness in South Carolina to believe 
that the Cherokees were behaving in a threatening manner. The war had made it clear that 
South Carolina was vulnerable to Indian attack. South Carolinians were watching the 
actions of the Cherokees for anything which might indicate a renewal of hostilities.  
Following a Cherokee delegation to Virginia the colonial press felt obliged to confirm that 
‘The report from thence of the Cherokees being either outrageous or insolent, which was 
circulated here, was absolutely groundless’.357 In reporting to General Gage, then the 
commander in chief of British forces in North America, a correspondent in Charlestown 
claimed that ‘Your Excellency may believe it gives me some pleasure to hear the people 
here say that they are under no apprehension as to the Cherokees, their planting corn, and 
not being able to live without it puts them always so much in our power’.358 These reports 
suggested that the Cherokees had been tamed by the violence of the Cherokee War. 
Whether or not individuals held these opinions was closely tied to the debate over the 
success or failure of the two British military expeditions which had carried the war into the 
Cherokee country. The question of how quiescent the Cherokees truly were became an 
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important part of this debate, which will be discussed below. Rumours and anecdotal tales 
about the behaviour and attitudes of the Cherokees after the conclusion of peace quickly 
became key to the competing narratives which were presented. 
 
There were significant concerns in South Carolina about the result of the war with the 
Cherokees, particularly about the two expeditions which had been headed by British army 
officers. The South Carolina elite felt that their honour and ability had been denied by the 
British commanders, during and after the campaigns. They were angry about the way that 
they felt that the British regulars had excluded the colonists from their rightful place in the 
war against the Cherokees and they struck back against this. Thomas Middleton, former 
commander of the South Carolina vociferously and openly spoke against the British 
commander, Colonel James Grant.359  He accused Grant of using the expedition to 
embarrass and belittle ‘those petty Provincial Officers who have presumed to censure of 
the Conduct of the Commander of the Expedition’.360 Middleton and the colonial merchant 
Christopher Gadsden, who wrote under the pen name ‘Philopatrios,’ agitated against Grant 
and the British conduct of the war after the return of the expedition.  
 
Gadsden was offended by Grant’s characterization of the colonial rangers who had taken 
part in both expeditions that he had been involved in. After the battle at Echoe, Grant had 
derided the rangers, claiming that they ‘behaved most infamously; near fifty deserted the 
night before we marched, and they ran off to a man the moment they heard the firing 
begin at which time poor Morrison [Captain Morrison of the colonial rangers] was killed 
when he was advancing and doing his duty like a gallant good officer’.361 Gadsden took this 
as an insult to colonial efforts in the war and perhaps even to colonial manhood itself, 
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arguing that Grant’s comments were ‘an obique reflection on the province: for whoever 
can suppose to consider a sample arrant cowards, must imagine most of the rest only 
wanting opportunity to prove themselves so’. Stung by this he set out to prove ‘that our 
Rangers did not deserve the Cruel Treatment they met with from him [Grant]’, arguing that 
in fact the Rangers had behaved well and could not have run off as their continuing place in 
the accounts for the expedition showed they were still present after the battle.362  
 
Whether Grant intended to question the bravery of all South Carolinians is an open 
question. After two campaigns in the region he certainly had not developed a great liking 
for the colonists and their military prowess. For Gadsden and his supporters though, the 
implication of Grant’s actions and messages were clear. They were a direct insult intended 
to belittle the South Carolinian role in the war. The concern that their bravery would be 
called into question was a serious one for the leaders of South Carolina. It struck at their 
deepest conception of who they were as gentlemen. Like honesty, bravery was at the heart 
of what being a gentlemen was in this era.363 By questioning the bravery of the rangers 
Grant’s statements threatened the South Carolina elites’ sense of themselves as gentlemen 
and hence their right to their positions of power and privilege.364  
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The information blackout that Grant had imposed was another significant factor in sparking 
the angry and aggrieved reaction from factions of the colonial leadership. In the midst of 
war these men, who were the most powerful men in their colony and who considered 
themselves English gentlemen, found themselves not only excluded from the conduct of a 
major expedition but prevented from even knowing the details of that expedition. When 
Grant’s verdict on the behaviour of the rangers became known it is not surprising that 
these Carolina elites saw his verdict on South Carolinian troops as an insult to them.365 The 
public nature of Grant’s comments on the rangers required a public repudiation. The 
Philopatrios letters were the vehicle for this.  
 
Gadsden was not only concerned to deny Grant’s accusations against the rangers. He also 
claimed that the professional British soldiers leading the expedition and Grant personally 
‘lost two fine opportunities that campaign of relieving Fort Loudoun and gloriously and 
effectually reducing the Cherokees’. Gadsden claimed that had Grant pushed on after the 
lightening assault on the Lower towns ‘they would have been in the midst of the Indian 
towns, one after another, in all probability, before the Cherokees could have time to 
recollect themselves and act properly in their own defence’.366 He further blamed Grant for 
the loss of Fort Loudoun, which Gadsden felt could have been saved. He asked rhetorically 
‘Is it usual, when a garrison is reduced to the last extremity, to desist from taking all 
advantages of an enemy, especially a savage one, when not only our friends  liberties, but 
their lives too, were known to be at stake?’.367 
 
Not all South Carolinians held this view. Henry Laurens, who had served under both 
Middleton and Grant during the war, was a staunch defender of the British colonel. Writing 
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in an unpublished letter as ‘Philolethes’ Laurens derided Gadsden’s pessimism about the 
peace claiming that, ‘however Philopatrios may affright himself with apprehensions that 
the Cherokees will join the Creeks in case they should come to an open rupture with us, be 
assured Sir, there is not the least danger of it’. Laurens also challenged Gadsden’s claims 
about the colonial troops, claiming that ‘The Men [were] constantly deserting altho the 
utmost care was us’d to detect & stop them, & some of these gave very strong marks of 
their opinion of the humility & peaceable disposition of the Cherokees by making the route 
of their escape thro their Country, the better to elude a pursuit’.368 
 
Laurens also challenged the account of events in the backcountry which had reached 
Charlestown and particularly the battle at Echoe of 10th June, he claimed that, ‘I know not 
where the publisher of the Weekly Gazette got his Account that the Loss of the Cherokees 
on the 10th June “was not less than 200 Men”’. While he agreed that, ‘Such a report was 
spread in the Camp & I heard several officers say they believed it &some of them assigned 
plausible reasons for their opinion.’ Laurens claimed that ‘I was also present & heard the 
same report & the Authority for it mentioned to the Commander in Chief. His reply was 
“that he thought it impossible.” & I think so too’. Laurens claimed a greater knowledge of 
the Cherokee side of the battle. He cited ‘three distinct Accounts , of Attakullakulla, one 
John Bench an independent Soldier who was a prisoner among the Cherokees, & Old 
Tripple nose Caesar, who had no opportunity of comparing their notes’ from these 
accounts Laurens stated that, ‘I have been led to fix the loss of the Cherokees on the 10th 
June at about 35 Men’.369 This incident shows clearly the kinds of rumours which could 
circulate among the troops in a military expedition after a battle, particularly in confused, 
inconclusive engagements such as those the expedition had fought against the Cherokees. 
With no way of confirming the number of Indian casualties, it is not surprising that rumours 
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swirled amongst the soldiers. In the months after the conflict, as different groups sought to 
argue for their own particular opinion on the war, they seized upon the accounts which 
most aided their interpretation of events. 
 
As a veteran of the campaign and a prominent spectator at much of the diplomacy 
following the second expedition by Grant, Laurens claimed a greater knowledge of 
Cherokee intentions than did Peter Timothy, the publisher of the Gazette. It is interesting 
that two of the three witnesses that Laurens quoted in his account of the battle were 
Indians, both headmen who were known to the British, while the other was a private 
soldier, a man very low down in the hierarchy of colonial society. This curiosity could 
indicate a push on the part of Laurens to argue that his opinion of the Cherokee casualties 
was based on direct experiential observation of the events by witnesses. The nature of 
those witnesses and the likelihood that they would not have been taken as believable 
witnesses individually may have explained Laurens’ insistence on the strength in numbers 
that he had to back up his opinion and his emphasis that his correspondents ‘had no 
opportunity of comparing their notes’. This meticulous, almost lawyerly marshalling of his 
sources, suggests that Laurens was aware that his views on the campaign might not be 
shared by many of his contemporaries in Charlestown.370 
 
Laurens also attempted to deconstruct and discredit the sources of information that 
Gadsden relied upon for his opinion of the state of affairs in the Cherokee nation after the 
war. In the Philopatrios letters Gadsden referred to a packhorseman who had been at the 
inn kept by Thomas Nightingale, a saddler ‘on the path leading up to the Charlestown 
Neck’, citing as evidence that he ‘“heard a Man say the other day at Mr. Nightingale’s just 
come from the Nation who has liv’d many Years amongst them”’.  Laurens was extremely 
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suspicious of this unnamed informant and questioned where he might have been in the 
Cherokee nation and whether he could have known the things that he talked about. 
Furthermore, Laurens argued that Gadsden was twisting the words of his informant. ‘I must 
say,” he argued, ‘that Philopatrios has even abus’d this pack Horse Man, by commenting 
too freely upon his conjectures, & giving out for fact, what the Man after being sifted & 
wound up could at most but guess at.’371 In following this line of argumentation, Laurens 
was both questioning the reliability of Gadsden’s witness and also impugning the honour of 
Gadsden himself, a serious matter for gentlemen and part of the reason that both men 
wrote under pseudonyms.372 While writing under these names the two men could 
exchange heated arguments and make personal attacks without leading to a duel. That 
such an occurrence was a genuine danger in this society was evidenced by the fact that 
Grant, the subject of so many of their exchanges fought a duel while in Charlestown with 
Colonel Middleton, former commander of the South Carolina regiment. 
  
Laurens also directly questioned Gadsden’s knowledge of Indian ways, calling him ‘this 
superficial Indian Politician.’ He argued that Gadsden was ‘much mistaken a Little while ago 
when he insinuated that the very face of those Ambassadors being painted Red (which 
notwithstanding the bloody colour of vermillion might frighten him, is an innocent mark of 
decency in their dress) pointed out deceipt & denoted that there was no peace in their 
hearts’. Gadsden was utterly mistaken, Laurens argued, mockingly claiming that he would 
‘fatally find himself to be by trusting to the Lines of any Indian’s face for the sincerity & 
“humility of his mind”’.373 
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In these exchanges we can see a determined contest by members of South Carolina’s elite 
to control perceptions of the Cherokee War in South Carolina and in the wider empire. 
Both writers mobilised networks of information and informants that were available to 
them in support of their points and sought to discredit and belittle their adversary’s claims.  
On a provincial level, the war, which brought terror and violence to the backcountry and 
uncertainty and expense in the colonial capital, created an atmosphere in which hostility to 
the Cherokees was much more likely. The outcome of the war and the controversy over the 
final expedition of the Cherokee war spread this hostility into the low country. While the 
protagonists of the controversy were prominent members of the colonial elite, the 
controversy was widely published.374 With the fundamental questions that the war raised 
about the place of the British colonists in North America and the British Empire, rumours 
regarding the behaviour of men involved with the expedition took on an immensely serious 
character. 
 
The end of the war also brought the possibility of return of some of those backcountry 
inhabitants kidnapped by the Cherokees over the course of the war. Despite problems with 
the practicalities of returning these individuals to colonial society the word reached 
Charlestown in 1762 that Tistoe, the same headman who had brought some of the 
Cherokees back into contact with the colony in the Lower Towns, was bringing in a number 
of former prisoners. Nevertheless, the report carries with it a note of alarm, even with this 
joyful news. The experience of life among the Cherokee had clearly changed the prisoners. 
As a report of the New York Gazette relates, ‘The whites are all children between five and 
twelve years old; they have entirely lost their English tongue, and speak nothing but Indian; 
they are the prettiest creatures you ever beheld, and as wild as if they had been caught in 
                                                          
374
 The Philopatrios letters were published by Peter Timothy, editor of the South Carolina Gazette, 
the first letter was originally printed in the Gazette of December 18
th
 1761. While the Philolthes 
letters were not published Laurens caused enough fuss that Timothy felt required to publish a 
defence of his own conduct in the Gazette of March 4
th
 1763. 
173 
 
heather’.375 The image of young white children slipping so easily and comfortably into an 
Indian way of life, to the extent of having forgotten their birth language was extremely 
worrying to a colonial audience.376 Given the insistence that the colony had placed on the 
return of all colonial prisoners when negotiating the peace, the behaviour of these captives 
raised the question: what had it all been for? If these redeemed captives were now so wild 
that even the venerable headman who brought them in found that,’ they often ran, he had 
to hunt them among the woods as if they had been so many rabbets or squirrels; he kept 
them together in the latter part of the journey by constantly watching them night and 
day’.377 This was clearly a problem for the colony. If white children taken by Indians were so 
wild that not even a senior headman could keep them in check what hope did the colony 
have of turning these children back into proper members of colonial society? Tales of how 
young captives had returned from living among the Indians utterly changed or had refused 
to return at all were widespread in the British colonies.378 Such tales and rumours added 
another layer of terror to Indian warfare for settlers. Once again this aspect of the war’s 
end raised troubling questions about the state of the colony. Both the conduct of the war 
and its aftermath served to raise concerns in South Carolina about their place in the British 
Empire and their relationship with the Cherokees. 
 
All this soul-searching and debate in the British colonies reflected the end of a system of 
intercultural diplomacy between the Cherokees and the British which had existed for a 
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least a generation. Challenged by the inadequacy of their diplomatic methods and facing a 
rapidly changing world, the British and Cherokees sought to understand how best to deal 
with one another. Rumour continued to play a role in this environment, but the 
environment had changed. While some might still attempt to use rumour to calm tensions 
and minimise conflicts, rumour came increasingly to exemplify and exacerbate the 
escalating mistrust and alienation between British and Cherokee.  
 
An unstable border 
 
In the early 1760’s, as war with the Cherokees began to wind down, concerns about the 
relationship between the backcountry borderlands of the colony and the richer plantation 
regions began to come more prominently to the fore. As has been noted above, in the early 
1760s the feelings of the South Carolinians about the outcome of the war and of their 
relationship to the Cherokees had become extremely ambiguous. Even those colonists who 
were relatively upbeat about the end of the war anticipated potential problems in the 
future. In the same letter in which he declared that ‘our Cherokee gentry [are] as humble 
as Slaves’ and ‘I defy history to produce such an instance of Chastisement so rapidly 
brought on any Nation of Indians in America as that by the Kings Troops under Colonel 
Grant upon those poor Cherokees,’ Henry Laurens noted darkly that ‘The Indians are 
become very troublesome in the Northern Colonies’.379 
 
Part of this concern stemmed from the danger posed by malicious rumourmongers. The 
unauthorised traders who had caused so much trouble around the end of the Cherokee 
war continued to operate in Indian country and, (or so the colonists in the low-country 
believed) continued to stir up trouble. In early 1762 the Young Lieutenant of Coweta (a 
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Lower Creek town) met two white men in the woods who were thought to be carrying 
goods to trade with the Cherokees. These illicit traders apparently told the Creek ‘that the 
English were on the point of sending a large army against the Creeks by the way of 
Alabahma’. This left the Indian ‘under some uneasiness’. The report continued,  ‘not giving 
entire credit to this wicked and infamous story, he has applied, we hear, for better 
information, and at the same time sent the strongest assurances and protestations of his 
being steadfast in his friendship, to the English’. Warnings appeared in the colony that men 
of this ilk were also operating in the Cherokee country.  These reports claimed that these 
renegade traders spread rumours ‘that while they [the Cherokees] treat with us, a large 
army from Virginia is to enter their country’.380 Some of this uneasiness may be attributed 
to the long established and on-going fear of hostile conspiracy that haunted British 
colonists. At the same time the events at the end of the Cherokee War made clear that 
there were those who saw the potential for profit in playing upon problems in the 
Cherokee-British relationship.  
 
There was also an increased feeling in the imperial hierarchy, particularly among those who 
worked closely with Indians, that settlers and especially ‘the lower sort’ were a dangerous 
presence on the borders with Indian nations. This belief went back at least as far as the 
Cherokee War, when British officers such as Grant had shown a considerable amount of 
sympathy for the Cherokees (which may well explain the trouble he had on his return to 
the colony) and definite mistrust towards the colonists.  Following the war, the populations 
of settlers in the backcountry became a greater concern. Shortly after the treaty with the 
Cherokees a report from Charlestown noted that ‘Great numbers of People come daily 
from the northward, and settle at Broad River, Turky Creek, and other frontier places 
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contiguous to the Cherokees’.381 Gavin Cochrane, whose role required regular contact with 
Indians, was sympathetic to Cherokee difficulties with these numerous arrivals. In a letter 
of October 1764 he complained that ‘The White people on the frontiers of this province & 
North Carolina are such a Collection of abandoned Villains, as is not to be credited if there 
was not good authority for it. I am persuaded that they distress the poor Indians very 
much; and lead them into many Scrapes’.382  
 
Cochrane clearly had some support for this view from the more established backcountry 
settlers. Shortly after a shooting incident in the backcountry, Cochrane was approached by 
‘A Man of very good character, who lives about twenty miles above Long Canes’ on the 
outer edge of British controlled territory. This man ‘came to ask me if I had any letters to 
send that way. I asked him if he was not afraid to go where only a few days before some 
Indians had fired at a man on horseback and killed his horse’. The settler responded that 
‘the mischief done by the Indians was commonly owing to the behaviour of bad white 
people; and that those who were killed in that neighbourhood last winter, some were then 
actually on horses they had stole from the Indians, and the others paid for being in bad 
company’.383 The mistrust of these new arrivals was clearly not limited to the Cherokees 
themselves.  
 
The Cherokees also attempted to recover and to adjust to the new situations and old 
problems that faced them following the peace treaty. The impact of the three expeditions 
into the Cherokee homelands had been considerable. The numbers were uncertain and 
were linked to the on-going debates about the relative success of the expeditions. 
Nevertheless, following the expedition of 1761 Grant reported that ‘fifteen towns and all 
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the plantations in the country have been burnt- about 1,400 acres of corn, beans, pease, 
etc., destroyed; about 5,000 people, including men, women and children drove into the 
woods and mountains to starve’. It is clear that these attacks had an extremely destructive 
effect, both physically and in terms of societal morale.   
 
Other threats had also been a factor. Smallpox, measles and dysentery had all been in the 
Lower Towns since before Lyttelton’s expedition of 1759. The destruction of harvests and 
the rigours of war had also taken their toll on Indian bodies, making them more vulnerable 
to these diseases.384 During the war with the South Carolinians the Cherokees had also 
been left vulnerable to attacks by other Indian nations. The Creeks were a continuing 
threat to the south and by the early 1760s war parties of the Iroquois had begun pushing 
south to strike at the weakened Cherokees. One war-party came across a camp of 15 
Cherokees, 14 of whom they killed and the last they sent to take word of the assault to the 
wider Cherokee nation. The same war party also attacked a group of Chickasaws.385 The 
Northerners were not trying to hide what they had done. They wanted the Cherokees and 
all the inhabitants of the southeast to know who had wiped out the small Cherokee camp. 
 
The early 1760s also brought changes to the wider world of colonial Indian affairs. 
Prominent amongst these changes was the introduction of the role of Superintendent for 
Indian Affairs. This role had been first mooted in 1754 by Edmond Atkin, a successful 
Charlestown merchant and former member of the South Carolina Colonial Council who 
published his thoughts on colonial Indian policy while living in London. Central to Atkin’s 
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assessment of the problems in Indian affairs was a concern about the uncoordinated and 
fragmentary nature of that policy. These problems were real. Indian affairs were handled 
by the individual colonies and this led to problems of coordination and co-operation, a fact 
that had important implications for rumour. For example, in the panic of 1751 Virginia had 
had no idea that South Carolina was anticipating an attack by the Cherokees. Governor 
Glen neglected to inform his counterpart in Virginia of the trade blockade that his colony 
had initiated and as a result Virginia continued to negotiate with the Cherokees.386  
 
In response to this on-going problem of information, Atkin proposed a centralised system 
of Superintendents with the sole power to negotiate treaties, distribute goods and regulate 
the deerskin trade. 387 The Board of Trade liked the idea of a centralised system of Indian 
affairs and ordered the appointment of two Superintendents of Indian Affairs.  The 
Superintendent for the Northern Department, charged with dealing with the Iroquois and 
other Northern Indians was Sir William Johnson, a long established power broker and 
trader among the Mohawks who had gained a reputation and a good deal of celebrity for 
being able to effectively negotiate with Indians.388 Atkin lobbied hard to gain the role of 
Superintendent to the Southern Department for himself and after a long period of delay 
the Board conferred the role upon him.  
 
Atkin had been an astute observer of Indian affairs in Charlestown and London but proved 
to be a thoroughly disruptive figure in the southeast. Lacking the well-established personal 
powerbase enjoyed by Johnson, Atkin was forced to wrangle with the colonial governments 
for the resources he needed. Determined to assert his authority, Atkin spent six months at 
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Augusta, raising a troop of soldiers outfitted in a green uniform of his own design, 
stockpiling gifts and negotiating with the south-eastern governors for support. Atkin also 
made the thoroughly unwise decision to stop the deerskin trade while he prepared for his 
journey. This decision excited a great deal of anxiety among both traders and the Creeks. 
When his entourage did embark into the Creek country Atkin proceeded to ignore or slight 
a succession of the most senior headmen in the nation. Atkin’s great diplomatic adventure 
came to an end at the town of Tuckabatchee when Atkin declared the punitive halting of 
trade to the town of Cussita, so enraging a Creek warrior by the name of the Tobacco Eater 
that the latter hit Atkin over the head with a tomahawk.389Atkin survived the assault but 
was never able to live up to the role of superintendent for Indian Affairs. Like Atkin, John 
Stuart, his replacement, had also been a Charlestown merchant, a trade in which he had 
failed. Serving in the colonial military at Fort Loudoun as the beleaguered fort’s chief 
negotiator Stuart had formed a friendship with the Little Carpenter.390 Having survived the 
Cherokee War Stuart was well placed to act as a link between the British and the Indians. 
 
The appointment of the Superintendents created another path of communication linking 
the British government and the Indians of the southeast. The Superintendents were 
appointed by commissions from the Board of Trade and continued to report directly to the 
Board.391 At the same time the Superintendents were required ‘punctually to obey’ the 
orders from the commander in chief of British military forces in North America.392 This 
opened another channel of communication between the Superintendents and the British 
military. Both Stuart and Johnson in the Northern Department pushed against an absolute 
military command of their operations and John Alden has argued that Stuart asked General 
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William Gage, the commander in chief for orders much more frequently prior to 1766.393 
Nevertheless, both superintendents continued a regular correspondence with Gage into 
the Revolutionary era and made a point of informing him of events in their areas of 
operation. This was a logical policy by both men. Besides the official admonishment to 
defer to the military commander the passing of this information allowed greater co-
ordination between the separate departments in North America. Stuart, Johnson and Gage 
continued to share information throughout the 1760s and 1770s.394  
 
The Superintendents were also conduits of official information to at least some colonial 
presses. In October 1764 the South Carolina Gazette offered a rather apologetic comment 
on Indian affairs in the south east, the first the paper had made for several months. Noting 
that ‘While they are at peace with us, the intelligence from the different nations is of very 
little importance’  the paper claimed that ‘whatever there has been for upwards of six 
months past, has and probably man hereafter, come only tho’ one channel, at least for 
some time’.395 The meaning of this rather cryptic comment becomes rather clearer in May 
1765 when the editor of the Gazette felt compelled to post a declaration in defence of his 
journalistic methods: 
 
‘All intelligence concerning Indians or their affairs, in the Southern department, 
having been long time past confined (for good reasons no doubt) to the single 
channel of the Superintendent, his deputies, and agents; and almost every attempt 
to it from other quarters, where its authenticity might be unquestionable, having 
been frustrated; the public must not be surprised that so little has appeared in this, 
while the other paper had abounded with so much, on the subject; and the printer 
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hopes his past silence will not be imputed to negligence or inattention in him; 
whenever he can procure any from tolerable authority , it will be communicated to 
his readers’396 
 
The tenor of this remark suggests that the Gazette was under pressure, either financially or 
in its reputation (perhaps a failure to live up to its motto ‘Containing The Freshest Advices 
Foreign and Domestick’) for its lack of information on Indian affairs. The Gazette’s 
dependence on the Superintendent and his staff for information clearly led to a lack of 
stories reported in the paper, a situation of which a rival paper seems to have taken 
advantage. The Gazette defended its editorial policy on ‘authenticity’, the idea that the 
information it reported should be unquestionable. Several years later the General Gazette 
also published an article regarding its sources on Indian affairs: 
 
The Intelligence concerning Indian Affairs has always been sent to the Commanders 
in Chief of the Provinces, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and the 
Commanding Officers of his Majesty’s Troops; one or other of which Gentlemen 
have often been kind enough to oblige the Publick, by the Channel of this Gazette, 
with such information concerning the said Affairs, as appeared to them proper to 
be communicated. 397 
 
 The Superintendents were by this time considered by the publisher of the Gazette to be a 
particularly good source of reliable information. While the fact that the Gazette’s rival did 
not hold to this same rule suggests that their opinion was not universally shared, the 
Gazette’s insistence clearly showed that information from the Superintendent carried 
significant weight. Given that the Superintendents were working with similar sources of 
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information as the colonial Governors had in previous decades, their information was no 
less likely to have been shaped by rumour than those of their predecessors. While both 
Stuart and Johnson had extensive experience of operating in the backcountry, giving them 
experience of weighing the differing strands of information and rumour that existed in the 
backcountry, this did not make them immune from the effects of rumour. The newspaper 
articles, nevertheless, show that the Superintendents had developed a strong reputation as 
sources of ‘official’ news.398  
 
The Superintendents added another important conduit for rumour to pass through. 
Charged with rationalising Indian affairs and with a vested interest in keeping relations 
between the Cherokees and the British, the Superintendents seem in the space of a few 
years to have established themselves as reliable sources of ‘official’ pronouncements on 
Indian affairs. Despite this authority the Superintendents were reliant for their information 
on the same rumour laden sources as any other official and in the coming years their 
expertise would come to be valued to a significant degree for their experience of 
understanding and evaluating these rumours.  
 
Despite the attempts by the Superintendent to bring a measure of organisation to Indian 
affairs, problems continued in the backcountry as the rivalries among Indian nations and 
colonies festered. The Creeks and the Cherokees had been at war since before the 
Cherokee War and rumbles of trouble continued into the 1760s.  In mid-1762, non-specific 
warnings reached Charlestown out of Augusta that some trouble might soon be expected 
from the Creeks. Conversely the correspondent noted that ‘at the same time there are 
letters from thence, dated 24th past, which mention the return of some traders from the 
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nation and not a word of bad news’. The correspondent was clearly uncertain of the 
information that he had received, musing that: 
 
‘We hear, that on the 22d ult. some traders with a considerable number of loaded 
horses, returned to Augusta, from the Cherokees, who had been as far as the 
valley; and that at midnight on the 23d, two gangs of horses set out for the same 
country, with eight bags of powder, and ball in proportion, and 16 guns, besides a 
large quantity of goods. The day preceeding [sic] their departure, the alarming 
reports from the Creeks were raised, yet the horses went off’399 
 
The signs were confusing. On the one hand alarming reports were coming from the 
backcountry, but on the other trade was clearly continuing. Traders were often the most 
well informed of backcountry inhabitants and, with their businesses often existing on a 
financial knifes-edge at the best of times, they were unlikely to risk their assets if they felt 
that there was a credible threat of attack. The frustrated writer in Charlestown lamented 
that:  
 
‘It is always difficult to ascertain the truth of intelligence in general from that 
quarter, as several persons there are concerned in a villainous trade with the 
Cherokees, whose interest and convenience it suits to raise and spread false 
reports, which too often gain credit, to the great terror and hurt of the honester 
sort of people, and to the ruin of many out-settlers.’400 
 
In late 1763, tensions with the Creeks came to a head for both the Cherokees and the 
colony of South Carolina. In the latter half of December fourteen settlers were killed in the 
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Long Canes region. This burst of violence sent alarms throughout the backcountry of North 
and South Carolina, Georgia and Virginia. Large numbers of settlers fled their farms and 
others fortified themselves in makeshift forts.401 As the backcountry shook under this new 
threat colonial leaders and local power brokers searched desperately to ascertain the 
perpetrators and cause of these new murders. Wildly differing rumours of the murders 
swirled around the colonies: 
 
‘Some imagine , that they are dissatisfied Creeks who have taken this step 
effectually to embroil us with their nation; others that they are only part of the 
gang of that restless and inveterate enemy to the English, the Mortar of Oakchoy; 
other suspect them to be Northern Indians; and some think that they may be 
Cherokees, set on by Serowih (or Salloue) the Young Warrior of [Estatoe], who, it is 
said did not appear well satisfied with the share of presents delivered to him after 
the last congress at Augusta’402 
 
George Galphin, the venerable trader and political fixer among the Creeks, was among the 
first to learn of the attacks, ‘when he first received the news and saw the terror the 
inhabitants were in, he went on the Indian Path for intelligence’.403 Travelling on the road 
into the Creek country Galphin came across a number of camps of Creeks, men, women 
and children, who all seemed as surprised by the news of the attack as Galphin had been. 
Returning home the elderly trader sent out one of his employees to go deeper into the 
Creek country to investigate the matter. On the road Galphin’s man met Togulki, also 
known to the British as the Young Twin, the son of the powerful Lower Creek leader 
Malatchi, who blamed the incident on a small group of Creeks who lived among the 
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Cherokees. Togulki spoke very vehemently against the murderers and promised that if they 
were caught in the Creek country they would be killed.404 
 
Suspicions of Togulki’s story and the motives behind it ran high in the colonies. The Gazette 
reasoned that: 
 
‘many circumstances render it highly improbable that the late murders at Long 
Canes were the act of only seven renegado Creek Indians who deserted their 
country 5 years ago... Is it not rather to be suspected that he either knew of an 
intention to do mischief before it was done or that he met the murderers 
themselves upon the trading path carrying their Scalp or scalps to the Creek 
nation/ for how else should he almost as soon as the murders were perpetrated , 
know of them and the murderers, where he was hunting  near [unclear] upwards of 
50 miles to the westward of Mr Galphin’s and much earlier than he could have had 
the intelligence from the Cherokee country’ 405  
 
Noting that several of the suspected perpetrators were prominent Creeks and that at least 
one was Togulki’s own cousin, the Gazette suggested that the Creeks had killed the settlers 
‘in order to lay it to the charge of the Cherokees, and set us and them again at variance’.406 
The Gazette thought that the Creeks’ hope in doing this must have been to prevent the 
Cherokees from escalating the increasing tensions between the two nations into war or, 
even more alarmingly, to encourage the Cherokees to join them in a joint attack upon the 
English.  
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The whole incident makes clear the power of rumour in the backcountry and the 
seriousness with which rumours were taken by Indian and colonial powerbrokers. After the 
violence at Long Cane, these individuals all sought to understand these events as best they 
could. Given the plethora of different groups and rivalries that existed at the close of the 
Seven Years War it is not surprising that the rumours to explain the attack were many and 
varied. The violence of the 1750s and 1760s and the influx of new arrivals left all alliances 
and agreements suspect.407  The importance of rumour is also clearly shown by the 
immediate response of George Galphin, a man who had seen several similar crises in his 
time in the backcountry. Galphin’s first instinct was to head into Creek country, to secure 
for himself and his allies, clearer knowledge of the circumstances and likely repercussions 
of the attack. In all likelihood, the Creeks too understood the power of this knowledge, as is 
made clear by Togulki’s attempt to give an immediate explanation of for these events. His 
explanation sought to latch onto a rumour about the attacks which reflected blame upon 
the Cherokees and away from himself and his compatriots.    
 
Togulki’s less than subtle attempt to tie the murderers to the Cherokees was noted by 
British observers. This was done partly to debunk the suggestion and at the same time to 
exert leverage over the Cherokees. In a talk sent to the head Warrior of Estatoe and 
Toogaloo General Gage warned the headman that the Creeks ‘pretend they were sett 
[sic]on by the Cherokees, & by you in particular’ assuring the Cherokee that ‘I do not, I 
cannot believe the Creeks. You & the Cherokees had certainly no hand in perpetrating this 
wickedness’. The British general hoped to push the Cherokees to an overt punishment of 
the Creek offenders by insinuating that ‘if you are innocent you will show you are so either 
by killing or by giving up the Murderers to us’.408 
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The words of the British General had an effect for not long after a letter was sent to 
Charlestown claiming, ‘That Serowih, the Young Warrior of Estatowih, is much incensed 
against the Creek Indians for their uncommon insolent behaviour, thirsts for revenge, and 
is impatient to hear after what manner the English resent the late murders’. Nevertheless, 
Serowih was not so angered that he was not ready to do some insinuating of his own. He 
claimed that the Creeks had been concerting the attack upon the English for some time, 
‘that the seven murderers were in the Creek nation, and protected there, some of their 
principals giving out that it shall cost the English many sevens before they shall have them’. 
Furthermore, the Cherokee suggested that the Creeks had had a much more murderous 
plan in train but that it had been set off too early by the killings at Long Canes and that the 
Creeks were angry that it would now require larger groups of warriors to overpower the 
settlements.409 Serowih continued to argue that the Creeks were plotting against the British 
for some time; in July he told Ensign Price at Fort Prince George, ‘that the Creeks are ripe 
for an irruption; that their first blow will be against the Settlements, and that they have 
sent for their people living amongst the Cherokees’.410 This train of events seems to have 
been unsurprising enough that Gavin Cochrane, John Stuart’s deputy, felt confident in 
asserting that ‘the Cherokees and the Young Warrior in particular wish to draw us into a 
war with the Creeks’.411  
 
About a week later a Creek delegation arrived in Augusta. They declared that they had sent 
all the white people in their towns away as a precaution but that everything was quiet in 
the Creek country. They also asked for gifts to take to the Creek nation to show that the 
diplomatic bond with the British still held. When the news of the visit reached Charlestown 
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the Gazette was scathing; in an editorial Timothy claimed that ‘by this and some other 
accounts it appears pretty clearly that the Creeks as well insult as injure us’.412 Incidents like 
this strained relations in the backcountry and showed the dynamics and power of rumour. 
 
The End of the Seven Years War and violence on the rivers. 
 
Even as the Seven Years War came to an end the possibility of French machinations among 
the Indians continued to stir rumours among the British. In October of 1764 Gavin 
Cochrane wrote to Gage about a Cherokee who had arrived in the colony with a disturbing 
story; ‘If this Cherokee speaks truth, he tells what is very suprizing: that last spring when he 
was taken, he was carried to a fine French Settlement three days march from Fort 
Assumption’. At this settlement, the Cherokee said, ‘where a Great French officer and 
others of less note, under him, were very assiduous in sending for the different tribes of 
Indians in their alliance to whom they gave talks, ammunition, guns, flints, tomahawks, & 
knives, desiring them to go to war against the English & their allies’.413 It is not entirely clear 
what the Cherokee informant aimed to gain in carrying this news to the British. Possibly it 
was intended to elicit greater attention to Cherokee desires on the part of the British or to 
increase fears of the other Indian nations in the southeast. On the other hand, the 
information may have been volunteered by the individual Cherokee in the hope of 
receiving gifts. In Cochrane’s letter the identity of the Cherokee informant is not made 
clear. Nor does Cochrane confirm if any other Cherokees were taken to the purported 
French settlement. This absence of information  suggests that the informant was not a 
figure whose reputation had reached to colonial British circles and suggests also that he 
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was making rather vague non-specific suggestions to his British audience hoping to play on 
their fears of a potential French inspired conspiracy.414 
 
These rumours of French scheming continued to swirl around the colony. In one particular 
incident in March 1765, word reached South Carolina about an expedition led by the 
headman known to the British as Judd’s Friend. The Cherokee war-party had apparently 
travelled for over a month and a half without finding anything. They eventually spotted a 
number of bateau, one of which they managed to seize near to the site of the old French 
fort of Assumption. In the process they captured two Frenchmen who claimed that several 
months earlier two large parties, thirty boats in total, of French troops and their Indian 
allies travelled up the Ohio with supplies of goods for the northern Indians. They then 
entered the ‘Ousbach’  (Ohio) River, which, Judd’s Friend noted, ‘is navigable to numerous 
nations of Indians’. Shortly after the journey of this mysterious French convoy a group of 
northern Indians came into the Cherokee hunting grounds and killed fourteen men 
including the ‘Bullet-Head of Toquo’, a warrior whose death purportedly angered the Great 
Warrior so much that the Cherokee leader ‘declared he would, in the Spring, make the 
beloved path between the Cherokees and the French bloody and have 10 scalps for every 
man he had lost’ and claimed that since the departure of the previous French governor the 
‘French were becoming rouges’. The Great Warrior further promised that no more French 
convoys would be allowed to carry ammunition north.415  
 
There are a number of possible layers to the imparting of this rumour. Judd’s Friend, the 
headman who led the initial expedition to the Mississippi and the capture of the 
Frenchmen on the bateau, stood to gain favour with the British for the action he took in 
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attacking the French near Fort Assumption and therefore would have a good reason to 
emphasise the continuing importance of French movements on the Ohio. Judd’s Friend also 
seems to have pushed the very explicit association of French movements in the 
backcountry with the Cherokees’ ongoing war with the northern Indian nations. It may also 
have been the case that the captured Frenchmen claimed that large French forces moved 
on the Ohio as a way to intimidate their Cherokee captors. The forces necessary to protect 
thirty boats would have been considerable. They would certainly have been a difficult 
proposition for all but the biggest Cherokee war party especially given the difficulties of 
attacking boats on a river.416 The final agent in this rumour was Peter Timothy, the 
publisher of the South Carolina Gazette who not only published the account of the events 
in the backcountry but included an editorial opinion that the failure to man the old French 
forts on the Mississippi and the surrounding rivers was allowing the violence and French 
machinations in the backcountry. The story of Judd’s Friend’s expedition to the Mississippi 
and the surrounding incidents provided ample weight to this argument. It may be that the 
Gazette hoped to increase support for the costly measures necessary to rebuild and 
resupply forts in the backcountry. Whether these various actors used the story of the Ohio 
River convoys to further their own ends is difficult to say. All the parties involved in the 
spreading of this story stood to gain if it was widely believed and circulated. At the same 
time it seems likely that these parties may well have believed, or at least considered 
plausible, the tale of large scale French supplies to the north. The notion that the French 
would continue to intrigue among the Indian nations was a continuing rumour in British 
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circles. Rumours of French forces supplying northern Indians and meeting with Cherokees 
following the end of the Seven Years War continued to circulate in 1764.417  
 
The attack on the Ohio River tied the Cherokees into momentous events in the wider 
colonial world. Around the Great Lakes and particularly around the British post of Detroit, a 
large coalition of Indian peoples, some led by the Ottawa headman known to the British as 
Pontiac had struck at multiple British posts, destroying several and driving others behind 
the walls of their stockades. Many British officials were firmly convinced that the Indians 
were being encouraged and supplied by the French at New Orleans. Gregory Evans Dowd 
has convincingly argued that the evidence for this is deficient and that in all probability the 
French were not actively driving the attacks. In fact, Dowd's work suggests that the 
northern Indians were attempting to gain French support for their campaign, both through 
direct appeals and through a form of rumour based 'conjuring'. Pontiac and other leaders 
of the anti-British groups regularly made claims that the French were returning to free the 
Indians from British injustices.418 While Indian affection for their French 'father' was 
questionable (French commanders were as capable of arrogance and mistreatment as their 
British rivals), French power in the backcountry had been much less of a threat to Indian 
ways of life than the expanding power of the British state offered to be. Whatever their 
faults, the French had provided a useful counterweight to the British in North America, one 
which many Indian leaders would be happy to see reinstituted.419 
 
The events of Pontiac's War shed light upon developments in the Cherokee country in a 
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number of ways. First, the British reacted to the violence around the Great Lakes by 
blaming the French for the actions of Indian peoples. It was a tendency that both northern 
Indians and Cherokees were aware of and knew how to exploit in the British. It often suited 
Indian leaders to allow the British to blame French machinations for outbreaks of violence 
and hostility. The war also gave added impetus to the violence between the Cherokees and 
some of the northern Indians, particularly the tribes in the Illinois country. The Cherokees 
by 1763 were in a state of war with northern tribes from the Great Lakes to the Illinois 
country and down the Mississippi. The Cherokees sent out parties to attack both the 
northern Indians and French traders who supplied the Northerners with arms and 
ammunition. The raid on the Ohio was the most successful of these attacks.420  
 
As in the 1750s there was still the possibility of clashes between Indians and settlers. Both 
Indians and whites were killed in the violence. A northern war party travelling south to 
attack the Cherokees in the summer of 1766 had four of its men killed and George Croghan, 
deputy to William Johnson the Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the northern colonies 
felt moved to complain to General Gage that ‘by the best accounts I can get the 
Majestrates [sic] on the Frontiers who ought to preserve peace rather than encourage the 
killing of them’ were complicit in the murders. Croghan also warned that ‘unless your 
Excellency can prevail on the several Governors to take some more effectual measures 
than they have hitherto done to prevent the practise I fear a peace cannot be long 
preserved with those Nations’.421  
 
The previous year an especially brutal incident had occurred in Virginia when members of a 
Cherokee war party, had invaded the home of a blind man near Staunton, Virginia. These 
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Cherokees were already fleeing having been set upon by twenty to thirty settlers, known as 
‘Augusta Boys’ and having five of their number killed. When the Cherokees got into the 
house ‘they tomahawked him and his wife, and took a very small scalp off of the man, but 
did not disfigure the woman’. The same Cherokees also attempted to murder a man who 
passed them in the road. Left for dead while the Indians attempted to catch his horse the 
man ‘escaped, putting his hat under his wound, to catch the blood, that they might not 
track him’. Several months later nine Cherokees were murdered at Anderson’s Barn, 
Virginia, an incident that was thought to have led to at least two other murders of settlers. 
The irony of these events was that the Cherokees had only come north as allies to the 
British to aid in fighting the Shawnees and Delawares. The Augusta Boys for their part 
insisted vehemently that they had killed enemy Indians, not Cherokees who they claimed 
to view as ‘Friends’422 
 
Through all this violence and counter-violence, the Cherokees and British attempted to 
maintain cordial relations with one another. When ‘Mr Boyd and Mr Miller, two gentlemen 
from Virginia with their Servants’ were killed on Broad River in the Upper Cherokee 
country, the Cherokees initially tried to blame the act on northern Indians.423 This kind of 
claim and insinuation was common in backcountry killings of this era. It often suited both 
British and Cherokee leaders to either shift the blame for acts of violence to some other 
group (such as lawless hunters or the French) or indeed to ignore less spectacular 
confrontations altogether. John Stuart admitted as much to Gage, claiming that, ‘we must 
always expect to hear of Disputes and Fracas between the back Inhabitants of the 
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provinces and the adjacent Indians, which can no more be prevented than Robberies & 
theft among more civilized Nations.’424 
 
‘That Jealousy so Natural to Savages’ Ending the Inter-Indian wars. 
 
While occasional acts of violence were a regular part of backcountry affairs, in the war with 
the Northerners the Cherokees suffered particularly both in terms of casualties and in the 
humiliating and dispiriting defeats that they had suffered. In one incident a party of five 
northern Indians attacked some Cherokees at night, killed eight, and took a boy prisoner. 
The surviving Cherokees fled to the nearby woods. So confident were the Northerners that 
they sat at the Cherokees’ former campsite eating and loading themselves with plunder 
while the survivors of the larger Cherokee party sat in the nearby woods watching 
fearfully.425  
 
The Cherokees’ plight was not helped by the diseases raging through their towns. Stuart 
informed General Gage that the Cherokees ‘continue to be harassed by the Northern Tribes 
which with the Sickness and Mortality that this year prevailed in their Nation, has beyond 
measure dispirited and distressed them’. Faced with this horror, the Cherokees had sought 
desperately for a way to end the violence. Reluctantly Stuart had supplied them with 
passes to send a delegation north to make peace with their enemies.426 
 
Many in the colonies and in the British hierarchy were not sorry to see Indians killing one 
another. Gage had argued at least as early as 1764, ‘we shall always stand in that happy 
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situation with the savages, as long as they have quarrels amongst themselves. Whenever all 
the nations are at peace I look upon it as a signal for us to take care of ourselves’. Gage 
encouraged Stuart ‘to forment the [wars] and Bickering of the several tribes against each 
other and excite that jealousy so natural to savages’.427 In Charlestown too the belief held 
that the best way to keep Indians from killing whites was to foment wars, Ralph Philips 
wrote to Gage having received no word of violence against settlers over the course of that 
winter: 
 
‘I can’t help thinking but that it is very lucky for this as well as for the Neighbouring 
provinces that the Northward Indians keeps the Cherokees in aw[sic], also the 
Chickasaws & Chactaws the Creeks were it not so, I dare say we should have heard 
of many depredations, and Murthers [sic]committed long agoe [sic]on the 
Frontiers’428 
 
But violence between the Indian tribes, as has been noted above, had a nasty way of 
spilling over into violence against colonists. As the backcountry began to fill up, some key 
imperial figures began to consider the possibility of helping the Indians reach some sort of 
an agreement. In January 1767 Gage wrote to Stuart concurring with his decision to 
support Cherokee attempts to end the war: ‘I am to hope that with your assistance & the 
help of Sir William Johnson, a Peace may be procured fir them with the Northern Indians, in 
a manner with respect to both, as may turn out greatly to our advantage’.429 Despite their 
misgivings about peace between the Indians British officials saw tranquillity in the 
backcountry as advantageous.  
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In October 1767 a Cherokee delegation set out for the north. Among this party were some 
of the most senior Cherokee headmen, men who had been prominently involved in the 
nation’s decision making throughout the War of 1759-61. At the head of the group was 
Occonostoata, the Great Warrior, whose anger at the British seizure of Cherokee 
negotiators had been an important factor in the outbreak of the war. As chief negotiator 
the delegation had Attakullakulla, the Little Carpenter, a key figure throughout the war and 
the chief negotiator of the final treaty that brought the war to its end. The presence of 
these senior headmen suggested that peace negotiations were serious and at an advanced 
stage. The Cherokee delegation arrived in New York in December and began the journey 
upriver to Albany. Despite being in New York ‘at an unlucky Season of the year’ the 
delegation was able to conclude negotiations with the Six Nations successfully. They made 
the dangerous journey back to the southeast without major incident. 430 
 
The peace with the Six Nations was not the end of violence on the frontier as friction 
between the Cherokees and backcountry settlers continued. A party of Virginians was killed 
by the Cherokees in the summer of 1769, greatly exasperating John Stuart who admitted 
that the dead were ‘A Gang of Villains most probable, but there is no excuse, for the same 
thing would have been done, had they been People going on their Lawfull Business’. The 
Cherokees were clearly suffering from the increased encroachments of whites onto their 
land, one group of headmen requesting Stuart, ‘to send directly to the Governor of Virginia 
that he may write to his warriors in the out settlements to order the people all within the 
land & that his men shall not hunt in any of our lands’. The Cherokees complained bitterly 
that the Virginians ‘they do as they please for they steal our deer and Land’ and warned 
                                                          
430
 Matthew Keogh to Gage, 24
th
 October 1767, Gage to William Johnson, 16
th
 December 1767, Gage 
to Johnson, January 27
th
 1768, Gage to Stuart, March 26
th
 1768, Gage to Johnson, April 4
th
 1768 , all 
in Gage Papers, Vol.71, Vol.73, Vol.75. 
197 
 
that ‘if not soon altered will be of bad consequence, for our young fellows are very angry to 
see their Hunting Grounds taken from them’.431  
 
At the same time trouble continued to fester in the backcountry of the southern colonies. 
One of the key provisions of the Proclamation of 1763 had been the running of a notional 
line down the back of the British colonies to divide the colonies’ lands from a ‘reserve’ 
inhabited by Indians. The intention was that British settlement should not go beyond this 
line, thereby preventing the clashes and frictions that had plagued the frontier throughout 
the colonial era.432 But the settling of this line was itself fraught with tension. The 
Proclamation was issued in 1763 but the running of the line was a long, drawn out process. 
In 1768 John Stuart met with a number of Cherokee representatives at Hard Labour Creek 
to mark part of the line. The line itself was no guarantee that the boundary would be 
respected as much of the language used in the speeches at Hard Labour attests. 
Occonostoata remarked at this meeting ‘The Land is now divided for the use of the Red and 
White people and I hope the white inhabitants of the Frontiers will pay great attention to 
the Line marked and agrees upon. I see many of them here present and I recommend to 
them to use such of their Red Brethren the Cherokees as may chance to come down into 
the Settlements Kindly’. Stuart also attempted to convince the backcountry inhabitants to 
avoid clashes with the Indians; ‘The superintendant then addressed the Frontier 
inhabitants of whom a great number were present and admonished them to use the 
Indians kindly and not to encroach on their Lands he urged many forcibly arguments from 
their own Situation and Interests to induce them to live upon good terms with the 
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Indians’.433  The question of who held a right to land was often highly contentious. Some 
squatters had lived on the land for years. These deep seated problems were made clear at 
a conference at Lochaber in October 1770.   
 
Opening the conference, Stuart noted that some families whose farms lay on the Cherokee 
side of the line had lived there for twenty years and although ‘at the beginning of the war 
with the Northern Indians they were driven from their Habitations but as soon as a Peace 
was established they took possession again’. At the same time Cherokee hunters, mostly 
young men had held a right to hunt on lands which now fell on the British side of the line. 
At Lochaber Occonostata worried aloud that there were no young men at the conference 
who would be the ones to breach the line in their hunting.434 In these talks, Stuart and the 
Cherokee headmen attempted to establish a new basis for agreement that would allow 
them to keep the more contentious elements of their respective communities apart and 
limit the uncontrolled contact between the two peoples. Nevertheless, as Stuart’s 
observations make clear and the continuing history of the backcountry was to prove, the 
maintenance of this line would be impossible. Indians and backcountry whites would 
continue to meet, sometimes peacefully and sometimes not, regardless of the line.  
 
But the problems of settling the line with the Cherokees in South Carolina were mild 
compared to the friction caused by the attempts to set the boundary line in Virginia. 
Tensions were already high between Virginia and the Cherokees following the death of 
several Cherokees in Augusta County, Virginia, killings for which Virginia ‘never gave any 
satisfaction either by bringing the murderers to Justice, or by presents to the relations of 
the murdered’. Several murders of whites since then had been attributed to the relatives of 
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the Cherokees killed in Virginia.435 The attacks seem to have been carefully targeted. Gage 
claimed that the attackers ‘seem to have confined their Revenge to the Virginians, which 
[is] rather more consistent with reason than their general practise of killing all they meet 
without distinction’. The chaos caused by this violence exasperated imperial officials. Gage 
remarked to Johnson that ‘it is time to put an end to their killing the white people who 
were no doubt to blame, but they have had sufficient Satisfaction’.436 It would take more 
than this assertion by the British commander to calm the tension between the Virginians 
and the Cherokees.  
 
The running of the line between the Cherokees and Virginia was disrupted by these killings 
in the backcountry. But there was also a good deal of opposition to the line from within 
Virginia. In the same letter in which he called for an end to the murder of Virginians, Gage 
noted that ‘Virginia does not seem much inclined to have any Limits fixed to their 
Territorys’.437 Indeed a much more effective limit to the expansion of Virginia seemed to be 
fear of Cherokee retaliation. Gage noted in 1769 that the Cherokees laid claim ‘to the 
Country below the Kanahwa River, and the fear of a Rupture with them has no doubt 
occasioned Virginia to be bounded by the said River’.438 Those imperial officials who 
worked closely with Indian leaders were clearly concerned that the expansionary 
tendencies of Virginia would complicate their jobs; John Stuart complained to Gage in 1770 
that the ‘Pretensions’ of Virginia would lead to trouble if they were allowed to continue 
unchecked.439 
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 The Virginians were not simply dragging their feet in marking out the Proclamation. By the 
account of imperial officials Virginia speculators were actively attempting to derail the 
marking of the line entirely. Officials alluded darkly to forged talks and to the attempted 
bribery of headmen. One exasperated official complained to Gage that ‘I cannot describe to 
your Excellency the Little arts & underhand tampering that were practised by the Virginians 
to defeat and render abortive my Negotiations.’440 Rumour played a key part in this process 
acting as a tool for the Virginians attempting to sabotage the running of the line. At the 
same time rumours of potential violence by Cherokees created a de-facto line and placed a 
temporary limit on Virginian expansion. While the Proclamation Line had been intended as 
an answer to the problem of unauthorised settlers and Indians clashing it became simply 
another point of friction between the two peoples. Indeed the negotiations between 
Cherokee headmen and British diplomats served only to isolate the young men of the 
Cherokee nation from peaceful interactions with the British. This distance, coupled with the 
inexorable expansion of white settlement and the obstructionism of Virginia speculators 
made rumours among the Cherokees about British expansion both more likely and more 
dangerous. 
 
Fears of lawlessness and the rise of the Regulators 
 
Friction with Indians was not the only source of trouble in the backcountry. Following the 
Cherokee War many areas of the backcountry began to expand extremely fast. As one 
correspondent in Virginia claimed: ‘There is scarce any history, either ancient or modern, 
which affords an account of such rapid and sudden increase of in inhabitants in a back 
frontier country as that of North Carolina. Taking as an example Orange County in North 
Carolina the paper noted:  ‘that twenty years ago there were not twenty taxable persons 
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within the limit of the above mentioned county of Orange; in which there now are four 
thousand taxables. The increase of inhabitants and flourishing state of the other adjoining 
back counties are no less surprizing and astonishing’.441 While the population of the 
backcountry expanded markedly in the early 1760s the infrastructure of the backcountry 
did not expand to meet this need. The only backcountry parish in South Carolina, for 
example, was St. Marks, which sent two members to the colonial Assembly while covering 
a vast area and rapidly expanding population. At the same time the only judicial courts in 
the colony were situated in Charlestown, a 250 mile journey for some backcountry 
inhabitants.442 Situated as they were far from the colonial centres of power the 
backcountry regions were often places where the power of British authority sat very lightly.   
 
Violence and robbery had become notorious features of backcountry life and the 
lawlessness of the western settlements was proverbial in the interior of the colony. In 
August 1766 the Gazette reported that John Scott, a backcountry settler had been robbed 
by ‘three in inhuman villains’ who broke into his home tied up Scott and his wife and 
tortured him with a branding iron.443  
 
One of the most fearful aspects of this brutal violence for the colonists was the apparently 
organised gangs who perpetrated it. In the sparsely settled backcountry there was space 
for outlaw communities to establish themselves beyond the reach of organised colonial 
authority. There is even evidence that some of these bands could have represented an 
alternative social network to the mainstream backcountry hierarchy centred around 
settlements such as Ninety Six. One description of an illegal settlement along the rivers of 
the South Carolina backcountry told of ‘Gamblers Gamesters of all Sorts - Horse Thieves 
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Cattle Stealers... United in Gangs and Combinations’. These communities included women 
and children ‘Women and Girls... very deep in the Foulest of Crimes... aiding abetting – 
Watching- Secreting- Trafficking and in ev’ry Manner supporting and assisting these 
villains’. There was also a support structure of more elderly individuals in these 
communities ‘Elderly Persons, who have harbour’d, Entertain’d and Embolden’d these 
fellows, and taught them the rudiments of ev’ry Vice’.444 While the records of these outlaw 
communities are even more sparse than those for the backcountry in general, several of 
these gangs were known to be led by groups of brothers and there is even evidence of 
family ties between the leaderships of several different gangs.445 This fact suggests that 
these groups were, to a certain extent, linked and that there existed the potential for co-
operation between them.  Many of the gangs had connections with other criminal groups 
in other colonies. As in the 1740s gangs of horse thieves from Virginia to Georgia stole 
livestock and, depending on the location of the theft, sent it either north or south. These 
networks even stretched across the sea as these stolen animals were destined for the 
French and Dutch islands or to be sold to smugglers bound for destinations unknown.446 
 
The fear of these violent and lawless bands also drew on colonists’ fears of an alliance 
between escaped slaves and unruly whites. Like the Indians in the 1740s, these gangs were 
seen by colonial authorities as a potential safe haven for runaway slaves and a possible 
threat in the event of a slave uprising. Blacks were even seen among the leadership of the 
gangs, Winslow Driggers a prominent bandit was classed by the South Carolina authorities 
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as a Mulatto.447 The presence among the gangs of armed blacks and mulattoes was a 
source of great alarm to slave owners and the white population generally within the 
colonies. Charles Woodmason captured the mood clearly when he warned:  
 
‘We have an Internal Enemy Not less than 100,000 Africans below us (and more 
daily importing) Over these We ought to keep a very watchful Eye, lest they suprize 
us in an Hour when We are not aware, and begin our Friendships towards each 
other in one Common Death.’448 
 
South Carolina was still clearly extremely insecure regarding the large slave population 
within their borders and the presence of hostile communities on the colony’s borders was a 
cause of extreme anxiety among whites in the colonies. 
 
Attempts were made to capture the perpetrators of the lawlessness in the backcountry. In 
1767 four members of one gang ‘that have long annoyed the back parts of these Southern 
colonies were brought to town and committed to jail’.449 Unfortunately for the authorities, 
the gangs’ information gathering networks rivalled any within the colonies. Charles 
Woodmason while travelling as a preacher found himself captured by one group of thieves 
who requested that he give them a sermon. Woodmason warned the local militia of the 
time of the proposed sermon. But despite the attempted ambush the ‘Banditti’  having 
‘Spies ev’ry where, they had early Inteligence, and moved off’.450 
 
In many ways these criminal gangs became the targets of similar rumours to those which 
had been previously levelled at the Cherokee. In the days before the Cherokee War the less 
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reputable elements of the backcountry had been tolerated, perhaps in part because they 
were seen as providing a protection against attacks by the Cherokees.451 Through the 1760s 
this situation began to change as more prosperous backcountry landowners came to see 
the gangs and the less settled inhabitants of the backcountry as a greater threat to their 
security than the Cherokee Nation. The acts of violence committed by backcountry gangs, 
their gruesome details repeated in colonial newspapers and in the correspondence of 
prominent backcountry inhabitants, became a byword for cruelty. The gangs’ acceptance of 
racial mixing and extensive networks of co-operation also echoed older fears about 
conspiracies involving the Cherokees.452  
 
In response to colonists’ fears about these gangs and given their belief that they lacked a 
legal remedy against such criminals, vigilantism became a popular response in the 
backcountry. Following a particularly brutal string of robberies in June and July 1767 some 
backcountry landowners formed themselves into extra-legal units calling themselves 
Regulators. They set out to kill or capture those they considered undesirable or 
threatening. There were distinct Regulator movements in North and South Carolina and 
their activities spread across the south-eastern colonies. In this context we will focus on the 
South Carolina movement as their actions seemed to tie most closely in to questions of 
rumouring and information gathering. The Regulators burned outlaw communities and 
severely punished those gang members who they were able to catch.453 The news of these 
extra-legal actions swirled around the backcountry and added a new layer of uncertainty to 
this most uncertain of environments. The issue of uncertainty was just as acute in the 
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colonial press as they tried to make sense of the succession of attack and counterattack. 
The Gazette felt confident in July 1768 that ‘The People in the back parts of this province, 
who have assumed the name Regulators by the accounts we daily receive, are far from 
being inactive’ but that at the same time the newspaper admitted that ‘the reports of their 
proceedings are so various and contradictory, that it is almost impossible to discover which 
of them can be relied on’.454 
 
The attitude in the coastal regions of South Carolina veered between censure and strained 
approval for the actions of the Regulators. The Gazette noted that ‘we daily hear of new 
irregularities committed by the people called Regulators’ and that the backcountry would 
not be at peace until these Regulators had been stopped. But in the same piece the Gazette 
also seemed to express a measure of sympathy for the vigilantes claiming that the 
Regulators ‘seeming to despair of rooting out those gangs of desperate villains that remain 
among them any other way , still take upon themselves to punish such offenders as they 
can catch’.455 The cautiously positive coverage of the Regulators’ activities continued in the 
Gazette. In July of the same year the Gazette described a planned meeting of twelve 
hundred Regulators and their supporters at Lynch’s Creek. While such an unauthorised 
assembly might have been calculated to cause great alarm among authorities in 
Charlestown the Gazette explained that the meeting was in response to ‘a Party of them 
having been lately roughly used by a Gang of Banditti consisting of Mulattoes. Free Negroes 
and Notorious Harbourers of run-away Slaves, at a Place called Thompson’s Creek whom 
they ordered to remove’.456 The Gazette portrayed the Regulators as zealous, if unruly, 
defenders of law and order and emphasised the threatening racial mix of their opponents, 
a formula likely to elicit sympathy in the Low country.  
                                                          
454
 SCG, July 11
th
 1768. 
455
 Ibid, June 13
th
 1768. 
456
 Ibid, July 25
th
 1768. 
206 
 
 
In early August the Gazette attempted to calm a number of rumours that appeared in the 
colonial capital relating to the activities of the Regulators. The Gazette noted that ‘A variety 
of reports continue to be circulated in different ways, and  no Doubt, with different views, 
of the Proceedings and Intentions of the People called REGULATORS in the North-Western 
Parts of this Province, some of them very alarming’. One of these reports was that between 
2000 and 3000 people were planning to assemble at the Congarees settlements ‘for very 
unjustifiable purposes’. The Gazette was quick to excuse the planned gathering as harmless 
claiming that those planning to meet at the Congarees ‘have only in view to be informed of 
the Bounds of the respective parishes to which they belong’457   
 
A week later the Gazette was even more explicit in its positive characterization of the 
Regulators and their cause. On July 25th 1768 a number of constables and miltiamen had 
been shot and beaten at a place named Marrs Bluff. As news of the outrage filtered back to 
Charlestown there was a great deal of discussion regarding the identity of the shooters and 
the name of Regulators was mentioned. In response to these rumours the Gazette 
published an article about the various parties to the violence in the backcountry. The article 
differentiated between ‘the Honest Party’ - a group whose sole aim was to punish and 
expel horse thieves - and ‘the Rouges Party’  -a group of criminals who the Gazette blamed 
for the attack on the constables at Marrs Bluff. The Gazette implied strongly that the 
Regulators were the ‘Honest Party’, a group of vigilantes who were only trying to restore 
order in a lawless region. 458  
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The Regulators were not inactive in seeking to control the information about their activities 
in the backcountry. In November 1767 four senior Regulators presented a remonstrance to 
the colonial assembly in Charlestown. This document presented the difficulties that the 
Regulators considered themselves to be living under and vehemently sought redress. 
Central to these demands was the creation of backcountry law courts and parishes that 
would give the backcountry both a voice in the colonial Assembly and allow local redress of 
grievances. The remonstrance also included requests for jailhouses and schools in the 
backcountry.459 The remonstrance was intended to publicise the grievances of the 
Regulators and call for redress from the central government.  
 
The Regulation in South Carolina came to an end with the passage of the Circuit Court Act 
of 1769. With it the Regulators gained many of the reforms that they had hoped to elicit 
from the colonial power. Regulators continued to be prominent citizens in the backcountry 
and many of them went on to play an important role in the American Revolution. In the 
end the Regulation in South Carolina represented an attempt by a section of backcountry 
society to rid itself of other groups within the backcountry which threatened its interests. 
The ambitious landowners and business leaders of the backcountry attempted to rein in 
the criminal gangs which operated in the backcountry but extended their activities to 
target hunters, landless inhabitants and anyone else they considered disruptive. 
Fundamental to the Regulators’ success was their ability to control perceptions of 
themselves and their opponents in the backcountry. To achieve this they mobilised a trope 
which had been a regular feature of life in the colony for decades. The Regulators were 
successful in portraying their enemies as part of a united inter-racial conspiracy. While the 
Cherokees were not directly named in this discourse, the narrative clearly draws from 
earlier panics and rumours which had convulsed the colony for many years. For the 
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inhabitants of Charlestown, events in the backcountry were often obscured and confused. 
In attempting to address this lack of knowledge it is not surprising that the most influential 
figures in the colony might look to existing understandings of the backcountry to explain 
the situation. The dynamics of rumour facilitated this, drawing on the existing tropes of 
backcountry ruffians combining with slaves or Indians in threatening racially mixed groups. 
This idea echoed the earlier fears of escaped bands of maroons which had existed since the 
early eighteenth century as well as the more recent concerns about lawless backcountry 
riffraff who stirred up trouble with the Cherokees. 
 
The 1760s was a time of rapid and confusing change. In the south-east this led to new 
attempts by American Indians and British colonists to negotiate their way through the 
changing political and social environment of the backcountry. Following the Cherokee War 
the inhabitants of South Carolina sought to understand their place within the British Empire 
and find an emotionally acceptable explanation for the outcome of the Cherokee War 
which had failed to provide a conclusive win over the Cherokees. New structures emerged 
in the imperial apparatus, designed to assert British imperial control over relations with 
American Indian peoples. Increasing migration to the backcountry regions lead to friction 
and violence within colonial society. Among the Cherokees, battered by years of war, 
attempts were made to rebuild the society that had suffered so much damage in the war 
and find a safe place for the Cherokee polity within a changing and dangerous region. As 
this was happening increasing pressure continued on Cherokee lands as white settlement 
began to encroach increasingly. As Cherokee leaders sought a way to avoid this oncoming 
tide, generational gaps began to open between old and young within Cherokee society.  
 
Throughout all of this turmoil, rumour continued to play an important role. The uncertainty 
of these new arrangements created an ideal environment for the emergence of rumour. 
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The necessity of improvising news to fill the gaps led to the development of variations on 
some old rumours and fears. For South Carolina the removal of the French from North 
America led to an increasing focus on the role of unruly settlers and unlicensed traders in 
stirring up trouble with the Cherokees. At the same time, the old fear of a mixed race 
conspiracy of enemies was linked in with a panic about the threat of backcountry ruffians. 
On the other side of the backcountry, the long held concern that the British might attempt 
to enslave the Cherokees came increasingly to be linked to the fear that British appetite for 
land would be insatiable, a belief that rang true particularly for the young Cherokee men 
facing the loss of their hunting grounds and the threat of violence in their travels through 
the backcountry. These new concerns and rumours would come to have increasing 
importance very shortly. 
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Chapter 4 
Conspiracy and Confusion: British, Cherokees and Americans in the Revolutionary era. 
 
In the early 1770s peace remained elusive in the backcountry and the competition for 
information regarding events around the colonies was as strong as ever. As tensions began 
to rise between the British and their American colonists the cracks in colonial and Cherokee 
society would became more obvious. Rumour, already an important aspect of intercultural 
relations would break the last bonds between the whites of the southeast and the 
Cherokees. Rumour, fear and propaganda about the Cherokees became a weapon in the 
civil war between Revolutionary Patriots and British Loyalists. 
 
The idea of an imminent conspiracy, which had always been a key feature of the rumours 
that circulated between the British and the Cherokees, reached a height of power and 
importance in the Revolution. Through the early 1770’s rumours began to emerge about 
connections between the Cherokees and a variety of other American Indian peoples. To the 
British these rumours quickly became potential warnings of a conspiracy against British 
interests in North America. As tensions flared between the British and opposition groups in 
the North American colonies rumours began to emerge of similar conspiracies.460 The 
central difference was that in these rumours the British were at the centre of the supposed 
conspiracy. 
 
At the same time rumours also stirred tensions within Cherokee society. The increasing 
pressures of colonial expansion onto Cherokee lands further threatened the already 
precarious attempts of the old headmen to maintain peace with the British. Younger 
leaders had begun to emerge who advocated resistance to the whites as the best way to 
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protect Cherokee interests. In this environment, rumours of planned expansion by colonial 
speculators could quickly spark violence. This was intensified as the British and Patriots 
moved closer to outright conflict and began seeking Indian support. It was rumours of a 
successful pan-Indian alliance, ironically in support of the British, which gave a final catalyst 
to the outbreak of war. It allowed the young warriors to reject the accommodation 
advocated by their elders and embark on full scale war against the Patriot backcountry. 
 
Once the war was joined, rumour became once again a valuable tactical resource and 
control of information a vital part of any strategy. Cherokee raids spread terror and 
dislocation throughout the backcountry, sending the by now familiar torrents of refugees 
streaming back into the colonies. The Patriot response sent armed expeditions into the 
Cherokee country to burn and demolish. As the Cherokee attacks had emptied the 
backcountry so the Patriot expeditions sent Cherokees fleeing towards safer territory. 
Rumour became a weapon rather than a multipurpose tool.    
 
‘What they will agree upon God Knows’: Inter-tribal diplomacy and British fears. 
 
At the dawn of the 1770s, despite their victory over the French, British officials had to 
contend with the same concerns and fears that had dogged their predecessors. While the 
threat of the French might have been ostensibly removed, fears of potential conspiracy 
focussed increasingly on what the various Indian nations might plot. These fears were not 
without foundation. Various attempts at pan-Indian unity had been tried throughout the 
Seven Years War, often under the auspices of the French.461 But what is important in this 
discussion is not so much whether Indian groups were seeking to create a large scale 
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alliance between their different peoples, but whether the British thought that they were.  
In early 1770 rumours began to emerge in the correspondence of British officials, that the 
peace agreement between the Cherokees and the Northerners had developed into 
something more sinister. The first whispers of this appeared when General Gage wrote to 
George Croghan warning that the Cherokees might have entered an alliance with the Six 
Nations. John Stuart sent word that a delegation of Cherokees had gone north and might 
even have agreed to an alliance. But Stuart claimed that they were men of little influence in 
the Nation and no agreement they made would have carried any weight. Later that year 
another story emerged of a northern Indian warrior who had been entrusted with three 
belts of wampum, two white and one black, by some unnamed Cherokee headmen. The 
presence of a black wampum belt would have been particularly unnerving for the British. 
Black wampum was thought to represent war and hostility.462 The acceptance of a black 
belt could, certainly, in the minds of the British officials, have represented an agreement 
between these Indians to ally against the British. The northern warrior got as far as Johnson 
Hall in New York but got drunk and lost the black belt.463 Seemingly small incidents like this 
represented a major source of worry for colonial officials starved of information and 
uncertain of the loyalties of Indian nations.464 It is hardly surprising that they exchanged 
scraps of information and stories of Indian diplomacy in an attempt to piece together the 
actions of Indian leaders who they did not trust. While rumours about Indian alliances were 
nothing new, the uncertainty in British ranks following the ceasefire between the 
Cherokees and the northern Indians led to the emergence of rumours more specifically 
targeted to address fears of inter-Indian conspiracy and possible threats to British 
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dominance following the removal of French power from North America. This rumour of 
Indian entanglement would not be the last intertribal connection that would cause 
consternation among British observers. 
 
Rumours like these spread rapidly along the lines of communication between British 
officials. Officials wrote frequently to one another and to their superiors spreading news 
about events near their posts and forwarding the news that had reached them via 
informants or passing travellers.465 The myriad of potential sources used in letters between 
colonial officials meant that they were filled with rumour and gossip. The confusion caused 
in British circles in March 1770 by the journey of the mysterious Cherokee delegation to the 
Iroquois was only the beginning of a string of incidents which connected with heightened 
British fears of intertribal alliance. John Stuart had argued, as the rumour of a possible 
alliance between the former enemies spread among British officials, that the Cherokees 
who had gone north had been unimportant men who would not be able to raise support 
among the nation.466 But in that same month word reached the British that a ceremonial 
pipe, given to the Cherokees by Stuart had been taken to the north and given to the 
Iroquois. British officials were not certain of the importance of this gift but they were 
alarmed by these diplomatic manoeuvres among the Indians. Objects such as pipes and 
wampum belts carried an important function in Indian diplomacy.467 British officials firmly 
believed that these belts ‘bodes [British interests] no good’.468 
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William Johnson, the Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the Northern colonies looked into 
the matter and confirmed that the pipe used by the Cherokees in negotiating with the 
Iroquois was not the same as the one given to the Cherokees by Stuart. Nevertheless in his 
investigation Johnson found that the leader of the delegation was a more notable 
individual than had previously been thought. Or if he was not an important figure at least 
that the Iroquois considered him important and treated him as such. Johnson later claimed 
that given the way the Iroquois had treated the Cherokees he would have been surprised 
to learn that the visiting delegates were not authorised by the Cherokee Nation. Even more 
alarmingly Johnson found that the Cherokee delegation had come north to do more than 
simply confirm the treaty of peace between the Cherokee and Iroquois. His sources claimed 
that the delegation had come ‘principally with a design to form an Alliance for carrying on a 
war against some of the Western Indians’, an aim that the Cherokees had apparently kept 
secret from John Stuart. 469 Johnson believed that the main point of contention between 
the negotiators was whom to attack, with the Iroquois arguing for an assault on the 
Choctaws, a course of action about which the Cherokees were unenthusiastic. The contacts 
and information of men such as Stuart and Johnson were enough to give them partial 
accounts and titbits of information but not to supply them with a full account of events in 
Indian country.470 
 
In the spring of 1770 rumours began to circulate between New York and the south-eastern 
colonies about Shawnees making diplomatic inroads among the Cherokees. In May Gage 
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warned Johnson that a group of Shawnees had apparently entered Cherokee country 
having been dissatisfied by the terms of the Treaty of Stanwix shortly before. Luckily for the 
British, Gage’s information indicated that only one Cherokee town had listened to the 
Shawnees and that several Cherokee war parties had gone out against the western 
Indians.471 Several months later, when John Stuart confronted the Cherokee headman 
Emistisiguo about the Shawnee visitors, the headman was coy about their presence among 
his people. Eventually he admitted that the talks that he had heard from the Shawnees 
were ‘not good’ and that another embassy was likely to arrive around the time of the 
Green Corn festival. Emistisiguo promised ‘that he should not keep their Business a Secret 
from us’ but this sort of information, with no specifics on the negotiations between the 
Indians and with the promise of future contacts between the Shawnees and the Cherokees 
was guaranteed to cause consternation among British officials.472 The combination of 
mysterious delegations of Cherokees to the north and parties of Shawnees circulating in 
the Cherokee country could very easily be transmuted in the minds of British officials into a 
conspiracy against British interests. 
 
In September of 1772 more rumours began to surface of a possible meeting between the 
Cherokees and the western Indians to discuss the possibility of an alliance. This possibility 
greatly alarmed the British. General Gage, warning John Stuart about the possibility of an 
alliance, observed that it was ‘A Sensible Scheme and dangerous to us if it succeed’ but he 
comforted himself with the belief that ‘I believe it is impracticable’. Nevertheless William 
Johnson began organising a conference with the Iroquois to prevent this supposed 
alliance.473 
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Less than a month after this exchange, word reached British officials of a conference at 
Scioto between representatives of various Indian nations. Details of this meeting are sparse 
but spies recruited by the British confirmed that the Western Indians had made peace with 
the Cherokees. The potential for an alliance between the Cherokees and the Western 
Indians was considered serious by British officials particularly as such an alliance might 
allow the Shawnees to confront the Iroquois Six Nations.474 The earlier tales of Shawnee 
parties among the Cherokee became all the more suspicious and Gage warned that there 
were still Shawnees active in Cherokee country who ‘are certainly hatching some great 
Peice [sic] of Mischief’.475 At the same time, despite Cherokee flirtations with the Western 
Indians their alliance with the Six Nations appeared to be healthy; in November a number 
of Six Nations war-parties went south to aid the Cherokees. To British observers the 
alliance had made the Cherokees more ‘insolent’ toward their Creek neighbours.476 The 
seeming contradiction of these events, with the Cherokees developing links with western 
Indian peoples, while at the same time continuing to benefit from their alliance with the 
Iroquois, left British officials perplexed and alarmed. With such alliances the Cherokees 
could sit at the centre of a pan-Indian alliance network that stretched from the Great Lakes 
to the Mississippi River, lying right across the path of British expansion.477  
 
 The Cherokees themselves denied sending deputies to Scioto but admitted that it was 
possible that young warriors from the nation had attended the conference. Also in October 
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of 1770 several headmen of the Cherokees had attended a conference at Lochaber with 
John Stuart to agree the running of a new boundary line between the Cherokees and the 
British.478 The young men of the nation were faced with the choice of attending a 
conference with British leaders, a meeting which was likely to result in the cession of more 
of their lands. With the alternative of going to Scioto and potentially strengthening ties 
with Indian nations who might represent potential allies in a future war with the whites, it 
seems clear that the young men and warriors voted with their feet and chose to go to 
Scioto. This split was remarked upon at Lochaber by Occonostoata who lamented that 
there were no young men present as they would be the ones with the most to lose in the 
event of land cessions.479 The decision of most of the younger warriors to stay away from 
Lochaber while the older headmen sought to maintain diplomatic relations with the British 
was the first visible manifestation of what would become a critical split within Cherokee 
society in later years. 
 
Parties of western and northern Indians continued to be seen in Cherokee country. So 
when rumours emerged in February 1771 that parties of western Indians were once again 
attacking the Cherokees, Gage remarked that this was ‘rather a lucky circumstance, for we 
may be sure if these friendly Leagues subsist any time, that we shall suffer by them’.480 War 
between Indian nations prevented a possible united front against British expansion. As the 
War of 1759 had shown the British colonies could have difficulty imposing their will on the 
Cherokees in isolation. If the Cherokees were to combine with one or more of the other 
major Indian nations this would prevent any further attempt to overawe them by the 
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British. As such it is not surprising that Gage greeted the rumours of hostility between the 
Cherokees and the Westerners with such enthusiasm. 
 
Despite this, within months information came from Fort Prince George that the northern 
Indians were again conspiring with the Cherokees. The tale was that a party of Northerners 
had arrived at Keowee and proposed an attack on the British which the Great Warrior, 
Occonostoata refused. The visitors then proposed an assault on the Creeks which, despite 
recent clashes between the two Nations, the Great Warrior again refused. Finally the 
Northerners put forward the idea of an assault on the distant Chickasaws which 
Occonostoata, perhaps wary of offending his guests, agreed to; a number of Cherokees 
joined the Northerners’ expedition against the Chickasaws.481 The close proximity of such 
wildly differing rumours, one suggesting violence between Indians and another claiming a 
renewed alliance, gives some sense of the confusing flurry of information that confronted 
British officials. One official even felt moved to begin a report to General Gage with the 
disclaimer that ‘Indian Intelligence [is] always doubtful’.482  
 
Discontent with the land cessions agreed at Lochaber continued to fester in the Cherokee 
country and the British were quick to see the hand of western and northern Indians in 
Cherokee opposition. In 1771 shortly after meeting at Fort Prince George, John Stuart 
complained that ‘the Cherokee Indians have been infected with the discontent of the 
western tribes & wanted to recede from their agreement at Lochaber in October last which 
must not be suffered’. Although Stuart’s deputy Alexander Cameron succeeded in holding 
the Cherokees to the agreement made at Lochaber, British officials continued to fear the 
disruptive influence of western and northern Indians. In June of the same year came news 
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of further Cherokee objections against the land cessions which were again blamed on the 
machinations of outside Indians.483  
 
More alarmingly, when a plot was apparently uncovered at Fort Pitt, suggestions were 
made by the Indians involved that the Cherokees and the Iroquois had been the inspiration 
behind the whole conspiracy. The report of a Fort Pitt Indian named ‘Mohikin John’ claimed 
that the Six nations had inspired a conspiracy against the British among the Indians around 
Fort Pitt.484 These rumours may have been an attempt to transfer blame for anti-British 
activities away from the Fort Pitt Indians. Alternatively it could be seen as an expression of 
hopes among the Indians of the Great Lakes that they could look for support to these 
powerful Indian nations. A decade earlier a variety of Indian peoples around the Great 
Lakes had launched attacks on British forts and installations in the conflict that the British 
named Pontiac’s War. During this war, and in the centuries since, rumours have existed 
that the French were involved in encouraging this violence.485  These rumours caused 
consternation among British commanders for several months although senior military 
commanders seem to have been rather more sceptical about them. In September Gage 
wrote to William Johnson that, ‘It’s pretty plain that the Six nations were no way concerned 
in the intrigues they were accused of... I gave very little Credit to the Intelligence at the 
time and believe Mr Croghan was of the Same opinion tho’ for some Reason he would not 
declare his Sentiments. But was right no doubt in transmitting the Reports to you’.486 Gage 
even felt confident enough to sarcastically respond to a Fort commander who had warned 
of Indians massing to attack his post that ‘Many Nations must have joined to make up the 
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fourth part of the Number of Indians you suspected to be near Fort Chartres, if they go 
against the Cherokees their Numbers will probably be lessened’.487 The scepticism of some 
senior members of the British hierarchy suggests that they felt confident at this point that 
there was no large scale conspiracy imminent among the Indian Nations in the southeast at 
this time. Nevertheless the fears of some of their subordinates suggest that such a notion 
was certainly current among British officials at the time. 
 
Details of the Scioto conference continued to emerge throughout 1772. A British 
representative named McKee travelled to the area to try and evaluate what had happened 
there and what it might mean to British interests in the backcountry, his report was sent 
back to Gage in September 1771. The British also sent ‘messengers’ to Scioto apparently as 
much to gather information as to deliver any messages.488 While these measures did glean 
some information they did not necessarily greatly illuminate the situation for British 
officials. Gage wrote to Stuart in September 1772 ‘You mention the Cherokees making 
Peace with the Outarrons which is probably true’.489 This information was clearly of interest 
to British officials but such scraps of information created a picture of events in Indian 
country which was neither clear nor comforting. 490 
 
Furthermore, Gage warned, ‘I hear from Sir William Johnson that the Western Nations are 
endeavouring to establish what they call a general peace, and that many Belts are going 
among the Nations far and near’. Johnson’s intelligence on inter-Indian diplomacy was 
interesting, coming as it did ‘from the Deputy’s of the Six Nations’. The Iroquois were most 
certainly experienced and subtle players of the diplomatic game in colonial North 
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America.491 But at Scioto they seem to have met with resistance. The Six Nations claimed 
that they had tried to agree a meeting with the western nations but that the Westerners 
‘refused to meet them on account of the Conduct of the Six Nations and Cherokees 
towards them last Spring, having its said Killed Six of the Ouatanons’. The Six Nations 
deputies left their diplomatic wampum belts with the Shawnees, the only other nation 
prepared to negotiate with them. After their departure, the Iroquois maintained, the 
Shawnees had organised another diplomatic meeting excluding them: ‘a friendly hunt was 
proposed this Autumn at the Falls of Ohio, and Runners dispatched to the Cherokees 
Wabash and many other Indians, and several Party’s are already set out upon the hunt’.492 
This introduced the possibility of a pan-Indian alliance excluding the Iroquois from 
proceedings.  
 
Further to the alarming developments at Scioto there were rumbles of trouble in the west. 
The Chickasaws, long known as reliable allies of the British had been contacted by the 
Creeks. According to Henry Lefleur, an interpreter among the Chickasaw, the Creeks had 
sent a wampum belt including a tomahawk to the Chickasaws. Lefleur reported that the 
Chickasaw headmen were alarmed by this; ‘Mingo Houma said he did not like it, as it was 
not Customary to have a Tomahawk in a Peace Belt, & that he believed they had bad 
intentions & that the Tomohawk was against the White People’ .493 British officials were 
uncertain as to the meaning behind the information received from the Chickasaw country. 
Lefleur had also sent some information to Stuart regarding a purported killing of whites 
committed by the Chickasaw. Stuart claimed that Lefleur’s information ‘is false the inclosed 
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copy of a Letter from Mr McIntosh in the Chickasaw Nation mentions nothing of it and the 
Terrapin Leader or Paya Mingo Euluxy was then at home’.494 
 
 Oddly, McIntosh, as well as giving the lie to Lefleur’s information, described an incident in 
which the Chickasaw headman known to the British as Terrapin Leader met a group of 
Creek Indians on their way into the Chickasaw country and regaled them with tales of the 
violence he had committed; ‘he had a long talk with them told them it was now all with 
them, that he had killed Three White men at the Illinois and by that time all the White Men 
in his Nation were killed’. The Terrapin Leader also claimed to be carrying talks and 
wampum belts for the Cherokees from the Shawnees and that representatives of the 
northern nations were expected in Chickasaw country in the spring, ‘with Long Belts & 
great Talks’.495 The tales of the northern delegations were corroborated by the Chickasaw 
headman Opaya Mataha, who told McIntosh that a party of Northerners was planning a 
tour of the Chickasaws, Creeks and Cherokees and was planning to secure peace with the 
southeastern nations.496 More alarmingly ‘at the same time [Opaya Mataha] said that he 
believed the Cherokees would soon be at War with the White People, that they had already 
begun by killing  Several White Men on Holstons River’. McIntosh also passed on some 
rumours of a planned meeting between the Creeks, Chickasaws and Cherokees for the 
winter, ‘what their Consultations are or what they will agree upon God Knows, but it is 
prudent to Watch their Motions’. The British were carefully watching all their Indian allies 
at this point and were highly sensitive to any suggestion of meetings between Indian 
groups, particularly when these meetings were arranged secretly or outside of the 
knowledge of British officials.497 
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What emerges from the succession of British concerns about a pan-Indian alliance is a 
picture of individuals and a society seeking to make sense of an opaque and alarming set of 
circumstances. In the late 1760s and early 1770s, British officials were confronted with a 
series of rumours of mysterious Indian conferences, stories of unrecorded meetings and 
wampum belts of unknown origin. The belts in particular alarmed British observers. 
Wampum belts were known to officials who were experienced in Indian diplomacy as 
powerful symbols of agreement and alliance. But at the same time the precise meaning of 
particular belts was often unclear to the British, a circumstance that caused much anxiety 
for officials dealing with Indian affairs. Gage even went so far as to consult a former French 
officer who had sworn allegiance to the British Crown on the matter. The officer, Monsieur 
De St Luc, was believed by Gage to be ‘high on these matters’ and apparently agreed that 
‘there was certainly a Belt as the Indian declares given by him’. Hearing of this, a concerned 
Gage mused that ‘it is to be asked what was the meaning of said Belt, and on what account 
was it given’.498 Faced with these confusing strands of information the British had to 
improvise a picture of events that made sense to them. With the memory of Pontiac’s War 
still fresh in their minds the first conclusion for many British officials was that the Indians 
must be planning a similar conspiracy. In this situation the idea of a wide ranging 
conspiracy among Indians bent upon the destruction of the British colonies in North 
America was the story improvised from the confused profusion of information with which 
the British were faced. 
 
Blood on the Paths: Settler and Cherokee violence in the backcountry  
 
The situation in the Cherokee towns in the early 1770s was more opaque than that which 
can be seen in colonial discourse. What can be discerned is a regular flow of different 
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Indian groups passing through the towns. Shawnees, Iroquois, Creeks and Chickasaws were 
all known to have been present in the Cherokee country at this time, either with the 
consent of the Cherokees or as their adversaries. These visitors carried news of distant 
events to the Cherokees. For example, in 1770 Shawnees who had been displaced by the 
treaty of Fort Stanwix brought word of the treaty to the Cherokee towns and complained 
to the Cherokees of their mistreatment by the British and the Iroquois and warned that the 
Cherokees too stood to lose through this treaty.499 Although they only gained the support 
of one Cherokee town, the tale of woe and dispossession told by the Shawnees cannot 
have failed to have had an impact on listening Cherokees. The problems which faced the 
Cherokees in the early 1770s were similar to those confronted by many American Indians in 
this period, primarily the westward advance of white settlement, the ongoing demographic 
disasters of disease and the search to a establish a secure place for their people in the face 
of these threats.500 
 
In September 1772 John McIntosh described a rumour he had heard among the 
Chickasaws. ‘It was a Common Talk here a few days ago,’ he noted, ‘that the Creeks were 
to surprise Pensacola, and now they have it that England France & Spain are at War, and all 
the Red People are to be at Peace’.501 These two rumours deal with different possible 
scenarios in the southeast. The first was that the Creeks were planning an attack on the 
British at Pensacola. Rumours of planned attacks on European outposts were often used as 
diplomatic leverage to encourage allied Indian peoples to join in the attack and to 
demonstrate commitment to resistance to the whites. For example, in the lead up to the 
Cherokee War, Creek representatives negotiated with some Cherokees in hopes of securing 
an alliance. These Creek negotiators claimed that they had French backing and were poised 
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to strike.502 The Cherokees agreed to this ‘conditionally, that you will first kill all the white 
People belonging to the English in your Nation’.503 The Creeks killing of British traders 
would seal the alliance and protect the Cherokees from being double crossed. Similar 
rumours circulated about different Indian groups in the early 1770s. Indeed in his letter of 
1772 McIntosh described another rumour from a Chickasaw headman ‘that he believed the 
Cherokees would soon be at War with the White People’. Second, the rumour that ‘England 
France & Spain are at War, and all the Red People are to be at Peace’ offered an image of 
Indian unity and European hostility. Rumours such as this fulfilled a similar ‘conjuring’ 
function to the rumours of French support which surfaced during Pontiac’s War.504 For 
Europeans such a rumour could be very alarming, suggesting as it did peace and possibly 
alliance between different Indian peoples. McIntosh attempted to trace the source of these 
rumours and pressed his Chickasaw informant on where he had heard this news. The 
Chickasaw blamed the ‘Quaipas’, who apparently travelled regularly from the Illinois 
country to the north. The news of such troublesome rumours arriving from the north and 
the widespread intertribal connections that it suggested would have been highly alarming 
to many British officials. 
 
As noted above relations between the Cherokees and the Creeks had been strained by the 
diplomacy of the early 1770s. In late 1772 tensions between the Cherokees and the Creeks 
reached a head. Some Cherokees had agreed a cession of land with a group of traders. The 
only problem was that the lands that they had agreed to cede were controlled by the 
Creeks, who ‘have possessed them for many years as their most valuable hunting Grounds’. 
The reasons for Creek opposition were well understood by British leaders. Stuart noted to 
Gage in September 1772, ‘They see white people settled all around [and] every meeting 
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produces a New demand- in short they are beyond measure jealous’.505 The Creeks were 
unlikely to sit idle while their lands were seized.  
 
The path through which information about the cession reached British officials is also 
revealing. John Stuart received word of Creek dissatisfaction from Joseph Daives, a 
packhorseman among the Creeks. Daives warned that the Chickasaws had sent a talk to the 
Creeks. When British interpreters went to the house where two senior headmen had been 
discussing the Chickasaw talk all night they overheard Emistisuguo, one of the headmen, 
say that ‘he was for war- that they were Men & must Shew themselves so, if the white 
people wanted to take away their land for the Augusta traders’.506 While some warriors in 
the Creek towns were fearful of war, Emistisuguo himself declared that he ‘wished that the 
Just Spirit above would Open the Earth & Swallow up all their Lands and themselves too 
rather than a War Should be brought About on that Account’ the danger of a war between 
the Creeks and the British seemed very real. Emistisuguo lamented ‘that he was not for war 
but he did not see how it was to be avoided’.507 The most unusual aspect of the rumour was 
the claim that the substance of the information had been ‘overheard’ by interpreters 
arriving early one morning. The notion that this information was fortuitously overheard 
stretches credulity. In fact, the information conveys some very carefully calibrated 
messages from the headmen to the British. First, it carries a warning that the Creeks would 
not tolerate the expropriation of their land based on the cessions agreed by the Cherokees. 
At the same time it makes clear that the Creek headmen do not seek war but felt that they 
were being forced into it. The account ends with the lament by Emistisuguo that ‘he did not 
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see how it was to be avoided’.508 The Creek headmen were leaving the possibility that, if 
British officials could prevent the expropriation of Creek lands, violence could be avoided. 
 
This message was heard by John Stuart.  He made a point of defending the provenance of 
the tale, claiming that ‘Whatever Credit is to be given to the Inclosed affidavit… yet the 
Sentiments are what I would Expect from Emistisiguo & the Second Man who are both men 
of sense’. Stuart believed that, despite the danger of violence in the backcountry, the 
authorities in London had been influenced to accept the cession and he expected ‘Orders 
to Negotiate for the Cession by first Packet’.509 Gage concurred with Stuart’s assessment of 
the situation, agreeing that ‘it’s highly proper that his Lordship should know the true 
situation of that affair’ and grumbled that ‘I have too much reason to believe that the Kings 
Ministers are too often deceived by Representations, Reports and Petitions made by 
People whom Interest leads to misinform them’. Like Stuart, however, Gage felt tied by the 
obligation to follow orders and noted that ‘When the Truth is laid before administration we 
must follow their decision what ever it shall happen to be’.510  While officials in North 
America might see the dangerous consequences of dubious land cessions obtained from 
Indians, there were times when they were powerless to prevent them.  
 
However much influence the architects of this plan might have had in London, its 
implementation was likely to cause trouble in the backcountry. As noted above the Creeks 
were clearly not prepared to sit quietly by while a significant area of their land was 
expropriated for the use of whites and if diplomacy failed to protect them there were many 
Creeks who were prepared to see violence ensue.511 The knowledge of this increased 
tension had an impact on the behaviour of both whites and Indians. In January of 1773 a 
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group of colonists from South Carolina were going to view lands around the Oconee River 
when they met a group of Creek Indians on the path. At the end of the meeting one of the 
Creeks ‘carried off a blanket from the white men’, not an overtly hostile act but certainly 
not a sign of respect or friendship. The incident quickly escalated as one of the party, a man 
named Austin, fired at the Creek and in the ensuing fire fight one of the whites was hit, 
dying shortly after having been carried to a Cherokee camp some twenty miles away.512  
Violence between Indians and British settlers once again began to escalate. In 1773 white 
settlers killed the wife of a Mingo headman. Mingos and Shawnees retaliated in what 
became known as Dunmore’s War.513 Some Cherokees did join in this war but the majority 
kept carefully neutral.514 Chickasaws and British colonists had clashed violently in the 
Illinois country leading to the death of two Indians and one white although the Chickasaw 
headman Paya Mataha had enquired into the matter and thought that further violence was 
unlikely.515 More ominously, Stuart reported a party of Cherokees had attacked a party of 
Virginians on the Ohio, killing seven whites and one ‘negro’. Although the Cherokee towns, 
hoping to avoid a direct confrontation with the British, refused to accept the scalps and 
berated the leader of the war party Stuart declared that ‘I am humbly of opinion that this 
must not be passed over unnoticed, otherwise we can never demand satisfaction of any 
other Nation’.516 The cycle of violence, rumour and retaliation had begun to get beyond the 
control of either Indian headmen or British officials.   
 
These events caused fear and consternation, not only because of the physical violence that 
they threatened but through the confusion and uncertainty sown by the attacks. News of 
the attack on the Virginian party was sent originally by Alexander Cameron, Stuart’s deputy 
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at Lochaber. Cameron had the figure of seven whites and one black killed from an Indian, 
known as the Wolf. Cameron had received alternative accounts of violence in the 
backcountry. A settler from the area around the Holston River came through Lochaber and 
informed him that eleven whites had been killed ‘among whom were Captain Guest & His 
Wife’. Cameron, however, was uncertain about the provenance of this information. He 
noted about the rumour that ‘this may be groundless’ and Stuart did not repeat it in his 
letter to Gage. 517 With the succession of violence and rumours of violence that surrounded 
them it was difficult for the British to know what to believe or to discount. 
 
Cameron also included mention of an incident in the Cherokee country reported by one 
Thomson that once again echoed British fears of a combination between the Cherokees 
and the northern Indians. A mixed group of Cherokees and Northerners got drunk on rum 
supplied by nearby traders. The drunken party then proceeded to attack the traders, 
driving them into the woods. The traders complained to the local headmen, who agreed to 
stave most of the barrels of rum in the nation. Such incidents were not unprecedented. 
Among the Cherokees, as among many southeastern Indian people young men were often 
expected to be impulsive and occasionally violent, incidents that the calmer heads of town 
leaders would smooth over. Alcohol was also a factor which was known to lead to sudden 
outbursts of violence which might need smoothing over later.518 What is most interesting 
about this incident is the linking of these almost mundane incidents in British minds with 
the development of a pan-Indian conspiracy.  
 
Cameron was clearly concerned that the Indians were attempting to avoid atoning for the 
violent incidents in the backcountry. He noted to Stuart that ‘I have sent a Talk to the 
Indian Chiefs but did not mention any thing about the Murther of the white People further 
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than their, I was Surprised they would conceal it from me’. 519 Perhaps not coincidentally a 
number of senior Cherokee headmen anticipated a suspicious response to the violence 
from the British and wrote to Stuart shortly after Cameron, declaring ‘Friend and Brother, 
There have been some False reports amongst the Traders that we intend to join with the 
Northwards &c. our Red Brothers in a War against our Elder brothers the White People’. 
The headmen expressed concern that these reports ‘occasioned one person to run from 
our Land, down to Augusta and as he may occasion some alarm among the different 
settlers as he passes’. They asked that Stuart ‘would assure them [the settlers] it is False 
and without grounds’. Their interest in the western and northern Indians, they assured 
Stuart, was simply to secure peace between themselves and the other Indian 
confederations, a process that might take until spring.520 
 
‘All were soldiers in Arms’: Slave revolt and fear in the Lowcountry 
 
The prevalence of rumours about Indian combinations was now well placed to combine 
with one of the central fears of southern colonial society. Conspiracy between Indian 
nations was a significant concern for many in the backcountry and among British officials. 
For many in the slave-rich coastal regions of the South-eastern colonies, though the spectre 
which most haunted their dreams was that of slave rebellion. The idea that slaves were an 
existential threat to their masters had not changed since the early eighteenth century. If 
anything, with the legalization of slavery in Georgia, slaves were an even more central part 
of the south-eastern colonial economy.521 
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As has been noted above settlers’ attitude towards slavery in the southern colonies was 
extremely ambiguous.522 This was still very much the case in the 1770s. Industries which 
relied on slavery, not to mention the slave trade itself, had made many fortunes in the 
southern colonies and had been key to the development of the southern ports.523 
Charlestown had become a centre for British style refinement and the richest port in North 
America almost entirely based upon crops produced on slave plantations, primarily rice and 
indigo. Slave labour was used in every stage of the production of these goods as one South 
Carolinian noted of rice production in the colony ‘Hoeing, Reaping, Threshing, Pounding 
have all been done merely by the poor slaves here’.524 The returns on purchases of slaves 
could be prodigious a new planter might make, according to one estimate, twenty percent 
profit annually on his investment, even allowing for the severe working conditions of the 
plantations killing two slaves each year.525 At the same time slaves also represented a grave 
physical threat in the minds of southern colonists, a potential ‘enemy within’ that might 
rise up against the ruling power of the plantation colonies. Tales of the horrors of slave 
uprising were widespread at all levels of plantation society. The Stono Rebellion of 1740 
was still a tale which preyed on the minds of South Carolinians.  
 
The contradiction was exacerbated for slave owners by the first stirrings of what would 
later become the abolition movement in the British Empire. There was an increasing 
perception that slavery might be incompatible with the role of an English gentleman, a role 
to which the vast majority of southern planters aspired. The ideas of moral philosophers 
such as Francis Hutcheson, who posited the idea of an innate moral sense within all 
humans were becoming known in the colonies. The most clearly visible face of abolitionist 
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teaching was the enthusiastic preaching of the new Methodist branch of Christianity which 
began to popularise anti-slavery messages throughout the colonies. The most famous of 
the Methodists in North America, George Whitefield, openly berated South Carolina 
slaveholders, declaring ‘I think that God has a quarrel with you for your abuse and cruelty 
to the poor Negroes’. Whitefield accused plantation owners of ‘faring sumptuously every 
day’ while ‘many of your slaves had neither convenient food to eat, nor proper raiment to 
put on, notwithstanding most of the comforts you enjoy are solely owing to their 
indefatigable labours’. More ominously for many slave-owners, Whitefield warned that 
should God allow an uprising by the slaves ‘all good men must acknowledge that the 
judgement would be just’.526 
 
Poorer, non-slaveholding whites potentially had a far less antagonistic relationship with 
slaves than their slave-owning fellows. Slaves and non-slaveholders interacted in a wide 
variety of situations, particularly in colonial cities. This fraternization did raise the 
possibility that non-slaveholders would be less likely to fear an uprising by the slaves. There 
is some evidence to support this, for example whites were implicated as accomplices in 
many slave rebellions.527 Nevertheless as will be seen below the furious mob response of 
white colonial society to the possibility of slave revolt makes clear that fear of slave revolt 
was not confined only to the slave-owning elite.   
 
All these factors - the dependence of the colonies on slave labour, the ubiquity of slaves in 
many areas of the southeast, the increasing awareness of the contradictions of slavery and 
not least, the knowledge of actual slave uprisings that had occurred in the past -  combined 
to create an atmosphere of extreme tension and uncertainty. In the early 1770s, southern 
colonists, even those who did not own slaves, had a definite fear of slave rebellion as the 
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worst fate that could befall them. This was a situation in which rumour was almost certain 
to flourish. An example of what was to come occurred during the controversy over the 
Stamp Act in 1765. In response to rumours of disturbances among the slave population of 
the colony ‘patrols were riding day and Night for 10 or 14 days in most bitter weather & 
here in town all were soldiers in arms for more than a Week’. However in the end ‘there 
was little or no cause for all that bustle, some Negroes had mimick’d their betters in crying 
out “Liberty”’. The possibility of slaves adopting the language of protest so popular 
amongst white Carolinians was genuinely terrifying to many in the colony and  ‘therefore 
some of them might probably frame and others propagate Reports to stimulate the White 
Men to Watchfulness in order to prevent any evil consequences’. Although it seems to have 
been widely acknowledged that the scare had been without real foundation and may even 
have been engineered by whites within the colony it was still felt necessary to punish a 
slave for the ‘disturbance’ so the authorities decreed the ‘banishment of one fellow, not 
because he was guilty or instigator of insurrection, but because some of his judges said that 
in the general course of his Life he had been a sad Dog, & perhaps that it was necessary to 
save appearances’.528  
 
The fear of slave rebellion was a constant concern for the inhabitants of the south eastern 
colonies. Rumours of slave insurrection could shake the colonies to their core. These were 
the two great strands of rumour and fear in the later colonial southeast. The fear of slave 
rebellion which dominated the low-country and coastal regions and the fear of Indian 
conspiracy which could spread panic in the backcountry. As the split between the British 
and the Patriots became more intractable these two strands of rumour would come 
together to exacerbate and inflame the war. At the same time rumours among the 
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Cherokees and particularly among Cherokee young men would come to have a decisive 
role in beginning the brutal violence which marked the Revolution in the South.   
 
‘Dark and bloody’: the coming of the Revolutionary War in the Cherokee backcountry 
 
As tensions began to rise between the British authorities and groups within the North 
American colonies in the mid-1770s, British fears of slave uprising and Indian conspiracy 
had not dissipated. Violence continued to flare intermittently in the backcountry. In May 
1774 two white families were killed in the Georgia backcountry. This incident coupled with 
the defeat of a group of Georgia militia ‘spread such Pannick as depopulated the parts of 
both Provinces’. This event prompted an exasperated John Stuart to declare that ‘the back 
settlers in this Part of America although Insolent and Savage when they may do so with 
impunity, behave like the most dastardly of mankind whenever they apprehend Danger’.529  
 
The issues of settler pressure on Cherokee land, which had been building for years, reached 
a peak in March 1775 with the conference at Sycamore Shoals. The journey towards this 
point had been precipitated by the machinations of a group of land speculators working 
under the title of the Transylvania Company. The aim of the Transylvania Company was to 
acquire a vast cession of land encompassing the entirety of modern Kentucky and large 
areas of Tennessee. While the Cherokees were only one of several American Indian groups 
with a claim on these lands as their hunting grounds, they controlled the paths through the 
Cumberland Gap, which were the pathways from Virginia and North Carolina into the west. 
As such the Transylvania Company had to overcome Cherokee objections in order to 
successfully secure their speculative inland empire. 530  
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The Transylvania Company met with representatives of the Overhill Cherokees at Sycamore 
Shoals on the Watauga River in March 1775.The Cherokee delegation included 
Attakullakulla, Occonostoata and the Raven of Chota, all senior long standing headmen. 
However it also included leaders of the young men who had the most to lose from a land 
cession, most prominently Dragging Canoe, a dynamic young Overhill leader. The 
Transylvania Company representatives succeeded in pulling off one of the largest land 
deals in colonial history, theoretically acquiring 27,000 square miles of territory. But the 
young men were not prepared to accept such an agreement. Dragging Canoe stormed from 
the conference according to legend threatening to make the ceded lands ‘dark and 
bloody’.531 
 
Dragging Canoe’s withdrawal from the Sycamore Shoals meeting represented not only the 
objection of a rising leader within the Confederacy to continuing land deals with the whites 
but the first manifestation of what was to become a critical generational split within 
Cherokee society. The first noises of this split had appeared in the absence of young 
warriors from the conferences in the late 1760s and early 1770s. The young men absented 
themselves from these events, perhaps as a protest against the ongoing loss of their 
hunting grounds. The young men relied on their ability to hunt on these lands both for their 
material needs through the deerskin trade and as a proving ground for their abilities as 
men. The young men of the Cherokee nation were one of the principal social groups whose 
support was needed for a successful decision to be made in the nation.532 The continuing 
loss of land to European settlers threatened the place of younger Cherokee men within 
their society. Arguably, young men also had less to fear from the prospect of war. While 
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young men traditionally placed themselves in harm’s way in attacking enemies of the 
Cherokee Nation, European methods of warfare, focusing on large expeditions targeting 
the Cherokee towns, posed at least as great a threat to non-combatant members of 
Cherokee society. When these expeditions had struck into Cherokee territory during the 
war of 1759-61, they destroyed towns and crops, but were unable to engage the Cherokee 
warriors themselves.533 Faced with steadily encroaching settlement and with the older 
grandees of the Cherokee Nation determined to secure peace even at the cost of lost land, 
young men saw little advantage in joining in such negotiations. As such it is not surprising 
that Dragging Canoe made the decision he did.  
 
At the same time a surge of rumours surfaced in South Carolina which inflamed existing 
fears of slave rebellion and began the process which would eventually link these fears into 
an all-consuming conspiracy. In early May 1775 the ship London arrived in Charlestown 
from Britain carrying a letter containing explosive information from the heart of British 
government. The letter was to Henry Laurens from Arthur Lee, a South Carolinian who had 
lived for several years in London and who had lobbied and written vociferously in support 
of American rights and privileges. Now, as military conflict began to look increasingly likely, 
Lee reported that ‘a plan was laid before the Administration [of Lord North], for instigating 
the slaves to insurrection’.534 Such a possibility, unsurprisingly, terrified wealthy South 
Carolinians. Two months previously word had come to the colony on ‘unquestionable 
authority’ that Lord Dunmore, royal governor of Virginia had written to the Board of trade 
that ‘the negroes have a notion the king intends to make them all free, and that the 
Associations, Congress and Conventions [of the Patriots] are all contrivances of their 
masters to prevent the king’s good intentions towards them and keep them still slaves; that 
from this circumstance, it is probable that they will rise’. A particular sinister spin was put 
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on this notion by Dunmore’s supposed addendum to this report that a slave uprising would 
hinder the colonists ‘from opposing the ministerial measures’.535 Furthermore, dire 
warnings that Dunmore had threatened Virginian leaders in April that if they opposed his 
authority with force he would ‘arm all my own Negroes and receive all others that will 
come to me whom I shall declare free’ While in actual fact no such communiqué seems to 
have been sent from Dunmore the notion was clearly completely plausible to many in 
South Carolina. 536 
 
These rumours of British inspired slave revolts were quickly linked to the possibility of an 
attack by Indians, including the Cherokees, on the colonies, in co-ordination with British 
regulars. The provincial Congress urged that whites in South Carolina train in the use of 
weapons as they were ‘ever subject to incursions by Indians’.537 The danger of Indian attack 
was regularly linked to that of a wider conspiracy; Henry Laurens asserted that  
 
‘No Stone has been left unturned by [the] Administration & by their Creatures to 
disunite us poor distressed Americans-Insurrections of our Negroes attended by 
the most horrible butcheries of Innocent Women & Children-Inroads by the Indians 
always accompanied by inhuman Massacre-Civil discord between fellow Citizen & 
Neighbour Farmer, productive of fraud perjury & assassination, are all 
comprehended within their plan & attempts have been made to carry them all into 
Execution’.538 
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Laurens’ direct conflation of Indian attack with slave insurrection and domestic strife, all 
orchestrated by the diabolical ‘Administration’ against the Patriots makes clear the 
emergence in Patriot thinking of a notion of widespread conspiracy against them 
encompassing every conceivable enemy in the southeast. The central villain of the part of 
this narrative that related to Indians was John Stuart. Stuart was the long serving 
Superintendant for Indian Affairs in the southern colonies and a staunch Loyalist. By July 
1776 one Patriot fumed that ‘You are undoubtedly informed before this that the detestable 
villain Stuart has prevailed upon the Cherokees to take up the hatchet against our 
countrymen’.539 Stuart had certainly long expressed opposition to the Patriots’ actions. In 
the winter of 1774 he complained that the inhabitants of Charlestown ‘are so inflamed with 
political enthusiasm, that anywhere else in America they would be deemed proper 
Inhabitants of Bedlam’.540 As the news of military actions at Lexington and Concord reached 
South Carolina and rumours of Indian attack and slave insurrection began to circulate a 
rumour emerged that Stuart had sent word to the Catawbas and Cherokees to attack the 
frontiers at once. Alarmed Patriots set off to seize the Superintendent. Stuart, who was a 
long-time resident of the colony, was warned by sympathisers and fled to his plantation 
outside the city before escaping south to Georgia.541  
 
Rumours quickly spread that Stuart had ordered attacks on the backcountry by the 
Cherokees in which thirty four families had been killed. At about the same time doubts 
began to emerge about Stuart’s actions during the Cherokee War when he had served at 
Fort Loudoun. Several Patriot leaders in South Carolina spread rumours that Stuart had 
betrayed the fort to the Cherokees leading to the massacre that followed the fall of the 
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fort.542 Reports such as these were first propagated by members of the Provincial Congress 
but over the summer of 1775 began to appear in sympathetic newspapers and were quickly 
spread throughout the colonies.543 The rumours followed Stuart to Georgia where the local 
Patriots were greatly incensed against him. Stuart vigorously denied the accusations, 
claiming that ‘I never have received any orders from my superiors, which by the most 
tortured construction could be interpreted to spirit up or employ the Indians to fall upon 
the frontier inhabitants’.544 In an attempt to dispel these rumours Stuart invited some 
Georgia Patriots to examine his correspondence. Initially this gambit appears to have been 
effective; the Georgians accepted that he had not been conspiring to send the Indians 
against the frontier inhabitants. Unfortunately for Stuart this ended when the Patriots 
found a letter from Alexander Cameron in response to Stuart’s warning about Patriot 
attempts to secure Indian support. Cameron promised Stuart that from the Cherokees he 
‘could head any number he [Stuart] thought proper, whenever called upon in support of his 
Majesty and Government’. Once again facing an angry force of Patriots Stuart fled again, 
this time to St. Augustine in Florida.545 
 
Unable to physically lay hold of Stuart, the Patriots in Charlestown instead impeached him 
and seized some despatches that had arrived at his home in Charlestown. A war of words 
now began between Stuart and the Patriot Committee of Intelligence. The Committee 
headed by William Henry Drayton wrote to Stuart demanding his return to answer charges 
and warning that his property in Charlestown stood ‘as a Security for the good behaviour of 
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the Indians in the Southern Department’.546 At the same time the Patriots also sought to 
put pressure on Stuart’s deputy among the Cherokees, Alexander Cameron. John Lewis 
Gervais, a member of the Committee of Intelligence, wrote to Cameron in attempt to 
convince him to resign his post both with a promise that in doing so he would be ‘admired, 
beloved, and I make no doubt rewarded among your friends’ and with dark warnings that 
‘if the Indians break out I should tremble of Lochaber [Cameron’s estate] and the 
Cameronian Family no doubt an enraged people would exterminate them and all their 
property and possessions’. 547 The Patriot leadership then was both operating under an 
apparently genuine fear of the actions of royal officials, and seeking to play upon the fears 
of officials in the colonies who were extremely vulnerable to the kind of crowd violence 
which had characterised the beginning of the Revolution in many parts of North America.548 
 
Stuart denied the charges vehemently. He wrote to Drayton that ‘I know not who it was 
that propagated such an injurious and False Report, but illiberal as the Word Villain may 
appear to be, the Malicious Author of such a calumny certainly Merits the Appelation’.549 
Cameron likewise disputed the Patriot interpretation of his letters and when Andrew 
Williamson, a member of the Committee of Intelligence visited him in the Cherokee Nation 
where Cameron had fled to avoid capture by the Patriots Cameron was apparently able to 
convince him of his sincerity.550 Although still extremely wary of Stuart and his 
subordinates, the Patriots lacked proof that Stuart was attempting to send the Indians 
against them. 
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The belief that these threats were all part of a great conspiracy against the freedoms of 
America was a key part of the Patriot discourse. In late May 1775 a letter supposedly sent 
from England was reprinted in the Charlestown Gazette. The letter asserted that the King 
was determined to crush resistance in the colonies and that he had backed this up by 
sending ‘seventy eight thousand guns, and bayonets, to be sent to America, to put into the 
hands of N*****s [Negroes], the Roman Catholics, the Indians and Canadians, and every 
wicked means on earth used to subdue the Colonies’.551 Such intentions were quickly 
imputed to the new Governor, Lord William Campbell. Rumours circulated in Charlestown 
that Campbell was bringing with him to the colony, fourteen thousand stands of arms to be 
given to slaves and Indians.552 By linking together this multitude of threats into one 
enormous conspiracy the Patriots were able to create a compelling and powerful narrative 
that could motivate large numbers of colonists to support their cause. The creation of this 
powerful and expansive framework of conspiracy was firmly based in the events of earlier 
years. For decades the fear of slave insurrection and foreign interference had haunted the 
colonial imagination. This suspicion was now transferred from the French and Spanish to 
the British government. In seeking to understand and respond to the developments of the 
mid 1770s the Patriots turned to long established tropes of rumour, fitting them to meet 
the details of their new reality.  
 
For South Carolinians this new framework of conspiracy was amplified by the experience of 
the Cherokee War. The descent into rumour fuelled conflict that the Cherokee War 
represented was a defining event for South Carolina, both in terms of their relationship to 
their Cherokee neighbours and to the wider infrastructure of the British Empire. That South 
Carolinian Patriots saw conspiracy between these two groups, the Cherokees and the 
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British, suggests that the fears and concerns of the Cherokee War still loomed large in their 
minds.  
 
‘Our people were born upon and live in the same land’ Diplomacy in the early Revolution  
 
Throughout autumn of 1775 the rumours of conspiracy which whirled around the colonies 
as the war between the British and the Patriots began to escalate. There was a determined 
effort by both sides to influence the Cherokees. In this competition the Patriots were at a 
distinct disadvantage. The British had in place the officials of the Indian Departments. John 
Stuart remained loyal to the British as did his deputies. These officials were practised in 
dealing with Indians having worked with many Cherokee leaders. At the same time, a 
majority of the deerskin traders in the Cherokee country, a key demographic in terms of 
securing diplomatic success with the Nation, sided with the British while on the other hand 
many of the speculators who had an interest in seeing the Cherokee pushed westwards 
were likely to side with the Patriots. Equally, the Patriots lacked the resources to supply the 
Indian trade as the British had, especially given the halt in trade between many of the 
colonies and the mother country.553 
 
To lead their diplomatic offensive in the South the Patriots appointed a group of 
commissioners from the various rebelling colonies in the autumn of 1775, these men were, 
Willie Jones representing North Carolina, Dr. Thomas Walker of Virginia, George Galphin 
and Edward Wilkinson of South Carolina and Robert Rae of Georgia.554 Some of these men 
were experienced in dealing with American Indian peoples. Galphin, Wilkinson and Rae had 
all been active in the deerskin trade. Galphin, in particular, had held an influential position 
among the Creeks. Thomas Walker, on the other hand had had a rather less positive 
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relationship with American Indians. In 1770, Walker had sent some presents and a letter to 
the Young Warrior of Estatoe proposing to settle ‘under long mountain on Enemy’s River, 
where he should be at hand to give them intelligence of Enemy and Supply them with 
necessaries’. The Young Warrior had taken the letter to Alexander Cameron for translation 
and ‘when he understood the contents he expressed the greatest Indignation & 
Resentment’, perhaps unsurprisingly given that the site proposed by Walker was within 
thirty miles of Chota.555 Walker represented, therefore, exactly the kind of land grabbing 
speculator which threatened any chance of an alliance between the Patriots and American 
Indian peoples in the Southeast. That a man like this was leading Patriot efforts to woo the 
Indians left them at a distinct disadvantage. 
 
Nevertheless, representatives of the Patriot cause made great efforts to secure the support 
or at least the neutrality of the Cherokees in hopes of forestalling the great conspiracy that 
they saw bearing down upon them. In September 1775 Henry Drayton met a group of 
Cherokee headmen at the Congarees Settlements. Drayton opened proceedings with a 
speech designed to place the best perspective he could on Cherokee relations with the 
colonies over the previous decades, conveniently overlooking the tensions and intermittent 
violence that had marked the period,  
 
‘I take you by the hand, in witness  of the Peace that has so long subsisted between 
your Brothers the White People of this Country & you & your People; and I hold 
your hand fast in testimony that your Brothers the White People wish that our 
Peace & Friendship with you & your People may continue’ 556 
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Drayton then attempted to put the Patriot side of the dispute with the British government 
‘that I might explain to you the causes of the unhappy quarrel between a part of the People 
in Great Britain & your Brothers the White People living in America’ and in doing so retold 
the history of British colonisation efforts in North America emphasising that the colonists 
had crossed the Atlantic with the understanding that they would have the full rights of 
Englishmen. Drayton denounced the laws which the British government had attempted to 
impose upon the colonies claiming that the actions of the British ‘is as much as to say they 
have a right to take all our money, all our lands , all our cattle and horses and such things; 
& not only all such things but our Wives & Children in order to make servants of them’. In 
this he attempted to play upon the fears of loss of livelihood that so alarmed many 
Cherokees.557 
 
Warming to his theme, Drayton extrapolated from the actions of the British government 
and sought once again to equate Patriot defence against an overreaching ministry with 
Cherokee defence of their lands and way of life: 
 
‘Oh my Brother Warriors, it is a lamentable thing that our Brothers beyond  the 
great water should use us in this cruel manner! – If they use us , their own flesh 
and blood in this unjust way, what must you expect: you who are red People; you 
whom they never saw; you whom they know only by the hearing of the ear; you 
who have Fine Lands?’558 
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Drayton’s inference here was unmistakable. The British, he argued, once they had 
subjugated the colonists would turn their attention towards the lands of the Cherokees. In 
making this argument, Drayton sought to shift the focus of Cherokee concerns about 
encroaching whites away from the Patriots (many of whom had been enthusiastically 
involved in attempts to acquire lands in the Cherokee country) towards the British 
government. He also sought to play upon notions of the importance of skin colour. While 
race was less of a fundamental issue among the Cherokee than in British colonial society 
the Cherokees would most certainly have been aware from seeing the treatment of black 
slaves among the whites the difference that complexion could make in the treatment of 
individuals.559 
 
Drayton also attempted to appeal to more immediate Cherokee economic concerns. He 
warned that the planned British tax increases would increase the cost of goods to the 
Cherokees and threaten Cherokee economies; ‘thus you see, that we do not quarrel only 
upon our own account ; but that we have put on our shot pouches, not only to preserve 
our money, but also to preserve your deerskins’.560  
 
Summoning all his powers of eloquence, Drayton sought to draw together all these points 
to push for an alliance between the Cherokees and the Patriots: 
 
‘Therefore, as your people and our people were born upon and live in the same 
land- as we are old acquaintances, and have thereby a regard for each other- as our 
interest in this quarrel is the same… so you cannot expect to be better treated by 
Men who want all that you and ourselves have, all these things shew you that if we 
are hurt you must be hurt also – if we lose, you must lose also- if we fall you must 
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fall also, so I tell you in time, that you and ourselves ought to join  together, in 
order to save all of us from being hurt , or from losing, or from falling’561 
 
 
At the end of his speech Drayton attempted to address an event which cast serious doubts 
upon the professed sentiments of brotherhood felt by white Carolinians towards the 
Cherokees. The Patriots had seized a shipment of ammunition intended for the deerskin 
traders to prevent it falling into the hands of Loyalists. Doubtless some of the traders, 
facing a sudden shortfall in their supplies and many of them already inclined to support the 
British government had publicised the Patriot action amongst the Cherokees and spread 
rumours that the Patriots had ‘used you ill’.562 Drayton admitted that the Patriots had taken 
the ammunition but claimed ‘that your Brothers the White People seized it with great 
concern, because they knew that their seizing it would in some way distress you: but I tell 
you also the Men about the Great King are the only Persons to be blamed in this affair’. 
Drayton argued that the British soldiers being sent to North America and the embargo on 
ammunition placed by British authorities forced the Carolinians to seize the ammunition ‘in 
order to have in our hands the means of defending our lives, our money and your 
deerskins’. At the same time Drayton also tried to downplay reports of violence in the 
backcountry. He admitted that ‘one of your people has lately been killed and that two 
others were at the same time wounded by some of the white people on the ceded lands in 
Georgia-I feel great grief at this news’ and promised that ‘if the White People have done 
wrong, and without provocation have killed your Countrymen, you may be assured that the 
White People who were concerned in such a wicked & black affair shall be punished’. 
Drayton also made an attempt to placate the relatives of the dead Cherokee by giving 
presents to the widow and children of the deceased.  
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With this speech, Drayton sought to overcome the myriad disadvantages suffered by the 
Patriots in Indian affairs by reframing their relationship with the Cherokees. Within the 
narrative of Drayton’s conference speech Cherokees and white Patriot southerners were 
no longer competitors contending for control of resources and land, they were brothers, 
fellow warriors united by a shared past and by their homeland.  
 
Drayton’s attempt to reframe Cherokee understandings of their relationship to British 
settlers seems to have little effect. It cannot have helped that a shipment of arms sent by 
Patriot authorities in South Carolina to the Cherokees were intercepted by Loyalists who 
feared the possibility of a Patriot-Cherokee alliance. This confirmed for the Cherokees that 
the Patriots could not replace the British in terms of meeting Cherokee desires for goods 
and supplies.563  
 
 1776: Cherokee raids and Patriot Expeditions 
 
In the spring of 1776 the Cherokees teetered on the brink of war with the American 
Patriots. Long term patterns of competition had driven the cause of the deteriorating 
relationship but it was tales of events in the north which provided the catalyst. The ties 
between Indian peoples, which British officials had so long feared as evidence of a 
conspiracy against themselves were now, ironically, turned to encouraging support of the 
Patriots. Rumour would once again bring dangerous tensions to a head. For all the patriot 
fears of a British inspired conspiracy against them this was very much a decision made by 
Cherokees, for Cherokee purposes, with the encouragement of other Indian nations. In 
fact, in April 1776 John Stuart had come into the Overhill Towns to persuade the Cherokees 
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to halt their push towards war at least for a time. The older chiefs were prepared to listen 
but the younger warriors, many of them followers of Dragging Canoe who had first come to 
the attention of the British by storming out of the Sycamore Shoals conference were 
restless and ‘were with difficulty restrained by Mr Cameron and the Old Sensible People’.564  
 
Into this parlous situation ‘a Deputation of fourteen Indians with a Cherokee fellow as 
interpreter arrived from the Northern Nations’ in Chota, dramatically painted all in black. 
The delegation included men from the Shawnees, Delawares, Mohawks, Nanticokes and 
Ottawas. The Northerners made clear the grounds of their visit from the outset, claiming 
that they had travelled seventy days to reach the Cherokees through lands that had 
formerly been the hunting grounds of Shawnees and Delawares but which were now 
‘thickly inhabited [by whites] and the people all in arms’. The image of a vast expanse of 
former Indian hunting lands now overrun by a hostile enemy was intended to be heard and 
understood by the young hunters who had seen their lands encroached on and taken all 
their lives. The emissaries also brought word of northern decisions to side with the British 
and encouraged the Cherokees to do the same.565 
 
The arrival of the northern Indians and the information that they brought led a swing in 
support for war among the young men even before they had made any official 
announcement. Stuart wrote that ‘after this day, every young Fellow’s face in the Overhill 
Towns appeared Blackened, and nothing was now talked of but War’.566 But the full impact 
of the Northerners’ visit was yet to come. The Overhills Cherokees came together to hear 
what the Northerners had to say officially. The appearance of the crowd greatly alarmed 
the British officials on hand: ‘Those from the Great Island, except Outacite [Judd’s Friend] 
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and two or three more, were all black, also all the Chilhowie and Settico people, and some 
from every town were blackened’.567  
 
Representatives of the Mohawks, Ottawas and Shawnees all stood to speak and present 
wampum belts. All called for united resistance against the encroaching Patriots. The 
Shawnee deputy expressed the tenor of the conference best, declaring that it was ‘better 
to die like men than to diminish away by inches’.568 This was just the sort of talk that would 
appeal to the angry young men of the Cherokee nation, redolent as it was with death or 
glory rhetoric and the promise of victory over the Patriots.569 The rumours of a united 
Indian offensive in the north also gave critical encouragement to the idea that this time, 
acting together, the Indians could push back the invaders. 
 
The old headmen, men such as Attakullakulla and Oconostoata who had led the Cherokees 
through the horrors of the war of 1759-61 refused the wampum belts. But when Dragging 
Canoe accepted the Shawnee war belt and the young warriors joined in singing the war 
song, the older men raised no complaint but ‘sat down dejected and silent’.570 A succession 
of young leaders struck the war post signifying their intention to go to war against the 
settlers. The fears of the young men, which were not unjustified, of the intentions of the 
American settlers and the tales brought by the Northerners of their peoples’ resistance had 
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carried the day. The old headmen had lost the crowd at the Chota council ground and the 
Overhill Cherokees were now at war. 
 
Over the next few days Stuart and Cameron intrigued to head off the oncoming violence. 
They aimed to shift the blame for war onto Dragging Canoe. Stuart claimed that he ‘made 
him acknowledge himself before all the Chiefs the sole cause of the war’. If the war could 
be laid at the door of Dragging Canoe, they hoped, the bulk of the Cherokees might be less 
prepared to follow him. Stuart also attempted to spread the rumour that the Shawnees 
had deceived the Cherokees at the Chota meeting. These gambits had echoes of the old 
way of handling rumour, where information and opinion could be used to smooth over the 
conflicts between Britons and Cherokees. Stuart and the old headmen tried to shift the 
blame for the trouble to a convenient scapegoat and thereby lessen the support for a war. 
But in the end, violence was coming and there was nothing that Stuart could do to prevent 
Dragging Canoe and his cohorts going to war. All that remained was to urge the warriors to 
stay on the western side of the boundary line and to avoid killing women, children or 
Loyalists.571  
 
Dragging Canoe and the other Cherokee warriors from throughout the nation swept down 
on the westernmost of the colonial settlements spreading mayhem and panic from 
Pennsylvania to Georgia. Some fortified blockhouses into makeshift forts and huddled 
there for protection, others fled across the mountains to escape the violence.572 The panic 
began with dark tales of brutal violence; a diarist in Wachovia recorded in early May that a 
war-party, possibly Cherokee, had killed seventeen in the backcountry. Even more 
alarming, for settlers, than the simple murder of these people was the treatment that had 
been meted out to the corpses.  The Indians it was said had ‘horribly mutilated them, 
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scalping the entire head, and hacking the body into many pieces’.573 Reports from the west 
of South Carolina confirmed that ’96 is now a frontier. Plantations lie desolate, and hopeful 
crops are going to ruin’.574  
 
More critically for the Patriots though was not the bare fact of the Cherokee attacks or 
brutality of the violence but the notion that the Cherokee attacks were part of a concerted 
British strategy. Adding credence to this notion which Patriots had long nursed was the 
attempted assaults on Savannah and Charlestown by British naval forces. Although these 
assaults failed, their timing in the spring and summer of 1776 as reports of assaults on the 
backcountry were beginning to multiply and panic and grief stricken settlers from the 
backcountry began to trickle in seeking refuge from the violence was enough to confirm a 
close association for the Patriots. Henry Laurens unselfconsciously referred to ‘the attack 
on Sullivant’s Island seconded by the Ravages and Murders in our West Frontier by the 
Cherokee Indians’.575 For the Patriots there was no doubt, the British had conspired with 
the Cherokees to defeat them.  
 
The Patriot response was enthusiastic and violent, Virginia, North and South Carolina and 
Georgia all sent expeditions to strike into the Cherokee country. Initially the terrifying 
impact of the Cherokee attacks seems to have limited the appeal for many recruits but 
soon some 6,000 Patriot troops were marching into Cherokee lands in four separate 
expeditions.576 Like the expeditions of the Cherokee War before them the expeditions of 
1776 advanced with a degree of force that the Cherokees could not meet head on.577 At the 
same time, again as in the Cherokee War, the invading whites were unable to bring the 
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Cherokees to a decisive defeat. Aware of the approach of the large colonial forces the 
Cherokees pulled back, evacuating their towns in the face of the expeditions and picking at 
the flanks of the invaders.  
 
The journal of Arthur Fairies, a soldier in South Carolina’s expedition describes travelling 
into the Cherokee country with few signs of the Cherokee themselves. The first Indian that 
Fairies notes encountering  was a ‘squaw’ who the soldiers killed and scalped. At the same 
time they seized several blacks from whom ‘we got information of the captives of an Indian 
Camp about sixteen Miles from here’. It took the expedition two days to reach the site of 
the supposed Cherokee camp, during which time the only sign was some sporadic firing 
which Fairies estimated to be coming from eleven guns. When the expedition eventually 
reached the camp ‘we found theron all gon[sic] and had Killed Mrs Kight whom they had 
took prisoner’.578  
 
Fairies and his companions continued to ineffectually attempt to engage the Cherokee 
warriors for weeks. On the 20th of September, Fairies declared that he and his compatriots 
had ‘resolved to Conquer or Dye in Attempt’ and set off to attack the Cherokees. Fairies 
description of the march gives a palpable sense of fear and confusion as the Patriots found 
so many signs of Cherokees in the area that ‘made us immagine [sic] We should have a 
battle every Mile and the Mountains so high on every side hindered our Flankers to March 
and confined us to one Path’, but once again they were unable to engage Cherokee 
warriors. In the only action of the day ‘in a sudden...An Indian Squa [sic] on Her they fired 
two guns which put us All in an Alarm Allowing it An attack. That soon found therin was no 
more Indians there’. Despite the injury to the Indian woman the Patriots brought forward 
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an interpreter to question her and through her wounds the woman ‘told the interpreter as 
she lives that all the overhill Indians & All the towns Indians are Gon [sic]’.579  
 
This information proved true throughout the expedition. In Fairies journal the only 
Cherokees that were encountered were women. The frustrations and tensions evoked in 
the Patriot troops by the difficulties of their campaign were assuaged on the only 
representatives of the Cherokee nation that the Patriots could secure, the women and 
children who failed to escape the oncoming Patriot forces; the Patriot soldiers who had 
shot the Cherokee woman killed her after her questioning ‘to put her out of her pain’.580 
This was also the case for other Patriot expeditions against the Cherokees; the force from 
North Carolina captured ‘two squaws and a lad’ on the Pigeon River. Having seized these 
Cherokees the troops were determined to exact retribution upon them for the damage 
done on the backcountry by the Cherokee war-parties that the expeditions could not find. 
An officer who tried to secure the prisoners ‘til we got the approbation of the Congress 
Whether they should be sold Slaves or not’ found himself facing his entire troop who 
‘swore Bloodily that if they were not sold for Slaves upon the spot they would Kill and Scalp 
them Immediately’.581  
 
Tom Hatley has posited deeply held psychological causes for the level of violence against 
women in the 1776 campaigns tied to colonial insecurities. He argues that the war against 
the Cherokees in 1776 was, in a sense, ‘the war of a generation against its history’.582 While 
there is certainly significant evidence for this an awareness of the prevalence of rumour 
adds to Hatley’s observation the point that these insecurities were inflamed by the lack of 
reliable information on Cherokee actions during the expeditions. Changes in the supply of 
                                                          
579
 Ibid. 
580
 Hatley, Dividing Path, p.196. 
581
 William Moore to General Rutherford, November 7
th
 1776 in ‘Rutherford’s Expedition’. 
582
 Hatley, Dividing Path, p.198. 
254 
 
information held by the expeditions could drastically alter the treatment of the captured 
Cherokee. This is corroborated by an incident from the South Carolinian expedition. In 
October after several months crashing around the Cherokee country unsuccessfully 
attempting to engage Cherokee war parties, the expedition captured another Cherokee 
woman. But, rather than killing or abusing her, the commander of the expedition ‘gave her 
leave to go to Her own people on an account of the Locality, in piloting Us and giving us 
Such true intelligence concerning them’. The woman was not released just for providing 
reliable information. The Patriots wanted her to carry a message back to her people: 
 
‘the Colonel ordered her to go home telling her that he would leave Warriors all 
along the Indian Line .. that we was ready to fight them Any time & Likewise Here 
we had above 5 Battles with them & Defeated them all times and Likewise that He 
would continue Destroying them while there was one of them after telling her this 
he ordered her off home‘583 
 
The ability of this Cherokee woman to satisfy the need of the Patriot officers to re-establish 
links for the passing of information to and from the Cherokees, saved her life. This incident 
gives an indication of the value of such links even as the Cherokee relationship with the 
Patriots collapsed into all-out war.  
 
While the expeditions sent out by the Patriots in 1776 were not able to meet and defeat 
the Cherokees in combat they were able to visit large scale destruction on the abandoned 
Cherokee towns. The South Carolina expedition  ‘cutting and destroying all things that 
might be of advantage to our enemies’ came across ‘ curious buildings, great apple trees, 
and whiteman-like improvements, these we destroyed... the smallest of these valley towns, 
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by our computation, exceed two hundred acres of corn, besides crops of potatoes, peas 
and bean’. While the expeditions might have lacked effective direction they were highly 
successful in destroying Cherokee towns and farmland. 584 
 
The Secession of the ‘Real People’ 
 
As the Cherokee nation swayed under the repeated blows of invasion and famine in 1776 
the older chiefs sought desperately for a deal that would allow their people some respite 
from the devastation that war had brought. The older headmen who had been unable to 
prevent the rush to war were able to reassert a measure of influence and some of those 
who had gone to war in the spring of 1776 agreed to come to terms with the Patriots. In 
the spring and summer of 1777 the different Cherokee sections met with representatives 
of the rebelling states and agreed peace deals. The treaties of 1777 included vast land 
cessions and agreements for large supplies of food to be sent to the Cherokees. 
Unsurprisingly many observers on all sides concluded that the Cherokees had made a 
hasty, painful treaty in order to prevent starvation. Hanging Maw, a headman who stayed 
away from the negotiations dismissed them as ‘only a make-hast[e] to save corn’.585 The 
truth was that the older headmen had few other options left. They could not prevent the 
Patriots from invading their towns and they could not bring the young warriors to heel. 
They had to make a deal for the survival of their people and communities. In the end it was 
both poignant and oddly fitting that this act of compromise and diplomacy was one of the 
last public acts of Attakullakulla, the Little Carpenter.586 
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Many Cherokee warriors, led by Dragging Canoe, took a different path. They ignored the 
diplomatic actions of the older headmen. Bolstered by many refugees from the towns 
which had been destroyed by the Patriot expeditions they headed south and west setting 
up new settlements along the Chickamauga River, from which the splinter group took its 
name. The impact of the Chickamauga split was decidedly mixed. On the one hand it drew 
blame for any ongoing violence away from the more established Cherokee towns and the 
headmen who had made the agreements with the Patriots in the spring of 1777. The 
Cherokees could not be expected to hand over Dragging Canoe or any of his compatriots to 
the whites when he was operating a rival centre of power to the south. On the other hand 
the split widened the break which had been seen in 1776 when the younger men had 
overridden the old headmen. It had always been part of Cherokee culture for factions who 
disagreed with the majority decision in contentious discussions to withdraw from the 
towns for a while.587 With the Chickamauga secession a deeper rift was created. With the 
older leaders staying in the Cherokee heartland and the young warriors moving south to 
join Dragging Canoe a generational rift was opening up within the Cherokee nation. The 
young warriors felt that the old men had betrayed them in giving away so much land to the 
Patriots. The bitterness of the betrayal is apparent in the names that the people of the 
Chickamauga settlements used, calling themselves ‘Ani-Yunwiya’ or the Real People and 
(even more tellingly) referring to those who did not join them as ‘Virginians’ grouping the 
old line headmen with the hated land-hungry whites.588 The use of the term Virginian raises 
some interesting insights into the process of rumours among younger Cherokees. While 
there is no direct evidence of the rumours that spread among young Cherokee men at this 
time some glimpses are given in the language used by Dragging Canoe, the most vocal of 
the young chiefs. At a meeting with Henry Stuart at Mobile in 1776 Dragging Canoe 
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complained of the encroaching whites. The agent replied that this was the Cherokees’ own 
fault for making private land deals with individuals. Dragging Canoe replied bitterly ‘that he 
had no hand in making these Bargains but blamed some of their Old Men who he said were 
too old to hunt and who by their Poverty had been induced to sell their Land but for his 
part he had a great many young fellows that would support him and that were determined 
to have their Land’.589 For the young men who rallied around the Chickamauga settlements, 
the older generation had betrayed the trust placed in them. The decision of older headmen 
to agree to land cessions, to the transfer of land from the use of Cherokee hunters to 
whites, made them appear less like ‘real’ Cherokees. From this understanding it was a short 
step for the young men to feel that the headmen had become ‘Virginians’ rather than truly 
Cherokee.  
 
The Chickamauga secession broke the old system of the Cherokees in which the old 
diplomats mitigated the excesses of the young warriors who defended the nation against 
outside attack. The traditional diplomatic and religious ceremonies which had kept 
Cherokee society peaceful and balanced ceased in the Chickamauga settlements as the 
towns lived in a state of continual war readiness. While the old line towns to the north 
attempted to maintain a precarious peace with the Patriots the Chickamauga towns, 
encouraged by the British and American Loyalists continued to raid the backcountry.590  
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After 1776: the later Revolutionary War 
 
The treaty of 1776 did not signal an end to the travails of the Cherokee neutralists. 
Chickamauga towns continued to draw disgruntled Cherokees especially young people who 
viewed the Chickamauga as their best chance to secure their livelihood and homeland. 
Even those Cherokees who attempted to remain neutral found themselves caught up in the 
violence of the war. Patriots made little effort to distinguish between the Chickamaugas 
and neutral Cherokees. At the same time while the Chickamauga towns received supplies 
from the British in Florida the Cherokees were unable to gain similar support from the 
Americans. Faced with this alternative more and more began to join the Chickamauga 
settlements. This exodus further weakened the hand of the neutralist chiefs. When the 
British returned in force to the south in 1779-80 the Raven of Chota one of the most senior 
surviving headmen, negotiated with the British declaring ‘that he was done with the Big 
Knife [Patriots]’. In the winter of 1780 a Virginian expedition burned much of the Overhill 
country.591   
 
Despite the violence of the late 1770s and early 1780s, white settlers continued to move 
ever further into Cherokee territory.  As the Chickamauga raiders tried to push them back, 
Patriot expeditions were mobilised to devastate the Cherokee country and attack their 
towns. In 1782 an expedition, led by Andrew Pickens struck into the Cherokee towns. 
Pickens and his descendants painted this expedition as a rousing display of patriotic 
intrepidity, Pickens’ grandson claimed that  the Cherokees ‘were so thoroughly overrun and 
conquered by the terrible slaughter in this new mode of warfare (but few firearms were 
used) that they sued for peace’.592 Despite this, a letter written shortly after the expedition 
by Pickens to an officer in General Wayne’s force suggests an altogether more confused 
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and inconclusive train of events. The Pickens expedition tried to draw together forces from 
North and South Carolina and from Georgia but suffered problems from the outset. Pickens 
led his South Carolinians into the Middle Cherokee settlements but received word that the 
force from North Carolina would not be able to meet for some time. Meeting with the 
Georgians at Little Chote Pickens was dismayed to find that the number of troops he had at 
his disposal were much smaller than he had planned with only a total of some 275 men.593 
Pickens’ strategy seems to have been to acquire provisions for his men in the Cherokee 
towns but was hampered by a lack of information on events in the Cherokee country. 
When he led the expedition into the Overhill territory Pickens found that ‘the Indians had 
removed from their towns with their provisions’. Dismayed, Pickens headed deeper into 
Cherokee country, arriving at one Overhill town ‘we were in hopes to get some Corn but 
did not get an Ear in the Town as the snow was excessive, and know [sic] [gr]ain or Corn for 
our horses, many of them Dropt dead on the Road that days march’. The Cherokees it 
seemed were also attempting to acquire information on the invasion force, in the same 
town ‘we met Crittenton and Jack Doherty with two other young fellows, who were sent 
from the middle grounds the day before to spy and watch our motions’. Two of the party 
were killed and the others seized ‘who told us the Indians had removed with their 
provisions into the Mountains  as soon as  they heard the Indians with the flagg was killed, 
which appeared to be the case’. The Indians were largely gone and had taken the majority 
of provisions with them, leaving the Pickens expedition to scrounge what little they could. 
Faced with this prospect the officers and men voted to return home as there ‘was 
know[sic] prospect of getting any Corn in the Indian Towns and could get no Intelligence 
from the mountain men’. Faced with a lack of expected supplies and, perhaps more 
importantly, no real idea of where to look for the Cherokees the expedition was forced to 
turn back ‘without Effecting what we so earnestly wisht for’. Pickens frustration is evident; 
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at one point he even seems to be pleading with Doherty for the opportunity to fight ‘I told 
him that we had come a great way to meet their warriors that I had heard they wanted 
much to meet us in that Country’. On his return Pickens aimed his ire at the leaders of the 
other forces who were supposed to join his own complaining that:  
 
‘I must say that this important Expedition for our frontiers, has not been as 
successful as I could have wisht- through the Inattention, neglect, or I fear the 
lukewarmness of some of the field officers, of the different regiments in this state-I 
hope one day to see them punished for their neglect’.   
 
But Pickens’ complaints about the failure of other commanders could not disguise the real 
reason for the failure of the assault (indeed a larger force might well have starved more 
quickly). The Cherokees had a better network of intelligence gathering, they knew when 
the militia were coming and escaped. Pickens on the other hand did not know where to 
find the Cherokee warriors he so wished to defeat. To an even larger extent than the British 
colonial authorities the American Patriots seem to have been estranged from the 
Cherokees. 
 
Even the Paris Treaty of 1783 did little initially to blunt the efforts of the Chickamauga. The 
treaty had been drawn up by British, French and American negotiators and no reference 
whatsoever had been made to the American Indian allies of the British. All the south-
eastern nations were dismayed by the terms of the agreement. So much so that some 
Creeks and Cherokees declared it ‘a Virginia Lie’ and refused to accept it.594 Even when it 
became apparent that the treaty had been agreed by the British and the Americans the 
Chickamaugas continued to fight. In March 1783, after news of the treaty had reached 
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North America, a party of Chickamaugas arrived in Detroit to request British help in fighting 
the Americans and Cherokees living among the Shawnees continued to send out war 
parties against the Americans.595 The Cherokees and the Chickamaugas in particular would 
continue to clash with the new American states until the destruction of the Chickamauga 
towns in the American campaign of 1794.596 
 
The 1770s brought the dissolution of many of the relationships that had defined the 
colonial backcountry. The suspicions and fears which had characterised interactions 
between Cherokees and the British for decades came disastrously to a head with the break 
between the British and many of their colonists in the upheaval of the Revolution.  With 
the upheaval of the Cherokee War, rumour and fear made South Carolinians suspicious 
both of the Cherokee and of the British imperial machine that had played such an 
important part in fighting the war. Suspicions about the attitude of the British towards 
colonials and concern that they had been cheated of their due in the war with the 
Cherokees added to the hostility felt by South Carolinians towards the British government. 
As the rift between the British authorities and the colonists widened long held fears came 
to prominence. In this environment, old fears of an Indian-slave alliance as well as a re-
directed concern about imperial rivals amalgamated with concerns about the lengths to 
which British officials would go to quash American independence to create a widespread 
belief that a vast conspiracy comprising the British, Indian groups such as the Cherokees 
and the colonists’ slaves was in motion with the intent of destroying the colonists. 
 
Cherokee fears of the steady pressure on their way of life from the British colonies led to 
increased ties with other Indian peoples. Younger Cherokees began to view Indian peoples 
in a similar situation to their own as more representative of their interests than the 
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headmen who were their supposed leaders. When stories of northern Indians supposed 
successes against the Patriots filtered into the Cherokee country it is not surprising that 
these rumours were eagerly seized upon by young Cherokees. Such stories offered a 
narrative that appealed to their desires and hopes and allowed them to take a measure of 
control that the careful diplomacy of the elder headmen did not. Unfortunately for the 
Cherokees the war did not end with the outcome that they had hoped for. The collapse of 
the British war effort in 1781 left the Cherokees, as so many other American Indian peoples 
in a precarious situation. 
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Conclusion  
Facing a New Reality 
 
In the end, rumour remained. After the Cherokee fields burned, and men, women and 
children, fled, fought and died through the backcountry, rumour continued to be an 
important factor in the ways that Indians and whites interacted. For over a century the 
Cherokees had stood at the centre of the forces competing for the eastern side of North 
America. For half a century they had been met there by British colonial officials and the 
subjects of the British colonies. In the end, rumour and fear, in combination with the 
monumental events of the 1770s and the exponential growth westward of Anglo-American 
populations would bring the Cherokee-British relationship, as it had existed in the colonial 
era, to an end. New relationships developed, but the days when a precarious balance could 
be held through the use of rumour were over.  
 
Since the 1740s the path of Cherokee-British interactions had led to steadily worsening 
relations between the British and the Cherokees. By the Revolution the Patriot Americans 
had come to see the Cherokees as, at best, culturally inferior and untrustworthy and at 
worst, less than human. The Cherokees found themselves facing victorious American states 
whose population clamoured for the Indians to be pushed back into the interior of North 
America. In the face of this threat and with the bloody violence of the Revolution fresh in 
the memory, rumour was losing its utility as a diplomatic tool. What remained was the 
other form of rumour, the panics, the mistrust and the growing estrangement between two 
peoples. 
 
Nevertheless, rumour continued to play an important role in the diplomacy of the 
southeast after the end of the American Revolution. In the years after the peace of 1783 
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the Chickamaugas maintained strong ties to other Indian peoples who sought to resist the 
encroachments of the victorious Americans. The networks that the Cherokees and then the 
Chickamaugas had built up with other Indian peoples remained intact .It was here that 
rumour continued to find a constructive use. In 1784, Shawnee diplomats visited the 
Chickamaugas and the Creeks hoping to draw the south-eastern Indians together to 
organise resistance to the whites. These networks were clearly maintained for many years. 
In 1792 a council of Indian nations met at the Glaize settlement in the Ohio country. This 
meeting included representatives of the ‘Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, Chippewas, 
Ottawas, Hurons, Munseys, Conoys, Mohikons, Potowatomies, Cherokees, Creeks, Sacs, 
Reynards’ who discussed attempts to promote Indian unity and resistance to the 
Americans.597 Such meetings were not an expression of an established fact. A primary focus 
of the speeches was to propagate the idea that a large number of Indian peoples were 
firmly united as an encouragement to others to join. At the meeting at the Glaize a 
Delaware speaker was quick to follow the Shawnee who opened the conference by 
insisting to the listeners that ‘Don’t think because the Shawnees only have spoken to you, 
that it was their sentiments alone, they have spoken with the sentiments of all the 
Nations’.598 By spreading the rumour that the Indian nations were united, the speakers at 
the Glaize hoped to secure their alliance in reality. Indian militants continued to invoke 
rumours of unity as a way to encourage such unity for decades to come. In the late 1820s 
the ‘Winnebego Prophet’, Wabokieshiek preached to a mixed group of Indians, that the 
Americans would be driven back by an alliance of Indian peoples joined by the British.599 In 
these claims Wabokieshiek echoed the rumours which had surfaced during Pontiac’s War 
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regarding the return of the French to the Great Lakes region. Ironically it was now the 
British that the Indian leader attempted to conjure as a counterweight to the Americans. 
 
A central part of this united strategy was the acquisition of supplies from the remaining 
European powers. To encourage this assistance the Indians used rumour. A letter from the 
Creek leader Alexander McGillivray (a close ally of the Chickamauga) to Arturo O’Neil, the 
Governor of Pensecola, reminded the Spanish that the Indians of the southeast were ‘a 
great check on the States in preventing their ambitious designs of possessing themselves of 
all the western lands’.600 In emphasising the role that the Indians played in holding back 
American expansionism McGillivray hoped to draw on Spanish concerns about their 
rapacious neighbours to the east in order to gain tacit Spanish support for a pan-Indian 
alliance. This alliance would, at least in theory, offer the Spanish a buffer against the 
expanding United States. 
 
But this method of diplomacy, with its use of careful innuendo playing upon the concerns 
of white Americans or Europeans, was not successful for dealing with the waves of settlers 
who pushed west in search of new lands. Rumour could not work as a strategy if the other 
side would not talk to you. The fate of several of the more accommodating headmen of the 
southeast offered a clear demonstration of how the landscape had changed. Among the 
Cherokees in the years after the war, Old Tassel had become the most influential voice for 
a policy of negotiation with the Americans. In 1788 following a succession of disputed 
treaties, raids and retaliations, a group of militia from the putative state of Franklin invaded 
the Cherokee towns. Old Tassel, hoping to diffuse the situation, met the militia at the town 
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of Chilhowee. A militia captain unceremoniously killed him with a tomahawk.601  A similar 
fate had befallen the Shawnee neutralist Malunthy two years earlier.602 
 
Among white settlers, rumours and fears about Indians continued to abound. Tales of the 
cruelty of Indians towards captured whites had existed since the colonial era and the 
captivity narrative became an important genre in early American literature.603 The 
nineteenth century overland migrations in particular pulsated with rumours about the 
danger of attacks by Indians. Rumours of Indian cruelty remained current throughout the 
nineteenth century. A former settler described her feelings in 1895 on going to live with 
her father who had married a Choctaw Indian: ‘I was absolutely scared to death. I didn’t 
expect anything else but to be scalped if Dad got out of my sight’.604 Clearly these rumours 
still had the power to inspire genuine panic. 
 
The continuing presence of rumour on all sides in North America does beg the question, 
would the changes that occurred in Anglo-Cherokee relations have happened regardless of 
the tensions and pressures caused by rumour? Was the surge in immigration into the 
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backcountry of South Carolina between the Seven Years War and the Revolution too great 
for rumour to matter? That the tensions caused by competition over resources were key to 
increased hostility between Anglo-Americans and Cherokees is certainly true. But rumour 
created the context in which Anglo-Americans and Cherokees came to fear one another, 
although the levels of hostility which came to exist between settlers and Indians were not 
caused by the pressure of demographics alone.  Rumour and the assumptions of hostility 
that followed it were central to the estrangement between the British and the Cherokees. 
More importantly, rumour was the mechanism through which the British and Cherokees 
found out about one another. Rumour was the medium through which most colonists 
gained their first picture of the Cherokees. Even those colonists who went on to have close 
personal involvement with the Cherokees, or indeed with other Indian groups, would have 
heard tales of the Indians long before they encountered them face to face. Rumours 
affected the decisions that individuals made and the strategies they pursued.  
 
The role of rumour in the relationship between the Cherokees and the British shifted 
significantly over the course of the eighteenth century. From the early eighteenth century 
the British saw the Cherokees as relatively reliable allies. There were certainly colourful, 
bloodcurdling rumours circulating about some of the south-eastern tribes. Rumours of 
cannibal Indians in Florida circulated in British North America for decades and as late as the 
1750s a ship’s captain was so panicked by the idea that he might be eaten by Florida 
Indians that he abandoned his ship.605 Despite the continuing presence of debilitating 
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rumours in Native American-European American relations, Cherokees were feted by British 
leaders during the Yamasee War and Cherokee warriors fought as allies of the British in the 
wars of the 1740s. For the British south-eastern colonies the greatest source of fear and 
rumour was the threat posed by large numbers of slaves living among them, not fear of 
Indian attack. The other great threats to the British colonies in the early to mid-eighteenth 
century were Britain’s imperial rivals, the French and Spanish. These ancient enemies were 
seen as constantly searching for an opportunity to isolate and destroy the British 
colonies.606 
 
When Indians were seen as a threat by the British at this time it was generally in 
conjunction with one of these two groups. It was thought that the Indians (including the 
Cherokees) might, if given the chance, plot against the British as part of a coalition with the 
French and Spanish or make common cause with the colonies’ slave population. These 
rumours appeared repeatedly in the colonial press and in the correspondence of British 
officials with their contacts. In many ways Indians were seen as the least dangerous of 
these groups, although their alliance with slaves or Europeans was seen as potentially fatal 
to British ambitions in the region. Indeed, Indians, if they could be co-opted to the colonies’ 
purposes were at times seen as a potential answer to the problem of slave runaways and 
foreign invasion. This is not to say that the Cherokees and Indians in general were not a 
source of concern for the south-eastern colonies. Indeed the basis of all the later rumours 
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about Cherokees which became widespread in the colonies in the later eighteenth century 
can be seen as early as the 1740s.607 
 
By the 1750s the Cherokees had begun to take on a more prominent role in the concerns of 
the colonists. Settlers had pushed into the lands around Saxe Gotha and Ninety Six and 
were increasingly threatening the lands of the Cherokees. More dangerously they were 
setting up home on lands which had long been a crossing point for Indian groups both in 
war and peace, exposing the new arrivals to assault by passing war parties. The Cherokees 
were beginning to appear regularly in the communications of British officials by the late 
1740s and violence in the backcountry became a major concern for those officials like 
James Glen who hoped to build a strong British presence in the interior.  Once again the 
most fearful rumour among the British was that the Cherokees were conspiring with others 
against British interests. By the 1750s the Cherokees were suspected of co-operating with 
northern Indians to attack the Catawbas and this increasingly came to be seen as a threat 
to British settlers themselves. In 1751 a panic over the possibility of a Cherokee attack 
pushed South Carolina close to a war with the Cherokees.  At the same time rumours began 
to increasingly circulate among the Cherokee that the British were a threat to them. The 
increasing presence of British settlers in Cherokee territory was adding to rumours that the 
British were plotting with the Cherokees’ enemies to attack them. These problems were 
exacerbated by actual clashes between settlers and Indians. 
 
Still, as the first shots of the Seven Years War were fired in the Ohio country British-
Cherokee relations still had an appearance of peace. The south-eastern colonies 
represented a relatively safe environment for British settlers and as French-allied Indians 
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ravaged the backcountry of Pennsylvania and Virginia many settlers moved south in search 
of peace. But the relative peace in the south-east during the Seven Years War did not mean 
that tensions were not building between Cherokees and the British. The on-going clashes 
between British settlers and Indian parties raised tensions in the backcountry. These 
tensions became critical with the killing of several Cherokees in Virginia as they were 
returning from fighting as allies of the British. 
 
It is also important in this instance to acknowledge the impact of personalities. These 
problems were only exacerbated by the behaviour of British leaders. At the national level 
senior British commanders, most notably General Forbes, deeply offended his Cherokee 
allies with his highhanded and dictatorial treatment most clearly seen in the diplomatic 
incident that occurred when Attakullakulla attempted to depart from the Forbes expedition 
of 1759. At a more local level, the criminal behaviour of officers at Fort Prince George led 
by Lieutenant Coytmore continually reminded Lower Cherokees about the attitude of many 
whites towards them. In 1758 and 1759, as tensions escalated between the British and the 
Cherokees Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina is the primary example of the problems 
caused by individual personalities. Lyttelton fervently hoped for an opportunity to win glory 
for himself and the colony and was quite willing to believe the rumours of Cherokee 
hostility which reached Charlestown. This had an important impact on the course of events 
in the 1750s. This was true of relatively marginal figures in the backcountry. Throughout 
the 1750s illegal traders were known to be operating in Cherokee country and were 
responsible for the spreading of a number of rumours which caused great alarm amongst 
the Cherokees and added to the general atmosphere of mistrust in the backcountry. From 
the British perspective the activities of French and Creek delegates among the Cherokees 
(and particularly the apparent receptiveness of some Cherokees to these overtures) once 
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again raised the spectre of a conspiracy being hatched against them by a combination of 
American Indian and European enemies.  
 
As the events of the Cherokee War showed, rumour offered a form of considerable power 
even to individuals outside the traditional hierarchies either of the British or Cherokee 
establishments. Traders and packhorsemen, who would never normally have been given 
admittance to the corridors of power, were able to develop considerable expertise and 
authority as intercultural brokers and purveyors of information. The official record often 
minimised or disparaged the importance of these individuals. But despite the hostility of 
many British officials towards these marginal figures, officials were regularly (and to their 
clear chagrin) forced to defer to packhorsemen, hunters and even women in their search 
for information on events in the backcountry. While the importance of women in Cherokee 
society was derided by many white observers as a sign of degeneracy and ‘petticoat 
government’ it was a reality that British agents in Indian country had to accept.608Rumour 
was a form of power which individuals, white or Indian, at all levels of society, could access. 
The reaction of individuals, particularly leaders, to rumours also mattered greatly. Those 
who understood the power of rumour did their utmost to control and channel its effects. 
Those who did not could react in haste and panic, exacerbating the damage that those 
rumours could do. 
 
With the outbreak of war rumour became key to the strategies of both sides. The terror 
caused by rumours of Cherokee attacks was instrumental in clearing the backcountry and 
driving South Carolinian settlement back towards the sea. The question of what was 
actually happening in the remaining British outposts in Cherokee country was of utmost 
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importance to South Carolinian colonists as South Carolina sought to stem the tide of 
attacks and retaliate against the Cherokees. As the war drew to a close the question of 
whether the parties could trust one another became critical to bringing the violence to an 
end. 
 
In the aftermath of the war both the Cherokee and the British struggled to re-establish the 
precarious equilibrium which had existed in the backcountry. South Carolina, heavily 
damaged by Cherokee raids and unable to extract a resounding military victory from the 
war, sought desperately to find an understanding of the war and its outcome which 
allowed South Carolinians to maintain a sense of pride. This re-assessment of the war 
became all the more critical as some in South Carolina began to feel that they were 
belittled and derided by the British hierarchy. In order to counter this concern, the question 
of what had actually happened during the war became central. Defenders and detractors of 
the role of the colony in the war wrangled long after the fighting had ceased. They fought 
to decide whether the colonial militia (and by extension the men of the colony in general) 
had played an honourable role in upholding the sovereignty of the British Empire or 
whether they had been merely an appendage of the British forces. This competition was 
primarily one of information and insinuation, the opposing sides argued vehemently over 
the relative reliability of their respective narratives and the main aim was to control the 
public discourse over the events of the war and how they were perceived.  
 
On the Cherokee side of the backcountry the Indians also struggled to re-establish their 
society. Faced with devastation caused by invading whites, deadly epidemics of disease and 
on-going wars with their American Indian neighbours the situation for the Cherokees was 
decidedly rocky. Faced with repeated attacks by other Indian groups the Cherokees sought 
a number of remedies. Initially several Cherokee leaders tried to fight their enemies 
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directly. While a number of Cherokee war parties did go against the Iroquois and Shawnees 
who had been attacking them the campaigns were unsuccessful. In response to this the 
Cherokees began to engage more actively in intertribal diplomacy, a decision that would 
have important implications for the development of rumour in the years to come.  
 
There were also major changes in the way that the British imperial hierarchy organised 
their operations in the colonies. Foremost among these was the appointment of the 
Superintendents for Indian Affairs, providing a central point for the gathering and 
distribution of information on Indian affairs in British North America. While the 
Superintendents did not subsume other sources of information in the backcountry or the 
colonies they did provide a central focus for that information and a first point of call for 
British officials looking for information. The early 1770s saw the emergence of British fears 
that several Indian nations were combining against British interests in North America. The 
actions of Cherokee diplomats, exchanging belts, meeting with envoys and in particular 
doing so outside the view of British officials caused a great deal of anxiety amongst British 
officials. For the British the gaps in their knowledge were the most fearful aspect of these 
events and they filled those with images of large scale conspiracies between Indian nations 
stretching throughout North America. 
 
As the relationship between the British hierarchy and a significant number of their 
American subjects became increasingly confrontational, the myriad fears afflicting colonists 
in the south east began once again to coalesce around the idea of conspiracy. Slave 
owners, ever wary of an uprising by their slaves and backcountry settlers and speculators 
nervously watching the actions of the Cherokees and other Indian peoples very quickly 
came to see the hand of the British government behind a myriad of threats.  
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Equally among the Cherokees there was an increasing fear of the danger represented by 
continuing British expansion. This fear became a particular source of friction between the 
older headmen who advocated negotiated management of British demands and a younger 
generation of men who had seen their hunting lands increasingly encroached upon and 
who had begun to feel that their only hope lay in violent resistance. Ironically given the 
fears of British officials throughout the early 1770s it was the young men who were in the 
closest contact with other Indian peoples, with the Iroquois and the Shawnee in particular. 
This contact was an important factor in convincing the young men led by Dragging Canoe 
that a military resistance was a viable alternative to the careful diplomatic game that their 
elders had played for the previous decade. It was the arrival of northern Indian 
representatives advocating war and carrying rumours of the widespread support for the 
British in the north that gave Dragging Canoe the authority he needed to lead a significant 
proportion of the Cherokee people to war against the Patriots. 
 
The War of Independence marked an important break in the relationship between the 
Cherokees and the inhabitants of what had been the British south eastern colonies. The 
violence of the war and the overtly confrontational attitude of many Americans towards 
the Cherokees, as the North Carolina delegates to the Continental Congress put it, there 
was a strong desire ‘to extinguish the very race of them and scarce to leave enough of their 
existence to be a vestige in proof that a Cherokee nation once was [for that] would perhaps 
be no more than the blood of our slaughtered countrymen might call for’.609 Nevertheless 
these dramatic disruptions to the relationship were only a part of a more gradual 
deterioration of relations between the Cherokees and British, a continuing process of 
mistrust and conflicting interests which both heightened fears between the two peoples 
and led to actual violence.  
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Besides damaging the Cherokee-British relationship this deterioration also represented an 
important factor in South Carolina’s path towards rebellion. The rumours which had 
circulated throughout the colonial era provided the basis of the conspiracy theories which 
became such an important part of the Patriot campaign in the colony. South Carolina 
rebelled, in part, because the colony had for so long had a deep seated fear of the kind of 
conspiracy that the Patriots were talking about. The Cherokee War, rather than bringing 
the colony closer to the empire, heightened Carolinian concerns about an imperial edifice 
that did not seem to value or respect their contribution. As Revolutionary sentiment and 
the British response began to spread into the Southern colonies, it was no great leap for 
Patriots to see the hand of conspiracy in the actions of British officials. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Rumour laced like a spider’s web throughout the eighteenth century relationship between 
the Cherokees and the British. The decentralised political makeup of the Cherokee Nation 
and the interweaving of clan and town loyalties which held the Cherokees together offered 
fertile ground for the spread of rumour between the inhabitants of the Cherokee country. 
Equally the British settlements in the backcountry were a hotbed of rumour where 
information was an important resource. This finding ties in with much of the work that has 
been done on rumour and communication. The networks of communication that groups 
and individuals created for themselves in the Cherokee backcountry share many 
characteristics with networks that have been unearthed in other parts of North America 
and with the networks that held together the trading relationships of the early modern 
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Atlantic.610 At the same time rumour in this environment often had a dramatic impact not 
unlike that seen in other times and regions.611 
 
This thesis has traced the role of rumour and gossip through the relationship between the 
British and the Cherokees. Rumour was ephemeral, opaque and often overlooked. 
Nevertheless it was critical, an undercurrent in all dealings between the two peoples. In 
this thesis I have argued that rumour in the backcountry had two broad roles. First there 
was intended rumour, the wilful attempt to control and manipulate the flow of information 
between groups and individuals. This was used by a diverse range of figures in the 
backcountry to further their own ends, from colonial governors to rogue traders. British, 
French and Spanish officials used it to sow mistrust among the Cherokees as with the 
French warning to a group of Cherokee headmen that travelling to Charlestown to meet 
with the South Carolina governor would lead to their deaths.612 Indian headmen used 
similar tactics in their negotiations, for example the Cherokee headman Judges Friend 
attempted to throw suspicion onto other factions within the Nation declaring that he ‘does 
not know but all the Over Hills Towns may join the French’.613Rumour was a tool of 
diplomacy and a way to achieve particular aims. 
 
There was, however, another aspect of rumour that often subsumed this constructed, 
propaganda style form. Rumour could be an uncontrollable force in colonial discourse. The 
fears that allowed some individuals to deliberately spread rumours were real. British 
officials genuinely did fear the possibility of a conspiracy between Cherokees, slaves and 
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the French, Cherokees did believe that the British military might attempt to enslave them. 
These fears could carry rumour beyond the control of the most experienced backcountry 
diplomat. It was in this guise that rumour most directly took on the characteristics of 
‘improvised news’ described by Shibutani.  
 
Shibutani’s conception of rumour as a collective method of understanding events is 
extremely useful in this context, capturing as it does the attempts by individuals and groups 
to shape rumour and understanding. But within the colonial backcountry rumours passed 
between different groups with different understandings and needs. The meanings that 
different groups attached to events could have dramatic effects. At the outbreak of the 
War of 1759, for example, when General Forbes seized Attakullakulla for leaving his 
expedition in 1759 he and many British officials viewed his action as the legitimate capture 
of a deserter who had left his post. But to the Cherokees this was an event not just of 
military procedure but the first stages in the British plan to make ‘slaves’ of them. The 
Cherokee martial culture allowed warriors who no longer had faith in the leader of an 
expedition to depart without sanction and the British attitude that those who left a military 
operation without leave were criminals made no sense to the Cherokees. Faced with this 
strange and alarming prospect it is logical that the Cherokees turned to an explanation 
which did fit in with an understanding that they held, namely that the British wished to 
confine them and make ‘slaves’ of them.   
 
The key addition that a study of the colonial backcountry makes to this model is the 
understanding that these groups could not and did not exist in isolation. While it is 
important to understand the very real barriers to communication between the British and 
Cherokees significant amounts of information were passed both consciously and 
unconsciously between the different groups. Colonial leaders sourced information from 
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among others, Indian travellers, Indian women and traders who had lived for decades 
among the Indians. Equally Cherokee headmen turned for information to white traders and 
colonial officials. Was the trust of these sources absolute? Certainly not. Still, Cherokee and 
colonial leaders would not have consulted individuals with connections in both cultures if 
they did not view them as the most trustworthy sources of information available.  
 
The networks of rumour that existed throughout the Cherokee-British backcountry spread 
far and wide throughout North America. An increasing corpus of scholarship makes clear 
that rumour was an important part of political and social life in American Indian societies 
from the Hudson Valley to the Gulf of Mexico.614 Similar tensions to those that shaped 
events in Hiwasee and Ninety Six, also drove events in the Iroquois town of Onondaga and 
the Creek town of Coweta. The landscape that rumour brings to light is one in which 
American Indians were trying to understand a world which was changing at an alarming 
pace. Rumour was a tool for achieving this. 
 
Rumour can add to our understanding of the processes of knowledge transmission in the 
eighteenth century Atlantic. The question of who had the authority to speak on matters of 
intercultural diplomacy was highly charged. Historians of science in the early modern world 
and the eighteenth century Atlantic have increasingly come to the conclusion that the 
process of knowledge creation and dissemination was shaped by the cultural and discursive 
contexts which surrounded it, that knowledge was a highly contested and constantly 
negotiated process.615 A study of rumour makes clear that these process applies equally to 
the passage of As this study has seen, senior colonial leaders sought to use their positions 
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of power to control the information that passed between Cherokees and Britons. Colonial 
leaders monitored the rumours that were spread in their colonies and on occasion 
attempted to quash the publication of those rumours. Yet the paradox was that these 
leaders were forced to rely for much of their own information on reports from individuals 
who they considered far beneath them. A study of rumour in the eighteenth century 
backcountry offers an example of continously negotiated and contested systems of 
knowledge and information. British-American leaders tried to maintain the ideal of trust 
and understanding among gentlemen as the ultimate arbiter of truth as Shapin discribed. 
This ideal ran up against the reality of life in the colonies and in the backcountry. 
Underpinning official networks passing rumour between gentlemen and leaders were much 
larger networks of informants and individuals with significant knowledge and power upon 
whom elite groups relied for information and that these networks and the veracity of the 
information they carried were highly contested. 
 
A discussion of rumour can also trace the ups and downs in an intercultural relationship. 
The interactions between the British and the Cherokees through the second half of the 
eighteenth century show a general trend towards greater tension. The levels of this tension 
varied, rising and falling with acts of violence committed or agreements of friendship made. 
Overall though, the story is one of the slow collapse of a diplomatic, economic and social 
relationship. In the 1770s and 1780s relationships like these were collapsing throughout 
eastern North America.616 
 
Rumour was a vital strand within the political and social processes of the colonial 
backcountry and an important consideration any leader, Cherokee or British, had to work 
with. A study of rumour reveals the steadily degrading state of relations between the 
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British and Cherokee over the course of the colonial era. Rumour was both a resource 
which could be used and an unpredictable danger that had to be managed. Over the course 
of the colonial era there were those who were able to use rumour as a tool and those who 
were not. As the pressures on the Cherokee-British relationship grew however, rumour 
ceased to be a manageable aspect of backcountry life and became a force which would 
separate Cherokees and whites from one another for well over a century. 
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